A Jus Post Bellum Analysis of Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Assessing the Importance of Human Interaction and Moral Repair to Peace by Arnott, Stephen M
 
A Jus Post Bellum Analysis of Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons: Assessing the 
Importance of Human Interaction and Moral 
Repair to Peace 
 
 
 
Stephen Mark Arnott 
 
 
 
MA by Research 
 
 
 
University of York 
 
Politics 
 
July 2017 
 
 
 
 
A Jus Post Bellum Analysis of Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
The future development of lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) presents a 
significant shift in the way that war is conducted. The present debates 
surrounding the ethicality of implementing LAWs focus on a broad spectrum of 
concerns, yet currently fails to address the impact these weapons have on 
securing peace. As such, this paper rests within a jus post bellum framework, 
seeking to address how the implementation of LAWs affects the procurement 
of peace. This paper looks at the relational mechanisms of achieving peace, 
insofar as it is a product of human interaction and relational processes, and 
settles on two themes; the factors within war related to human action and 
interaction – collective experience, recognition of humanity, and the exhibition 
of mercy – and the factors after war related to moral repair –forgiveness, 
reconciliation, and truth telling. Through historical examples of human 
interaction, and a normative enquiry into the demands of repair, this paper 
finds that LAWs have a detrimental effect on the current methods of securing 
peace insofar as they are incapable of replicating avenues which humans 
currently participate in. As such, this paper highlights the trade-off between 
measures to prevent suffering and the necessity of moral repair, and 
contributes to the literature on jus post bellum more broadly by demonstrating 
the importance of repair post-conflict which has thus far been omitted. 
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Introduction 
 
The development of lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) presents a significant challenge to 
the way war is currently waged, and threatens to create a new paradigm due to the 
advancement of artificial intelligence (AI). Discussions have begun taking shape throughout 
a number of disciplines on the ethical challenges and benefits of LAWs. To date, many of 
the present discussions taking place concern the immediate benefits or shortcomings of 
LAWs, that is to say, what they bring to war in and of themselves. However, this paper 
focuses on the consequences of implementing LAWs, looking at the utility of human 
combatant behaviour in bringing about peace, both in actions during war and after, and 
asks; Do humans possess capabilities that are conducive to peace which cannot be 
replicated by LAWs? And if so, does this question the ethical permissibility of LAWs given 
the benefits to preventative suffering that they have the potential to generate? 
This paper looks specifically at relational aspects of peace, addressing the different ways 
and manifestations of how human interaction and recognition develops the conditions for 
sustainable peace. That is not to say that I view AI within LAWs to be fatally flawed, but 
rather I see the development of peace to be a product, in many cases, of human interaction 
and relational processes which cannot be replicated by LAWs given their non-
anthropomorphic nature. 
Much of the current advocacy for LAWs focuses on the advent of technology allowing for 
ethical outcomes at least as consistent as humans combatants currently are. For this paper, 
the ethicality of LAWs is accepted since this does not affect the judgment I place upon 
them in relation to peace. However, if LAWs are more ethical than humans, then could they 
not calculate (in the same way as proportionality calculations) the likelihood of actions 
conducive to peace? This is a legitimate concern that needs to be settled before I begin. 
This paper seeks to address this question by looking at two areas which are separated from 
ends determined by proportionality. By focusing mostly on the outcomes produced by 
human interaction, this replaces the need to calculate the probable and necessary 
outcomes which are conducive to peace, and is thus instead reliant on something external 
to LAWs that is achieved cooperatively as opposed to unilaterally.  
I begin this paper by outlining the reasons for conceptualising autonomous weapons 
specifically as ‘lethal autonomous weapons’ in chapter 1, how I define machine autonomy 
in chapter 2, the various properties of LAWs which we can envisage them possessing in 
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chapter 3, reasons for the future implementation of LAWs in chapter 4, and in chapter 5 I 
outline the existing arguments relating to LAWs and show why those perspectives are 
unaware of the arguments I make here.      
 This paper is situated within a framework of jus post bellum and wider just war 
theory – that for a war to be just it must be fought for peace first and foremost – and 
therefore I dedicate chapter 6 to developing the current ideas and debates within jus post 
bellum theory, and respond to some of the criticisms of the view I take herein. I accept the 
dependence approach in arguing that all actions within an ethically permissible war must 
be directed towards the ends of peace. As such, I justify my post bellum assessment of a 
largely in bello process – the weapon itself – by requiring its actions to be conducive to 
peace as is the only ethically permissible use of weapons in warfare. 
Using both case studies and a theoretical enquiry into the existing capabilities of human 
combatants compared with the perceived and hypothesised capabilities of LAWs, this 
paper settles on two distinct areas. 
I focus on behaviour exhibited during war, looking at the role of human action and 
interaction within war, giving rise to the anthropomorphic properties of such avenues for 
peace.           
 Chapter 7 looks at the role of experience within and outside of combat, and 
highlights such manifestations through historical examples. I perceive such experience to 
act as a deterrent to the emergence of war enthusiasm and an important transgression to 
the obscuring ‘Myth of the War Experience’, and show that the experience of war has the 
potential to motivate us against unnecessary suffering. I also address the way that war can 
be reformed against these effects as a result of experience.    
 Chapter 8 looks at the way the recognition of humanity affects our perspective of 
the enemy, through fraternization, the recognition of humanity in the enemy as a limiter 
on unethical acts, and the detrimental effect that dehumanizing the enemy has on 
psychological health and unethical behaviour. The recognition of humanity is drawn from 
our own, and thus the ability to empathise from an equal position is a catalyst for such 
processes.         
 Chapter 9 addresses the role of martial virtues, and argues that the virtue of mercy 
is unique in its bilateral benefit through traversing the combatant divide of friend and foe, 
and has a role to play in the act of surrender too. Since mercy is motivated by the 
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importance placed in the offender’s wellbeing, we can perceive that LAWs would have 
difficulty replacing such actions.  
I am also concerned with actions post-war, and explore the necessity of moral repair and its 
utility to sustainable peace. Given wrongs committed during war, combatants have the 
obligation as perpetrators of wrong, to repair those damaged relationships. This part 
explores the reparative processes of; forgiveness as an interpersonal process of moral 
repair in chapter 11; reconciliation as a broader process of repair involving both parties but 
often facilitated through a third in chapter 12; and truth telling as a process possessing 
both intrinsic and instrumental value to the pursuit of peace in chapter 13.   
Through a normative enquiry into their conditions and processes, these chapters 
collectively find that each are necessary in different contexts of moral repair to the 
securing of sustainable peace, and also to the sorts of instrumental level repair described 
frequently in the literature on jus post bellum. The requirements for accountability 
mechanisms arising from victims, the demands of justice, the recognition of wrongdoing, 
and the development of meaningful acknowledgement of the views in each of these 
processes, concludes that LAWs as wrongdoers are unable to bring about the needs of 
moral repair.  
Although the determinations within this paper on the ethicality of LAWs do not attempt to 
be sufficient arguments against their use, its utility is instead found in questioning the sorts 
of actions expected of actors post-conflict, and highlighting that the changes we make to 
the agents who fight have ramifications upon the sorts of peace processes we can expect to 
bring about. It is my hope in this paper that I satisfy the claims mentioned above, and 
additionally show that since humanity and moral repair are fundamental aspects of conflict 
resolution, the inability of LAWs to act conductively to such ends places doubt on their 
ethicality.           
 In so doing, this is not a condemnation of LAWs, but rather serves to highlight their 
inadequacy at carrying out important roles post-conflict that are conducive to peace. It is 
thus up to the individual as to whether these shortcomings are sufficient enough, or rather 
we place enough value in such actions being carried out to make a judgment on the 
eventual use of LAWs within war. 
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Part 1: Lethal Autonomous Weapons: An Overview 
 
The speculative nature of LAWs requires as much explanation as possible in order for a 
coherent argument to be formed within this paper. As such, this part is dedicated to 
settling a number of uncertainties related to the future prospect of LAWs. I begin by 
outlining my chosen terminology and justifying it in relation to other potential and often 
used alternatives, before highlighting some of the properties I envisage LAWs to possess for 
technological reasons and military necessity. Additionally, I attempt to understand the 
reasons we might envisage for the subsequent implementation of LAWs from the 
perspective of the military, the political sphere, as well as technological pressures too. This 
part also outlines the existing debates and discussions surrounding the ethical challenges 
that LAWs bring, and therefore plays a role in showing the originality of the approach this 
paper takes. The following chapters aim to set the scene with regards to the arguments I 
make throughout, and satisfy some of the concerns and difficulties raised in focusing a 
normative enquiry on highly speculative and early-development technology. 
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1. Framing the Debate: Why ‘LAWs’? 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will be describing ‘lethal autonomous weapons’ (LAWs) as 
weapon systems that are capable of self-propulsion and independent assessments of 
external situations and environments, and importantly are able to target and use lethal 
force without human interaction. The exception to this is that the broad mission command 
would be directed by human decision. Although suggestions have been made to keep 
humans ‘on-the-loop’ in order to act as a final check on the actions of LAWs through mere 
supervision or veto power (Singer, 2010), this has the potential to limit the independent 
and beneficial characteristics of robotic weapons in the long run. As such, the linguistic 
characterisation of robotic weapons serves as a reminder of challenges faced when 
attempting to conceptualise new weapon technologies.  
There is no accepted consensus on how such weapons should be framed, with a range of 
possible terms associated with the same sorts of weapons. For example, such new weapon 
technologies have been termed; unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs (Strawser, 2010; Kreps 
and Kaag, 2012; Gregory, 2011), unmanned combat aerial vehicles (Beard, 2014), 
autonomous weapon systems (Sparrow, 2007; Hammond, 2015; Schulzke, 2013; Asaro, 
2012; Klincewicz, 2015; Thomas, 2015), autonomous weapons (Walsh, 2015; Johnson and 
Axinn, 2013; Guetelin, 2005; Hauptman, 2013), drones (Buchanan and Keohane, 2015; Dill, 
2015; Whetham, 2015), lethal autonomous systems (Swiatek, 2012), autonomous robots 
(Sharkey, 2009), autonomous lethal robot systems (Tonkens, 2013), and fully autonomous 
robots (Simpson, 2011). This can lead to a subtle but important difference between 
theorists who have contributed arguments to the wider debate concerning the use of 
robotic weapons in war. 
I have chosen to use the term ‘lethal autonomous weapons’ (LAWs), owed to a number of 
differences I have with other potential conceptions. For one important reason, it highlights 
the lethal capability of such weapons which UAVs or autonomous robots do not explicitly 
mention. There are different ethical concerns between the use of UAVs for surveillance and 
reconnaissance, and those with lethal capabilities. As such, it is important to direct our 
inquiry towards the morally problematic use of lethal force, and whether this is 
permissible.           
 By providing reference to ‘autonomous weapons’ in my conception, I differentiate 
between current deployed UAVs such as the Predator and Reaper drones, and thus intend 
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to distinguish  the sorts of ethical concerns which abound through the introduction of 
autonomous features, rather than remotely controlled UAVs. Although there are a number 
of weapons being deployed with increasing levels of autonomy, it is important to stress the 
difference between the autonomous capacity to move, and the autonomous capacity to 
use lethal force, which is inherent in a conception of ‘LAWs’.  
I am also cautious to use the term fully autonomous weapons as the continuum of 
autonomy is broad and ambiguous. Restricting our conception of weapons capability 
through the terminology we use is not helpful to future debates concerning the permissible 
use of LAWs. Therefore, I choose to omit the term fully autonomous from my account of 
the broad spectrum of new weapon technologies, as they will invariably incorporate 
varying degrees of autonomy, with similar ramifications to the arguments I make within 
this paper.  
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2. Defining Machine Autonomy 
 
It is vitally important to recognise what we mean by the term autonomy. Autonomy is a 
philosophical concept which has been a contested subject and the topic of significant 
disagreements. Although not entirely different, autonomy in machines is often 
characterised as a lesser autonomy than that possessed by humans, and provides a 
foundational view of how we conceive of possible actions deriving from LAWS.  
Those who see autonomy as an anthropomorphic concept argue that machines are 
required to directly replicate human cognitive capacities (Corn, 2014); that autonomy 
requires the possession of “certain forms of normative competence or self-reflexive 
normative attitudes” (Piper, 2012, p.317); and that “increasingly autonomous robots 
requires little further explanation beyond referring to the corresponding human capacities” 
(Noorman and Johnson, 2014, p.52).  However these conceptions ignore the grey area 
between direct human control  - whereby such machines could be termed ‘semi-
autonomous’ depending on their limited capacity to carry out tasks - and autonomy that 
actually replicates human capacities.      
 Alternatively some definitions conceptualise autonomy as a fluid property rather 
than an absolute one, such that various machines are situated on a continuum (Asaro, 
2008), a spectrum (Sparrow, 2016), stages of ‘scripted’, ‘supervised’, or ‘intelligent’ areas 
(Sharkey, 2008), or degrees of ‘autonomous power’ (Hellström, 2013), highlighting the way 
we can conceptualise autonomy within different machines. 
However, there are minimalist perspectives which see autonomy as; consisting of 
independent decision-making free from external human influences (Thomas, 2015); the 
separation from direct human control in both decision-making and use of lethal force 
(Asaro, 2012); the ability to simply act independently (Department of Defense, 2012; Riza, 
2014); or that machines merely need to be able to pursue their own agenda (Franklin and 
Graesser, 1997). It is these sorts of conceptions that I see as providing the most pragmatic 
utility for the discussions to come. I will proceed with a conception of autonomy that 
demands the very basic levels of independent decision-making. Although I concede that 
autonomy exists on a spectrum, only a limited conception of autonomy is necessary for the 
success of the arguments laid out in this paper. Lin et al. (2008) summarise this best, in that 
machine autonomy means “[t]he capacity to operate in the real-world environment 
without any form of external control, once the machine is activated and at least in some 
areas of operation, for extended period of time” (p.4). For my arguments here on in, one 
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must merely concede that LAWs are capable of acting on their own – insofar as they 
internalise decision-making processes – in targeting and use of lethal force.  
Although my arguments only require the basic level of autonomy consisting of independent 
decision making, one may stretch the concept of autonomy in machines to necessitate the 
advent of moral autonomy. I see the necessity of moral autonomy in military robots to be 
in conflict with military necessity, given that the threat posed by moral autonomy to 
efficiency and mission success is questionable due to the contingent moral awareness of 
ones actions. As such, my settlement on a limited conception of autonomy is grounded in 
military necessity for the aforementioned reasons of problematic moral awareness. 
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3. The Properties of LAWs 
 
It is important to outline some of the properties I envisage LAWs to possess based upon the 
current state of military technologies, and those proposed in available military documents. 
The nature of talking about LAWs that are yet to be implemented is highly speculative, and 
since this paper concerns an ethical enquiry on the effects of such properties, it is 
necessary to outline some of these in order to establish continuity herein. 
First, a likely property found within LAWs is the separation of intentional states between 
commander and machine as future weapons have the capacity to be too fast paced for 
effective human controlling. Singer (2010) argues that the role of humans-on-the-loop will 
consist of merely veto power given the degree of intelligence and rapid decision making 
within autonomous weapons. Furthermore, “research is finding that humans have a hard 
time controlling multiple units at once” (p.126), thus increasing the likelihood that 
functions will be outsourced and machines themselves will be trusted to make decisions 
within those areas. Former Army Colonel Thomas Adams argues that new weapons “will be 
too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an environment too complex for humans 
to direct” (Adams in Singer, 2010, p.128). For this reason, my conception of LAWs provides 
for the morally significant separation of intentional states between the mission commander 
and machine, given the unpredictability of the actions of LAWs.     
 Swiatek (2012) introduces the concept of biometric systems for target 
identification, which could be a possible technological innovation used within LAWs. 
However, he highlights that because of the contingent tolerance of error within future 
biometric systems (due to the necessity of both deterministic and probabilistic matches) 
there is a transgression of intentional killing. Given the advent of plausible target 
identification systems within LAWs, there exists a separation between who the commander 
intends to be targeted, and who is actually targeted. The difficulty in showing where and 
when the decisions were made, and when the mistakes were committed, leaves us open to 
the view that the machine is more responsible than the commander. This is because the 
mission commander possessed little to no control over the outcome and predictability of 
the machine itself. Importantly, “the decision to use lethal force will be based on 
probabilistic calculations and absolute certainty will not be possible” (Lin et al., 2008, p.22). 
Within these arguments, we can see that the future demands of technology separate the 
intentional states of the commander with the machines actions. This is important when we 
come to look at the obligations incumbent upon wrongdoers within situations of moral 
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repair, since blame must necessarily be situated with the machine, for the commander had 
no direct control over the harm caused. 
There is a second logical assessment we can make with regards to the sorts of capacities we 
expect LAWs to possess. I propose that LAWs will be programmed, out of military necessity, 
to be incapable of questioning orders they are given so long as they are in line with the 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This viewpoint can be 
broken down into two areas.        
 First, this corresponds to the second of Asimov’s Laws of Robotics (1985), modified 
by Clarke (1994) to state; “[a] robot must obey the orders given it by human beings, except 
where such orders would conflict with a high-order law” (p.61).  Although these laws have 
been discussed intensively since their introduction, this is a response to difficulties with the 
unpredictable nature of robots’ actions, and serves as an attempt to focus the direction of 
such actions towards human ends, rather than those of the robot itself, such that broad 
goals are set by humans and not left to the machine.     
  Second, this prohibition on the questioning of orders is in line with current military 
practices. “Following legitimate orders is clearly an essential tenet for military organizations 
to function, but if we permit robots to refuse an order, this may expand the circumstances 
in which human soldiers may refuse orders as well” (Lin et al. 2008, p.74). Thus, so long as 
the orders are in coherence with the machines programming (and in line with both ROE 
and LOAC), then the presumed ethical order cannot be refused, for purposes of both safety 
in retaining human control, and also to preserve functioning military organisations. The 
inability to refuse or question orders given to machines could be programmable, and as 
such has consequences for moral awareness insofar as machines would be incapable of 
assessing the morality of the orders they are given, and the subsequent morality of their 
actions. 
One final and important aspect of these hypothetical properties of LAWs is their ability to 
learn. Lin et al. (2008) argue, “it has become clear that robots cannot be programmed for 
all eventualities. This is partially true in military scenarios. Hence, the robot must learn the 
proper responses to given stimuli, and its performance should improve with practice” 
(p.20). This is also conducive to the more plausible strategy of ethical programming which 
takes the form of a bottom-up approach, rather than a top-down imposed set of ethical 
restrictions. The ability to act independently within the parameters of the ROE and LOAC is 
a military necessity in order to fully utilise the improved capacity of LAWs over human 
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combatants within warfare. As such, the internal processing will be done without humans 
in order to make use of the advanced speed within the machines decision making 
capacities, but equally require learning capabilities to apply these effects to broader 
situations than conceived of during initial programming.  
However, how do we reconcile the ability to learn with the aforementioned restrictions on 
refusing orders? First of all, these two properties are not evidently conflicting within human 
combatants, and so are not prima facie contradictory within machines. Second, the 
restriction on disobeying orders sets boundaries for LAWs to act within – the parameters of 
individual missions if you like. The specificity of orders will be altered, since the computing 
capacity to make (plausibly) better decisions based on information than humans can 
necessitates that LAWs are given freedom to achieve their full potential. However, the 
freedom to act within these parameters, which in this case can be equated with learning, is 
actually to the benefit of military necessity insofar as it remains under the control of 
humans. The actions of LAWs and ability to learn is thus only externally constrained by the 
boundaries of the mission itself, and therefore place to provide the best outcome possible. 
These properties of military robots help to clarify what LAWs might conceivably look like, 
and highlight the sorts of capabilities and advantages that LAWs allow within military 
organisations and their subsequent use in conflict. 
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4. The Advantages of LAWs 
 
Although this paper need not concern itself with ‘soldierless’ warfare per se, the following 
discussions rely on the premise that LAWs are likely to replace human combatants within 
varying contexts. Since the extent to which LAWs will be implemented is not immediately 
obvious, I will dedicate some space here to showing the sorts of technological pressures on 
both political and military decision-makers, and why the immediate short term benefits of 
LAWs are persuasive in justifying their eventual implementation on the battlefield.  
The technological advantages of LAWs place significant pressures within the military 
sphere; they would improve military efficiency, effectiveness, and be more environmentally 
friendly (Krishnan, 2009); be able to act, sense and decide quicker than humans (Barrett, 
2010); be faster, smarter and cheaper than human equivalents (Arkin, 2010; Guetelin, 
2005); provide greater freedom to act (Mayer, 2015); lower personnel costs and possess 
superior speed and strength on the battlefield (Hammond, 2015). The perceived 
advantages for a more efficient way of fighting conflicts are a persuasive endeavour and 
prima facie highlights little disadvantageous military costs to their use. 
 Additionally, there are pressures from within the current state of military affairs 
which encourage the use of LAWs. For example, the speed and tempo of modern warfare 
affects the supply and demand of technologies and their subsequent use (Anderson and 
Waxman, 2015), and the speed of modern weapons technologies and the necessity of 
gathering large amounts of data (Beard, 2014) are tasks only technology is capable of 
carrying out efficiently. The strategical pressures on the changing nature of conduct in 
warfare present further challenges to the development of new technologies. For example, 
the Revolution in Military Affairs that has accompanied the development of networked 
warfare has at its heart the robotics revolution (Singer, 2009), and networked warfare 
requires the assistance of more efficient technologies in order to function cogently (Niva, 
2013).Both arguments present a picture of how robots are expected to affect the way in 
which war is conducted. Although these are events that are yet to take place, it is clear that 
the direction of military technologies and robotics in general are becoming more 
sophisticated. 
Within the political sphere, the pressures upon decision-makers in resorting to war also 
increase the likelihood of implementing LAWs. There is an obligation incumbent upon 
those in power to protect their citizens and military from unnecessary risk, and also use the 
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most ethical means available in warfare. Furthermore, war is a costly venture, and the loss 
of life and consequent use of public resources for the ends of warfare are politically 
disadvantageous; not to mention that the reduced risk of LAWs aligns with an “increasingly 
casualty shy” western population (Sparrow, 2013, p.87) which places political pressures on 
their use (Davis, 2007). If other means are available to politicians and military leaders alike 
that would not only be more ethical but also more cost effective, then we can envisage 
such means being deployed over more precarious strategies that include human 
combatants. Similarly, the tentative shift towards ‘proxy warfare’ (Mumford, 2013) can 
include an incentive for using LAWs as the ‘proxy’, since political demands are met without 
incurring the human costs that are currently contingent to warfare.  
However, there are criticisms that emphasise a more limited or bilateral approach to the 
implementation of LAWS. A chief proponent of ethical autonomous weapons (insofar as 
they protect civilians better in war) is Ronald Arkin, who argues that they should be 
implemented “alongside soldiers not as a replacement. A human presence in the battlefield 
should be maintained” (2015, p.47). Although this may indeed be a preferable situation 
ethically, it ignores the short term appeal of LAWs in swaying decision-makers. Given that 
we are presuming that LAWs are capable of ethical behaviour as a condition for their 
implementation, it is both militarily advantageous and politically salient to deploy LAWs 
(where appropriate) in place of human combatants. 
I propose we envisage the deployment of LAWs over human combatants in a variety of 
areas as a presumption going forward, at least for the purposes of this paper. Besides, this 
hypothetical is not based upon distant science fiction, and is thus not out of the realm of 
future possibilities. Coker (2002) argues that; 
“[M]achines are threatening to make soldiers redundant, 
emeritus, and retired before their time. It has been happening for 
years. As computers have continued to provide faster, more 
comprehensive array of data, human operations have become 
more subordinate to machines than ever; as technology evolves, 
so have human actions” (p.172). 
Such a perspective affords us the opportunity to envisage changes to the way war is 
conducted and concluded, as well as to understand the indirect effects LAWs have beyond 
their immediate and persuasive short-term benefits. For this reason, I am neither 
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predicting nor advocating for a future soldierless paradigm of warfare. Rather, I am 
endeavouring to explore the anthropomorphic features of warfare, not merely the 
functions performed or outcomes achieved.  
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5. A Background on LAWs: The Current Debates 
 
In order to understand where the arguments of this paper contribute to the existing 
debates surrounding autonomous weapons, it is helpful to briefly outline the current state 
of the literature, as well as to offer my views on why, in some cases, the present arguments 
are insufficient. Within the existing body of literature surrounding weaponised robotics 
there are a number of themes explored including; responsibility, transmission of respect, 
and the relationship between LAWs and just war theory.  
5.1 Responsibility 
A significant area of the current discussion on the use of autonomous weapons consists of 
arguments pertaining to the “responsibility gap” (Matthias, 2004, p.175), such that the 
machines, programmers/manufactures, or military commanders are unable to be held 
accountable for the actions of LAWs (Sparrow, 2007). From a legal standpoint, the 
fulfilment of necessary intent and foreknowledge to actions taken (Rome Statute, 1998, 
Art.30) leads to neither programmer, manufacturers, or commander, from being held 
criminally responsible thus questioning the ability to hold such actors to account (Beard, 
2014; Egeland, 2016). A fundamental aspect regarding both ethical and legal accountability 
is whether the machine is capable of learning or not (Hellström, 2013); this will affect both 
its internal decision-making power and its subsequent unpredictability. From a 
technological perspective, Cummings (2004; 2006) emphasises the difficulty of moral 
buffers within interface design that could lead to a displacement of responsibility.  
 However, arguments to the contrary stress existing actors or processes that are 
able to accommodate for the actions of autonomous weapons (Schulzke, 2013; Noorman 
and Johnson, 2014); that the implementation of “fully autonomous weapons would not 
make it easier for leaders or designers to evade responsibility” (Walsh, 2015, p.5); that the 
state – as the decision-maker of implementing LAWs– could be held responsible 
(Hammond, 2015); or rather that this is not an important concern since a “devotion to 
individual criminal liability as the presumptive mechanism of accountability risks blocking 
development of machines that would, if successful, reduce actual harms to civilians on or 
near the battlefield”(Anderson and Waxman, 2012, p.12). 
The aforementioned advantages to LAWs make it difficult to envisage a human-on-the-loop 
implementation method, which would have otherwise reduced the responsibility gap as a 
level of human control is satisfactory to attribute responsibility to human actors (Schulzke, 
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2013; Noorman and Johnson, 2014; Arkin, 2008). Since the technological advantages of 
LAWs create a tolerance of error and measure of unpredictability, the responsibility gap 
indeed appears to be a worrisome product of deploying LAWs.  
For the arguments I make within this paper, it is my definition of autonomy which 
determines this issue. Importantly, the nature of LAW’s independent decision making 
threatens the attribution of responsibility, since stretching the application of ethical and 
legal responsibility to some agent other than the machine has the potential to create a 
precedent whereby, although LAW’s decisions are unpredictable, another agent is held 
responsible out of apparent convenience. The difficulty of responsibility attribution, as well 
as its complex nature and contextual necessity, is an issue I raise later on in my arguments 
on moral repair and the necessity of holding actions accountable. If one cannot be 
accountable to those they have wronged or committed harm towards, then to what extent 
does this threaten the imperative for responsibility within moral repair? 
5.2 Respect and Lethal Application of Force 
The outsourcing of lethal capabilities to AI is a contested subject too. By removing humans 
from the act of killing, it detracts from the transmission of respect between two human 
combatants, and transgresses moral beliefs concerning what constitutes the permissible 
use of force by failing to recognise the inherent dignity and respect owed to humans.  
 This perspective can be drawn from the second formulation of Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative (The Formula of Humanity), which dictates that humans are to be treated as 
ends in themselves and not simply a means to an end (Kant, 1959). This view is summarized 
by Norman (1995), who argues;  
“[W]hereas things, objects, have value because of their 
importance for persons, their place in people’s lives and projects, 
persons themselves, as the source of this value, possess not value 
but dignity and, as such, the appropriate response to them is one 
of respect” (p.10).  
Such value is inherent to humans by virtue of “their ability to act autonomously; their 
rational, morally autonomous humanity is thus what marks them as persons” (Rolf, 2012, 
p.596). 
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The arguments against lethal AI emphasise; the necessity of human decision-making 
(Johnson and Axinn, 2013; Bolton et al., 2012); the role of intention within the 
technologically contingent ‘tolerance of error’ (Swiatek, 2012); the effect of distance on the 
transmission of respect (Sparrow, 2016); the necessity of human reasoning (Sharkey, 2009); 
the instrumental role played by humans in the delivery of justice (Asaro, 2012); and that we 
have a normative obligation to be pacifists (Tonkens, 2013).     
 In addition, Klincewicz (2015) argues that the ‘frame problem’ – figuring out “what 
is relevant to possible lethal consequences in the situation at hand” (p.165, italics in 
original) – and the ‘representation problem’ – that LAWs have to “represent features of the 
world … [to] make it possible to engage in such searches” (p.166) of relevant possibilities – 
are barriers to outsourcing lethal application to LAWs as solutions leave open the 
possibility of external hacking.  Purves et al. (2015) see the inability to confer moral 
judgement to machines as a prohibiting factor. Since “moral deliberation is neither strictly 
rule like nor arbitrary, ‘programmed behaviour’ could never adequately replicate it” 
(p.858).  
Such arguments provide criticisms on the use of LAWs; however Jenkins and Purves (2016) 
reject such claims since LAWs are no less unique with regards to transmitting respect than 
weapon systems already in use, such as long-range missiles.  
For this paper, it is important to understand that respect would seemingly play an 
important role post-conflict, given that the more respectful one is in their use of lethal 
force the more an amicable post-conflict arena is likely to arise. However, it is my view that 
the lack of consistency on this matter throughout the literature highlights the current lack 
of emphasis we place on the transmission of respect in applying lethal force. As such, the 
following arguments I make throughout this paper, although grounded in an advocacy for 
respect and mutual recognition of humanity, is not dependent on ones perspective on this 
particular debate. Instead, I see the transmission of respect throughout the entirety of ones 
actions (to the extent that this can be accomplished within war) as a more fruitful 
endeavour, rather than focusing on the transmission of respect within the use of lethal 
force uniquely. The failure to account for respect as a necessary feature within warfare, 
beyond simply the use of force, is an area I address in the following arguments. 
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5.3 LAWs and Just War Theory 
In addition, the literature focuses on understanding whether LAWs are able to adhere to 
the ethical demands of discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination refers to the 
delineation between legitimate objectives and targets within warfare, and those which are 
not permissible; and although increasingly difficult in contemporary warfare to distinguish 
between combatant and non-combatant, this is the bedrock of ethical conduct in war. 
Proportionality is generally understood in that the harm caused to life or property must not 
outweigh the anticipated military advantage gained from the attack (Yoder, 1996, p.156; 
Sussman, 2013, p.429), and is also legally enshrined within Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977, Art.51(5)(b)).   
The debates surrounding whether LAWs can adhere to discrimination and proportionality 
come under two broad lines of argument; those who appeal to technological difficulties in 
achieving sufficient ethical programming (Asaro, 2008,2012; Sparrow, 2009; Melzer, 2009; 
Sharkey, 2009,2011; Kreps and Kaag, 2012; Wagner, 2011), and critics of these objections 
to LAWs which stress the need to see human combatants as the bench mark of ethical 
behaviour in warfare rather than retaining a strict observance to International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) or jus in bello (Arkin, 2010,2015; Bailey, 2015; Schulzke, 2011).   
Much of the literature stresses the potential benefits that LAWs bring to the adherence of 
ethical norms in warfare; that new conflicts are only appropriate with the use of UAVs 
because of their ability to spend a longer time observing targets (Gregory, 2011); that, 
providing the munitions are ethical, the weapon itself has no bearing on the adherence to 
ethical standards in warfare (Thomas, 2015); that LAWs allow for the development of 
‘information superiority’, ‘precision engagement’, and efficient information sharing which 
leads to better ‘command and control’ (Guetlein, 2005); and reducing collateral damage 
given “the ability to merge information and account for a multitude of factors without time 
delays” (Hauptman, 2013, p.183). These arguments show that LAWs would be more able to 
adhere to both IHL, and consequently jus in bello requirements in the short term, whilst 
simultaneously contradicting trepidations that LAWs are fundamentally misplaced to 
adhere to these ethical precepts.    
It is important to be cognisant of how LAWs are implemented and not simply focus on 
whether technological advances are plausible or not (Tonkens, 2012). Schulzke (2011) 
cogently dictates that given the difficulties that LAWs may face in certain contexts, it is 
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important to implement them in limited situations, if only at first. In the past there have 
been a range of actors such as humanitarian workers and journalists who have been in 
positions to hold indiscriminate actions accountable. However, the nature of LAWs is such 
that, by virtue of their implementation, these avenues of enforcing legal and ethical norms 
of permissible conduct in warfare are not available, despite attempts made to construct 
non-binding frameworks for international cooperation (Buchanan and Keohane, 2015, 
p.23). 
Proportionality and discrimination concerns are therefore intimately related to 
implementation.  This is a difficult position to maintain, and therefore those who feel 
intuitively that LAWs should not be implemented have a duty to uncover arguments which 
satisfy concerns in every circumstance. By focusing on what LAWs explicitly bring about in 
the immediate sense, such arguments are met by consequentialist reasoning to the effect 
that; LAWs bring about better short term advantages on the battlefield than other available 
means. This is a difficult argument to overcome even with the myriad of concerns 
previously outlined.  
However, although the literature is replete with arguments surrounding the compatibility 
of LAWs to jus in bello, there is an absence of concern surrounding the adherence to just 
war theory more broadly. As such, this paper differentiates its focus from those previously 
mentioned concerning just war theory by addressing LAWs compatibility with jus post 
bellum and post-conflict demands.  Despite the legitimacy of debates about whether LAWs 
might have discriminate or proportional outcomes, such concerns are part of a broader 
picture dependent on whether LAWs can direct their ends towards peace.  It is this gap in 
the literature on autonomous weapons that this paper seeks to contribute to, and as such 
is clearly differentiated with the previous accounts. By focusing explicitly on the 
procurement of peace via post-conflict mechanisms and human interaction (and the 
degree to which certain means of warfare encourage or prohibit the procurement of 
peace), arguments which focus on the short term advantages of LAWs will have to be 
reconciled with long-term changes in the conduct of military affairs. This account of LAWs 
and their compatibility to jus post bellum concerns offers to contribute to the existing 
literature on just war theory and offer a more complete account of LAWs when assessed 
against such ethical parameters.     
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6. Jus Post Bellum and LAWs: The Ethical Context 
 
Since this paper focuses on the area of applied ethics in war and the subject of securing 
peace, it falls into the area of just war theory called jus post bellum, or ‘justice after war’. 
This chapter will be dedicated to laying out where this research fits into the current 
debates within jus post bellum, whilst also laying the theoretical groundwork for assessing 
the arguments made later on. 
Jus post bellum is concerned with obligations incumbent upon a variety of actions post-
conflict, with such actions conducted with the ends in mind of a lasting and sustainable 
peace. Although references have been made throughout the history of the just war 
tradition to the post-conflict phase, it is only recently that they have been discussed at 
length. There are a number of key debates within the jus post bellum literature which I wish 
to outline in order to lay the theoretical foundation for the following discussion, as well as 
to establish my own viewpoint on the subject of jus post bellum and, indirectly, just war 
theory too. 
6.1 The ‘Dependence Approach’: Responding to Criticism 
One of the core debates surrounding jus post bellum is whether the tenets of just war 
theory – jus ad bellum and jus in bello – should be judged independently to the peace 
achieved.  The dependence approach, as it is often referred to, requires that jus post 
bellum adds a further set of moral considerations onto the traditional principles of just war 
theory, such that war is only just if it meets the principles of jus post bellum too, or in other 
words, the justness of the war is dependent on the actions taken throughout the war, in 
both ad bellum and in bello. My responses to the criticisms within this section serve as a 
defense for the views espoused throughout this paper; that we can legitimately judge the 
means of warfare by the ends they achieve. 
Pattison (2013) outlines the two main claims of the dependence approach. The first is that 
jus post bellum constitutes “a further set of moral issues” and second, “aspects of jus post 
bellum may be related to the moral considerations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello” (p.643, 
italics in original). However, one need not ascribe to the first claim to agree with the 
second, insofar as the first rests more on context; there may be examples where peace can 
be achieved without evoking the additional tenets laid out in jus post bellum. Although this 
is logically the case, it is clear that many proponents of the dependence approach infer that 
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the post-conflict phase necessarily gives rise to a number of additional obligations, such 
that the immediate state of victory is not enough to satisfy the conflict’s wider aims. 
Proponents of what I will call ‘non-dependency’ (that traditional just war theory and jus 
post bellum should be separated) advocate this interpretation for a number of reasons. 
Bellamy (2008) sees the fusion of jus post bellum and just war theory as premature, since 
additional obligations incumbent on belligerents are “almost utterly alien” (p.621) to just 
war theory, and that jus post bellum remains limited in terms of how it relates to the 
obligations of earlier principles.  
Although I see such obligations as naturally arising from prior just intentions and the 
pursuit of peace – something I will touch upon later – I think it is important to acknowledge 
that the specific details of how one achieves a ‘just peace’ is indeed alien to just war 
theory, and for this reason I too err on the side of caution in ascribing specific processes to 
post-conflict situations. This is not to say just war theory is not the right framework from 
which to discuss those actions. If one’s intention is to institute some form of corrective 
justice whose purpose was ultimately peace (just cause), then post-conflict considerations 
on how to most effectively manifest those intentions bear significant relevance to the 
broader themes of just war theory. Just war theory is an evolving body of theoretical 
enquiry – as is testament to the emergence of jus post bellum itself – and therefore ‘alien’ 
concepts need not be entirely irrelevant.   
Another claim in favour of non-dependency is with regards to access to justice. The 
argument is that, by extending the continuity of actions into the post-war stage, we 
exclude unjust actors from achieving a just peace, thus developing a situation whereby 
there would be no incentive to comply with other rules (Österdahl & van Zendel, 2009). 
Walzer (2012) also reiterates this point insofar as “[a]n unjust war can lead to a just 
outcome, and a just war can lead to an unjust outcome” (p.44). This argument against the 
dependence approach is flawed in its conception of justice as it relies on a concrete and 
evidential dichotomy between war and the post-conflict stage, when often this is not the 
case. However, even if clearly delineated, to what extent can we say that unjust actions in 
war lead to a just peace? A peace perhaps, but consequences for unjust actions must 
necessarily arise and often have negative effects on the procurement of sustainable peace. 
What incentive would there be to act justly in warfare if one could settle wrongs 
committed during war after conflict? The continuity of justice is therefore essential to the 
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emphasis we give to the concept of justice, and to accept that unjust actions can lead to 
just outcomes is to erode its fundamental importance. 
A key objection to the dependence approach comes from Pattison (2013). As we have seen, 
he outlines the dependence approach; that jus post bellum constitutes a further set of 
moral obligations, and that jus post bellum adherence provides evidence that ad bellum 
and in bello considerations have been met (p.643).      
 On the first aspect, Pattison argues that this is too demanding and leads to a 
situation whereby “wars that seem to be intuitively just may be viewed as unjust” (p.643). 
This criticism however threatens to retain the ‘just’ label to legitimise warfare simply 
because of an intuition. If we are judging legitimation via just war theory, then we must 
satisfy all relevant criteria or not resort to war (and similarly not judge the war to be just). 
Holding onto the label does nothing but legitimise wars that are not just in the literal sense. 
That is not to say that wars cannot in some way be justified or legitimate at various stages, 
it merely requires the label of justice to be used sparingly. Furthermore, if peace is the aim 
of just warfare, then the success must ultimately be determined by the success of peace 
and the realisation of the initial ends and intentions. I see no such contradiction inherent 
within just war theory, as the clearly laid out principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
delineate between when a war is just or not, and thus we need not appeal to ‘intuition’ per 
se.  
On the second principle of the dependence approach, Pattison (2013) argues that “many 
accounts of the principles of jus ad bellum are already sensitive to such likely long-term 
consequences” (p.645, italics in original) thus this is nothing new. Furthermore, he argues 
that by judging the justness of previous acts by the actions taken after war, this “potentially 
loses the action guiding quality of jus ad bellum” (p.644). Since such actions are taken pre-
war, we cannot then know if pre-war principles have been fulfilled until after the war, thus 
offering no guide for ad bellum decisions.     
 Pattison is mistaken here in assuming that the process for determining the justness 
of a conflict is found in a single judgement, rather than in the continued adherence to the 
guidelines within specific stages. We can determine pre-war that right intention/just cause 
are fulfilled by the standards of jus ad bellum, whilst also holding those permissible ends to 
account post-conflict through the imposition of jus post bellum demands. These two are 
not contradictory actions, and yet Pattison implies that pre-war determination of justice is 
confused when we add further duties at a later stage.  
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I see jus post bellum as the way in which we hold those just actions accountable; that right 
intention predominately serves an instrumental purpose in guiding the justness of future 
actions, but must therefore be held accountable through making sure those morally 
permissible actions are achieved. So long as external circumstances do not act as a coercive 
force upon the original and permissible ad bellum intentions, then one can be reasonably 
held accountable for the actions they take post-conflict through their satisfaction of post 
bellum principles. If circumstances change however, and the just state cannot realise the 
original just intention, then we do not judge the war solely by this. This seems to be 
intuitively sound, that we cannot judge the intentions of the war given that the intention 
was to realise some successful end state, in this case peace. In essence, if circumstances 
obfuscate the capabilities of realising those intentions, then this does not affect the 
justness of previous acts, it merely means that intentions cannot be realised as they were 
externally constrained. 
6.2 The Continuity of Intentions 
As such, I emphasise the role of intentions as the core mechanism of ensuring just and 
ethical outcomes. Intentions manifest themselves in actions, and therefore we can only 
judge an agents intention by what events they bring about; such that an agent can profess 
genuine intentions, yet by virtue of its internal nature, cannot be externally verified and 
held to account without reference to the outcomes those intentions produce. Finklestein 
(2008) sheds some light on the nature of intentions, arguing that “forming a prior intention 
is like setting up an external pre-commitment device to force oneself to act later, with the 
difference that the agent who forms an intention is internally, rather than externally 
constrained” (p.69, italics in original). This internal constraint is important for the view that 
ethical intentions lead to the production of ethical actions. 
Furthermore, this perspective of just war theory can be supported through the rejection of 
‘strategic intentions’. These are intentions which are made based on their short term 
benefit, however are complimented by the simultaneous intention of not carrying out the 
originally formulated intention since it is of personal disadvantage. This involves the 
existence of two competing intentions; what is in my actual personal interest, and what it is 
in my interest to demonstrate to others. The important element here is that “the object of 
the intention is tomorrow’s action.” If the actors has  
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“no reason to fulfil the intention tomorrow, he will know it today 
and, as a rational agent, he will then not be able to form it. 
Forming the intention to do X, and doing it, may be separate 
actions, but they have reference to each other: having intention 
at t to do A at t+1” (den Hartogh, 2008, p.186, italics in original).  
With respect to the arguments I am making here, this means that by mandating that right 
intention be fulfilled, the constraints on ethical action are secured.  
In judging the permissibility of jus in bello, we must be mindful of what our ad bellum 
intentions were, and strive to achieve such ends within warfare. Thus, this prohibits any 
means by which a lasting peace is less likely to be achieved.     
 This perspective on intentions only mandates knowledge of intention on the just 
side. The unjust party need not be understood from the perspective of their intentions per 
se, as “malicious or not, the external violation of right disturbs social order and justifies its 
vindication” (McKenna, 1979, p.385). Although intentions are useful in understanding 
future dispositions and behaviour, the principle here in right intention remains uniformly 
within the purview of the just state pursuing peace, and therefore has little relation to the 
intentions of the aggressor. 
We cannot forget why just wars are fought in the first place. The true cogent end of a just 
war is peace.  This often implied but rarely explicitly dictated aspect of just war theory is a 
feature of early thought on the subject of ethics in warfare. St. Augustine (1994) stated 
that; “[p]eace is not sought in order to provoke war, but war is waged in order to attain 
peace. Be a peacemaker, then, even by fighting that through your victory you might bring 
about those whom you defeat to the advantages of peace” (p.220). Furthermore, 
“Augustine sets right intention both as a precondition for any attempt to legitimize 
participation in warfare, and as the guiding principle for one’s action once engaged in 
combat” (Swiatek, 2012, p.242). Therefore, it is clear that the early Christian and traditional 
conceptions of just war theory prioritise the possession of right intention as a condition 
transposed throughout ones waging of war.      
 If we accept the nature of peace as the only just aim of warfare, then this has 
effects on jus post bellum and the varying obligations and duties for just belligerents after 
conflict has ceased. As McCready (2009) argues; “[i]f peace is the desired end of every war, 
is it not incumbent upon the political leadership to consider what the peace might look like, 
whether it is attainable, and what means of prosecuting the war is most conducive to 
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achieving it?” (p.72). Thus, although Pattison offers some concerns regarding the 
dependence approach, it cannot be ignored that the desired ends of warfare, a just peace, 
be satisfied and held accountable post-conflict and witnessed in efforts to achieve those 
just intentions. 
Those who advocate for incorporating jus post bellum into the wider theoretical schema of 
just war theory are fairly unified in their reasons. Coady (2011) argues that “a war that is 
fought without a considered view of bringing about a legitimate peace has a morally 
defective rationale that taints its legitimate beginnings and its ongoing processes” (p.50), 
thus implying that pursuing peace must be aimed for throughout all aspects of warfare. 
Rawls (1999) similarly argues that we must understand how our actions in war affect life 
after the cessation of conflict. He says; “[t]he way war is fought and the deeds done in 
ending it live on in the historical memory of societies and may or may not set the stage for 
future war. It is always the duty of statesmanship to take the longer view” (p.96). In both 
assessments we see the importance of understanding the place of peace within decision-
making, and it is here that the rationale for the dependence approach lies.  
Bass (2004) argues that we must be vigilant of means and ends in the waging of just wars. 
Jus in bello is thus clearly not separate from jus post bellum considerations. Bass argues 
that; 
 “[S]tates’ actions in bringing war to a conclusion are clearly 
connected to their conduct during war’s aftermath, and … will 
have implications for the actions of those victorious states in the 
months and years following the war’s conclusion” (2004, p.386-7). 
We can see the effects of recognising that means and ends are not entirely separated in the 
practical application of jus post bellum to post-conflict situations in looking at 
counterinsurgency operations. Johnson (2008) aligns counterinsurgency practices of the 
U.S with post bellum principles of restoring stability and peacebuilding apparatuses. This is 
highlighted in the existence of ‘Logical Lines of Operation’ within counterinsurgency, as 
deciding upon the means has ramifications for the ends which must be taken into account. 
Although it is clear that there exists significant theoretical differences between these two 
opposing viewpoints on the position of jus post bellum within just war theory, I have 
attempted to satisfy concerns raised by those who reject the dependence approach by 
appealing to intentions as the key delineator of continuity throughout the three areas of 
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just war theory. Envisioning jus post bellum as a theoretical check on previous conduct 
throughout conflict allows us to hold legitimate and just intentions to account, and further 
serves to conserve the attribution of justice on conflicts fought within the ethical remit of 
the just war tradition. An acceptance of the dependence approach in principle is 
fundamental to the arguments I lay out in this paper. Judging the means of warfare by the 
capability of achieving just ends only makes sense when one understands that justice is a 
cumulative process in just war theory, and that it is the ends of a just peace which jus in 
bello and thus LAWs should be directed towards.  
However, it may be asserted that conversations about the ethicality of weapons are 
uniquely a jus in bello concern and not relevant in discussions of how war is concluded 
peacefully within jus post bellum. Thus one may reasonably ask; what business do we have 
in talking about what are conventionally in bello related subjects, such as the sorts of 
weapons used, in the remit of jus post bellum? Throughout the literature on just war theory 
there is little research that touches on the overlap between the means of warfare and the 
ends they seek to achieve, insofar as the means are judged by the ends they bring about. 
It is clear that our actions within war have ramifications for the way peace can be secured 
(and the extent to which it can be secured too) after war. We can see how discussions 
about LAWs, and their ability to act towards peaceful ends, have relevance to discussions 
concerning the overall permissibility of LAWs within warfare. After all, if such weapons 
cannot contribute effectively and positively to peaceful ends, then how can we expect 
them to fulfil the ethical demands placed upon the waging of war? 
The means of warfare play a significant role in the securing of peace, and thus their ability 
to effectively encourage the procurement of peace in the post bellum arena should be a 
central theme to the ethical judgement of those means. This is the enquiry which I set out 
to undertake within this paper with respect to LAWs; namely, whether they can be 
conducive to peaceful ends. 
6.3 On Minimalist and Maximalist 
A second important debate within the realm of jus post bellum literature is between what 
Bellamy (2008) calls the ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ approaches to post-conflict duties 
and obligations. Proponents of the minimalist view “tend to view wars in terms of rights 
vindication and argue that combatants are entitled to wage war only to the point at which 
their rights are vindicated” (Bellamy, 2008, p.602), whereas the maximalist viewpoint 
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places additional burdens on belligerents (such as assisting within reconstruction) “from 
the position that because war always produces bad consequences, victors have a moral and 
legal obligation to do more than merely satisfy their own rights afterwards” (p.618). 
Irrespective of ones stance on the dependence approach, this debate focuses on the 
structure and role that jus post bellum should take.   
It can be argued that much of the post bellum literature focuses on some variation of 
maximalist approach with respect to the incumbent obligations on belligerents post-
conflict. The delineation between where minimalist ends and maximalist begins is difficult 
to ascertain, and in that respect the conceptualisation of this debate is somewhat limited. 
For example, does rights vindication in the minimalist approach solely concern itself with 
the cessation of aggression against oneself, or does it instead include further obligations 
such as retributive justice or reparations as necessary elements in vindicating the 
transgression of rights?  
However, the dichotomy between minimalist and maximalist conceptions highlights the 
differences between theorists on the essential characteristics of jus post bellum. Although 
discussions on large scale obligations such as institutional repair are vitally important, there 
is little mention of the need for moral repair between former enemies or wrongdoers and 
victims. As such, this section serves to highlight the sort of theory that jus post bellum thus 
far embodies, and serves as a basis from which my criticism is best highlighted later on as I 
attempt to contribute to the way jus post bellum is characterised. 
The maximalist conception tends to ascribe additional duties and obligations to belligerents 
because of the moral imperative of preventing future aggression to the greatest possible 
degree. These sorts of post-conflict obligations often take the form of quasi-policy 
ascriptions in the literature which I will address as methods of societal repair due to their 
target being society at large. Evans (2012) focuses on three areas; reconstruction of 
physical infrastructure; appropriate redistribution of material resources; and appropriate 
reestablishment of sociocultural institutions, practices, and relationships.  Österdahl and 
van Zendel (2009) offer a similar set of necessary post-conflict actions such as the 
“restoration of order, restoration of sovereignty, economic reconstruction, seeking a 
durable peace, extracting post-conflict reparations, and punishment of rights violators” 
(p.181).  
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A recurring theme echoed by the previous theorists is the necessity of reconstruction and 
institutional stability to secure the foundations for peaceful relations in the future.  Clifford 
(2012) argues for establishing a state capable of maintaining its sovereignty and becoming 
an established member of the international community; signalling a shift from its aggressor 
status pre-war and serving to be the most likely context of sustainable peace being 
procured. McCready (2009) further reiterates this ‘duty’ to re-establish political, economic, 
and social stability, as the intent is “to prevent domestic consequences of the war from 
becoming the seed of future conflict” (p.74). Coady (2011) sees this as a moral obligation to 
help the defeated state, and an obligation to the innocent too, so long as it is aimed at 
encouraging the birth of a peaceful state.  
Although Orend (2002) also entertains the notion of a maximalist approach with ascriptions 
evidently beyond mere rights vindication, such as the punishment of both leaders and 
soldiers who have committed crimes as well as compensation and institutional 
rehabilitation, he stresses the importance of proportionality, such that institutional 
rehabilitation “must be proportional to the degree of depravity in the regime” (p.56).  
Williams and Caldwell (2006) argue that contingent obligations within jus post bellum are 
intrinsically linked to the continued protection of human rights (p.317). For example, they 
see economic reconstruction, the restoration of sovereignty, and self-determination as 
necessary elements (since these are focused on areas of human rights), as well as deterring 
future violations through punishing violators of human rights. 
Although the prescriptions for post-conflict action are wide-ranging, the various obligations 
incumbent upon states post-conflict are summarised by Johnson (2008); that they include 
accountability for crimes of victor and aggressor, compensation such as reparations, and 
reintroduction into the international community via rehabilitation or reconstruction; and 
carried out through three broad phases of restoration, partnership, and the 
reestablishment of sovereignty. Although the literature differs on the details of principles 
such as punishment and reparations, reconstruction and rehabilitation, and the re-
introduction into the international sphere, these themes are echoed throughout and 
largely constitute the core tenets of maximalist post bellum thinking. 
The minimalist perspective gains little traction within jus post bellum literature for the 
reason that the post-conflict stage is underdeveloped in a minimalist perspective, thus 
obfuscating the need for extensive post bellum details. However, there are theorists who 
express caution over the maximalist view. The general theme within such arguments tends 
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to focus on the conflict’s context as a determinant of obligations, rather than existing 
irrespective of the way the conflict was undertaken, the actors and culpability of those 
involved, and the capability of such actors in the achievement of peace.    
 Bass (2004) explores the origin and nature of these obligations within jus post 
bellum, and concludes that the reasons for resorting to war are a factor in determining the 
after-the-fact obligations. For example, if self-defence, then no outright obligation to 
restoring the defeated (unjust) state exists. Yet if entered into voluntarily, such as 
humanitarian intervention as a third party, then such obligations do exist. Bass shows that 
political reconstruction is a cautious subject, yet becomes an imperative in genocidal states 
since they have lost all legitimacy and international standing. McCready (2009) also errs on 
the side of caution in ascribing principles irrespective of context, arguing that we must 
recognise a vast array of different post war situations and avoid checklists on the principles 
and demands within jus post bellum. Context seems to be an important point, yet is not 
explicitly acknowledged in many ‘maximalist’ perspectives.    
 Lastly, Berman (2007) addresses the difficulty in understanding post-conflict 
obligations. Maximalist prescriptions may be preferable, yet the philosophical legitimacy 
and continuity of their origin is no less clear. Berman argues that “[t]he logic that impelled 
the intervention may therefore suck the intervener into purposes or means beyond those 
initially bargained for” (p.173). We must therefore be mindful of the events leading to the 
instantiation of various post-conflict obligations. 
Although the post-conflict stage is multi-faceted with competing and complementary 
suggestions for successful peace procurement, the literature underestimates the role that 
conduct within war has on peace. To some extent this is acknowledged through the 
recognition that retributive punishment must be meted out to those culpable for war 
crimes and/or the instantiation of leading causes to the conflict itself. The actions taken 
within conflict must be acknowledged in choosing methods of peace negotiations. By 
focusing on the means of warfare with respect to LAWs, this research goes someway to 
showing that the peace process, or more specifically jus post bellum, is affected by their 
use. 
Furthermore, the literature on jus post bellum begins with an assumption that micro-level 
barriers to peace are already secured, and thus focuses almost exclusively on the macro-
level or societal repair, such as state policies or large scale restructuring. A key area 
omitted from the literature is the necessity of re-establishing relations between former 
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enemies insofar as a development of order between friend and foe is a necessary precursor 
to the success of societal repair. I aim to explore this glaring omission throughout this 
paper, and instead argue that there is significant utility to moral repair, in securing peace 
which is equally compatible with jus post bellum, as well as the need to encourage human 
interaction between adversaries as a way of developing ethical action and subsequent  
peace. 
This chapter has sought to construct the framework for the following arguments insofar as 
they take place within the conclusion of warfare and peace more broadly. Importantly, if 
the necessary elements for securing peace are diminished by the way in which war is 
carried out, then this calls into question the ethical permissibility of such methods (within 
the dependence approach), since the objective of peace is significantly less likely to be 
achieved. In relation to LAWs, it is the dependence approach which can be applied to their 
conduct within war, and to their ability to replicate necessary functions conducive to 
peace. In the succeeding chapters I intend to detail my argument by utilising the rationale 
of the dependence approach. The following arguments pertain to the current methods and 
mechanisms of human combatants that are conducive to peace, and thereby I will assess 
whether LAWs are able to replicate those functions too. If they cannot, then as per the 
dependence approach the products of LAW’s actions can be legitimately judged based 
upon this perspective.  
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Part 2: The Value of Human Action and Interaction 
 
This part focuses on the consequences of implementing LAWs by looking at the role of 
human combatants within war, and how this can be conducive to ethical behaviour and the 
demands of peace. Additionally, I am concerned with how elements of human behaviour, 
such as engrained aversions to killing and its effect on destructive output, can be 
constructive to peace given that we acknowledge that the less destructive war is, the more 
likely peace can be brought about. Much of these arguments take place through the use of 
historical examples as a comparative approach to highlighting the way that these various 
factors manifest themselves. 
It is important to understand why looking at human experience of war is of value. War can 
be made “navigable, given substance, and endowed with meaningfulness through the 
experiences of those who live with war (and indeed those who die in war)” (Tidy, 2016, 
p.111). It is therefore clear that referencing experiences is a legitimate way of approaching 
our understanding of its value. I recognise that many of the arguments and actions I 
proceed with are not widely exhibited, but rather I intend to show how humans have the 
unique capacity to demonstrate such beneficial acts. Given that LAWs could replace human 
combatants in a number of areas, the advent of human-human interaction will be reduced, 
and instead be replaced by the vastly different interaction of human-machine. 
What do we learn from hearing about experiences of war? The suffering and horrors, the 
moments of genuine sadness and despair, but also the hope born out of virtuous action, 
the bravery and sacrifice which fills one even now, decades later, with a sense of pride and 
respect for those who came before. Perhaps we learn more about humanity when it is 
stripped bare, hoping to inform us of what we should know but still do not. That humans in 
war are the agents of lessons which reverberate throughout history, and teach – but also 
remind us – that every effort should be made to acknowledge those that have come before 
and acted in such desperate circumstances, and to understand how we as humans can 
develop beyond the axiomatic inevitability of inter-human conflict. 
The positive effects of human action and interaction within the following chapters are not 
the mainstay of human activity within war. These are often due to the pressures and 
negative experiences which give rise to a range of actions that are unethical and 
consequently fail to seek peace. Merciless actions based upon prejudice, hatred, revenge, 
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or a culmination of these within the ‘Berserk State’ (Shay, 1995), must be recognised as 
features of contemporary warfare that we similarly lose if LAWs replace human 
combatants. However, the complementary positive actions are not devoid of value as a 
result, but instead made all the more valuable when contrasted with the possibilities of 
alternative responses. I am not pessimistic about reducing the proclivity of negative acts, 
but I think removing human combatants as a solution to this is ill-conceived without a full 
discussion concerning the perhaps uniquely positive human actions that we similarly lose. 
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7. Experience of War 
 
This chapter proposes that experience of war motivate changes to attitudes and methods 
of war that are conducive to peace. I see LAWs as unable to experience warfare in the same 
way, and attach meaning to suffering or destruction that humans do. Furthermore, the 
horror of war arises predominately because humans recognise the suffering of others to be 
equally detrimental to them. The distance created via LAWs to the suffering of warfare may 
generate apathy towards such events, or lose the potential action guiding consequences of 
how war experience can be used positively towards peaceful ends.   
 This chapter is largely based upon historical accounts of warfare, and looks at; the 
effects of experience on attitudes to war; the aversion to killing and use of lethal force 
amongst human combatants that reduces the destruction of warfare; the role of 
experience in motivating attitudes against war; and how war is reformed in response to 
lessons learnt through experience. 
7.1 Pre-War, Post-War, and the Myth of War Experience 
The role of experience in changing attitudes can be observed by its effect on prior beliefs. 
The myth of war experience is “designed to mask war and to legitimise the war experience; 
it was meant to displace the reality of war” (Mosse, 1990, p.7), and is the perspective 
created via the absence of experience. Often, those without experience view war much the 
same way as is portrayed in the media; a romanticised version of good and evil. However, 
this can encourage war-enthusiasm and a lust to achieve those ambitions in reality. The 
role of experience in highlighting the devastation of war is vital to the reluctance of waging 
war, especially if the contingent suffering and horror of experience is acknowledged. 
Therefore, experience helps to foster a more fruitful reluctance to go to war since 
experience invites scepticism, rather than an unfounded enthusiasm. 
There are a number of accounts that detail the change in attitudes to war as a direct result 
of experience. Private R. Richards of the Royal Engineers during WWI describes witnessing 
an explosion in which many of his friends were killed; “[w]ell, all my romantic ideals of war 
completely vanished with that episode” (in Arthur, 2002, p.106). It is the way in which 
Richards responds to this event – the tearing down of his view of war – that highlights the 
invaluable role that experience plays. Is it better for peace that individuals become aware 
of the nature and horrors of war? Or is it better for individuals to have an idealised 
perception in order to encourage them to fight? Although this experience changed 
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Richards’ view of war, it does not detract from the necessity or justness of particular wars, 
but rather highlights the value that experiencing suffering can bring on the rejection of 
romanticised ideals. 
Shay (1995) highlights similar processes within the Vietnam War, such that “[c]ontrary to 
what the young men anticipated in training and in watching war films, once they 
encountered the reality of battle, they fervently wanted to avoid it” (p.11-12). The message 
portrayed pre-war was akin to the myth of war experience, such that the encouragement 
of idealised perspectives was immediately transgressed once the soldiers were confronted 
with combat.          
 The Vietnam War was embroiled in a myth-type pre-war culture, whereby the 
views of what combat and conditions would be like were distinctly different to what was 
eventually experienced. Josh Cruze, a veteran of the Vietnam War, articulates this 
perspective arguing that;  
“[E]veryone went in with the attitude, ‘Hey, we’re going to wipe 
them out, nothing’s going to happen to us’. Until they saw the 
realities and they couldn’t deal with it. ‘This isn’t supposed to 
happen. It isn’t in the script. What’s going on? This guy’s really 
bleeding all over me, and he’s screaming his head off’” (in 
Willenson, 1987, p.61). 
Although anecdotal, this perspective highlights that expectations were vastly different to 
what was experienced. In turn, we can see how experience plays a role in determining our 
attitudes, and enthusiasm, towards conflict. 
From the First World War, the myth of war experience was evident, with a show of 
“national exhilaration during which all political parties rallied around the flag in the first 
week of the Great War” (Winter, 2006, p.105). We can learn much from the ‘men of 1914’ 
in terms of the role that experience plays, treating the attitudes before and after as a 
comparative approach to experience of war. Winter argues that post-experience “we see 
them as fully aware of the evils of war. Indeed, the language many of them use is that of 
solider pacifists, people who took up arms in defense of their country, but who – after what 
they had seen – would willingly take up arms against war itself” (p.110). There is no 
contradiction here in terms of viewing war as valuable. It merely highlights that if given the 
opportunity, these soldiers would willingly turn against war. Winter’s summary is clear; 
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experience of war changes our attitudes towards it, and destroys the persuasiveness of the 
myth of war experience. 
7.2 Ethical Limiters via Experience  
Human involvement in war, although imperfect, can be a limiter to unethical actions. The 
face-to-face nature of this type of combat is conducive to acting more ethically in terms of 
the extent of ones actions, due mainly to emotional and psychological reasons. Put simply, 
being aware of ones actions reduces the amount of harm one is willing to carry out. 
A key area of psychological enquiry is the seemingly innate aversion to killing within 
humans. As Thomas Burke, the former director of mental health policy for the US 
Department of Defense claimed during an interview with Frontline, “[p]eople have a 
natural aversion to killing other human beings” (2004, no page). Within the military, these 
barriers are designed to be overcome via different methods of training since the effects of 
human aversions to killing are known. Within the US military, there was a shift from using 
instinctive theories – drills aimed at overcoming aversions– to seeing the deciding variable 
as the character traits of the solider, such that drills are now developed to encourage these 
(Bourke, 1999, p.97).        
 This aversion acts as an ethical limiter in two ways. Before the act is executed, the 
course of action is limited in its destructiveness by what we ourselves might be willing to 
do. This may in the present manifest itself in carrying out the act at a distance, or via 
technology, which might be viewed as a response to the aversion humans largely possess. 
Additionally, the ethical limiter occurs during the act. As humans, our rejection of inflicting 
harm or suffering is positive with respect to the long term effects of our actions. This has 
ramifications for peace, since we can reasonably assume that the less destruction caused, 
the more likely peace will be secured. 
Furthermore, a 1986 Study by the British Defense Operational Analysis Establishment’s 
field studies division compared the killing potential of historical battles to the actual 
combat performance. They found that the potential was significantly higher than the actual 
hit rates (in Grossman, 1995, p.16), concluding that the aversion to killing via non-firers 
explains this gap in capability and actuality.      
 Interestingly, there was a recovery of 27,574 muskets from the Battle of 
Gettysburg; ninety per cent were still loaded with twelve thousand having been loaded 
more than once. Grossman (1995) argues that “[t]he obvious conclusion is that most 
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soldiers were not trying to kill the enemy” (p.22). Additionally, “most of these discarded 
weapons on the battlefield of Gettysburg represent soldiers who had been unable or 
unwilling to fire their weapons in the midst of combat” (p.25), highlighting the effect of 
such engrained aversions. 
However these conclusions made by Grossman, influenced heavily by General S.L.A. 
Marshall’s (1947) research into non-firing rates amongst military personal during WWII, are 
heavily disputed. Chambers (2003) argues that Marshall was “unscientific in his 
methodology” (p.119) and that his conclusions and assessment of a twenty-five per cent 
‘ratio of fire’ seems to be “based at best on chance rather than scientific sampling, and at 
worst on sheer speculation” (p.120). Additionally, Smoler (1989) contests Marshall’s 
conclusion (and by proxy Grossman’s too) by finding that little evidence exists that firing 
rates were ever discussed within the post-action group interviews Marshall conducted. The 
alternative evidence points to the fact that actually “the men shot too much” (no page) 
rather than too little.         
 Alternative explanations have been proposed which contradict the view that 
engrained aversions to killing are to blame for non-firing rates, if indeed they exist and 
constitute a problem. Kelly (2002) argues that Marshall was right, but for the wrong 
reasons. Kelly claims that an increase in firing rates between WWII and Korea is 
attributable to the “substantial reorganisation of infantry squads and platoons that 
occurred during this period” (p.161). This contradicts Marshall’s conclusion that training 
methods designed to counteract the engrained aversions to killing were the sole cause for 
this increase in efficiency, which is subsequently repeated by Grossman (1995, p.181). 
Although Marshall may have been right about the figures, the conclusion of an engrained 
aversion can be removed without affecting the legitimacy of the figures themselves. 
Furthermore, Engen (2011) produces a list of alternative explanations (if Marshall and 
Grossman are correct about non-firers) which contradict the explanation offered by 
Marshall and Grossman. Perhaps they did not fire because they were afraid; were suffering 
from combat stress reactions; were passively resisting; did not want to provoke retaliation; 
had been ordered not to; or maybe the terrain or tactical situation did not call for small 
arms fire (Engen, 2011, p.42-43). Additionally, Engen proposes an alternative assessment of 
the statistical figures offered by proponents of this non-firers perspective by utilising 
accounts of Canadian combatants during WWII. Instead of a limited use of force, reports at 
the time stated that “recklessly large amounts of small arms fire was standard procedure in 
some infantry units” (p.45) with efforts to reduce this practice being inculcated into the 
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Canadian Military. As such, the accounts of US soldiers (from Marshall) and Canadian 
soldiers are widely contradictory, which at the very least points to an alternative 
explanation other than an anthropomorphic aversion to killing one another.  
This is not to say that an engrained aversion is not present within many combatants, it 
rather presents the view that we should not be too hasty to draw conclusions from dubious 
statistical findings, and to be careful about extrapolating information to a broader view 
than perhaps is sensible. Arguing solely on the basis than an engrained aversion to killing 
exists in us all is unwise, yet I hope that this tentative argument would be assessed in light 
of the previous and following arguments which further attest to the positive utility of 
human action, interaction, and memory of war as instigators of aversions in their own right.  
As I am taking the potential dichotomy between humans and machines as the basis of my 
arguments, it still stands that if aversions exist within even a portion of combatants then 
this sort of process can still be beneficial to peace.  
Stanley Milgram’s study on obedience to authority (2005) can be interpreted to manifest 
elements of this aversion however. The experiment involved a victim (learner) – who was 
involved with the study – being ‘shocked’ by the subject (teacher) if a wrong answer was 
given through successively higher voltages. Although the shocks were not real, the subject 
was convinced that they were, and was prompted to continue with the shocks if the subject 
protested. Initially devised to test for obedience to authority, variations of this experiment 
are useful to this present discussion. Most importantly, Experiment 3 involved ‘proximity’ 
whereby “the victim was placed in the same room as the subject, a few feet from him” 
(Milgram, 2005, p.35), and Experiment 4 (touch-proximity) which involved the shock being 
administered to the victim by placing their hand on a metal plate, requiring physical 
interaction between the subject and victim. Milgram found that proximity and interaction 
greatly reduced the number of subjects who were willing to administer the maximum 
available voltage (450 volts). The number of respondents who obeyed up to 450 volts for 
the remote experiment (whereby the victim and subject were in separate rooms) was 65 
per cent, reducing to 40 per cent for Experiment 3 (proximity) and 30 per cent in 
Experiment 4 (touch-proximity).       
 One explanation for this decrease could be ‘empathetic cues’, such that “visual 
cues associated with the victims suffering trigger empathetic responses in the subject and 
give him a more complete grasp of the victims experience” (p.37-39). Ultimately, the 
experience of suffering caused, and the lack of separation between our actions and the 
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victims experience, are important areas which affect our proclivity and willingness to inflict 
suffering, and also highlight a tendency to exhibit these aversions too. 
Furthermore, distance emphasises the potential ethical limiter that humans possess when 
it comes to using lethal force. Take for instance the bombing of Hamburg on July 28, 1943 
when seventy thousand people were killed. The nature of the attack, and the distance 
between pilot and victim, obfuscates the psychological instincts against such destruction. In 
contrast, Grossman argues for an intuitive hypothetical which best demonstrates the 
advent of this barrier to killing;  
“If bomber crew members had had to turn a flamethrower on 
each one of these seventy thousand women and children, or 
worse yet slit each of their throats, the awfulness and trauma 
inherent in the act would have been of such a magnitude that it 
simply would not have happened” (Grossman, 1995, p.101). 
Distance forms a barrier to the full view of destruction, thereby contributing to this display 
of force. Such instances do not constitute the unwavering destructiveness of humans, but 
rather it is the context in which humans act within that contributes to unethical action. 
With respect to this ethical limiter, the least we can say is that we stand to lose this 
important component of ethical and less destructive warfare if LAWs are implemented over 
human combatants. Grossman (1995) states;  
“We may never understand the nature of this force in man that 
causes him to strongly resist killing his fellow man, but we can 
give praise for whatever force we hold responsible for our 
existence … as a race we can view it with pride” (p.39). 
Although Grossman asserts this as unwavering fact, I am inclined to at least accept its 
potential exhibition during warfare. As such, we cannot underestimate the role this 
aversion plays within war and its subsequent conclusion. If we place value in such aspects 
of human behaviour, and look upon them with ‘pride’ rather than as objects of cowardice, 
then we need to reconcile these soon-to-be-obsolete aspects of how war is currently 
fought. The difficulty is thus the extent to which it is universally exhibited, given the 
criticism laden against both Grossman and Marshall respectively. The question we must 
confront ourselves with is; does the psychological barrier that limits the potential 
destruction or wantonness killing bare greater value than the immediate short term 
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benefits of LAWs? Given the contingent distance of LAWs to humans and their perceived 
unpredictability, how can we ensure that this barrier, as a result of human-human conflict, 
is preserved via other means? 
Although war might have been more destructive without this anthropomorphic 
psychological tendency, LAWs might prevent more suffering and destructiveness in other 
ways. However this may ignore the other benefits which I outline later regarding human 
combatants in warfare. I merely wish to state here that human’s possess cognitive abilities 
which can limit the destructiveness of warfare if only we recognised such processes rather 
than outsourcing them to machines. Even if the benefits of LAWs are demonstrated in the 
future, the role of human experience in war and the pursuit of peace through more 
amicable combat must be recognised as a plausible avenue too, and be given more thought 
before being replaced for the immediate benefits of technology. 
7.3 Experience as a Deterrent to Future Conflict 
Experience of war assists peace by acting as a deterrent to future conflict. By witnessing 
the horrors and devastation of war, one is well placed to move against unnecessary wars in 
the future, but also motivated to seek the end of war. This utility of experience applies to 
both those on the front lines and home front. By experiencing the effects of war, it can act 
as a deterrent or rejection of war-enthusiasm. However, the experience of war does not 
transgress morally permissible justifications. Wishing to no longer experience unnecessary 
suffering can motivate individuals against unnecessary war, yet equally assist them in 
recognising the necessity of others.  
Intuitively at least, the experience of suffering, death, and misery is often contingent to 
conflict, creating a distaste to relive those events. I posit that such experience contains a 
paradoxically utility insofar as negative experience turns us against similar events (or war in 
this case) in the future, yet need be experienced to some degree – whether explicitly 
(combatants) or implicitly (relatives, civilians) in order for such a rejection to take hold. 
 Although we can envisage this taking place, there is ample evidence of such 
sentiments arising due to prior experience of warfare. An important example whereby the 
experience of war created a rejection of another is during the interwar years between the 
First and Second World Wars, from 1918 to 1939. I will use this period to highlight how 
experience creates such attitudes, and that we can place value in this process as a quasi-
deterrent of war-enthusiasm and recognition of caution in the future waging of war. 
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The events of WWI and it’s devastating impact upon millions of individuals “played a role in 
forming reactions to the Second World War” (Connelly, 2010, p.53) and created, amongst 
many, a reluctance to go to war again. Although a reluctance to go to war is largely 
engrained, the advent of experience and knowledge of war is a significant motivating factor 
to this aversion. Holmes (2003) argues that amongst other things, “the horror of war, the 
disillusionment, [and] the sense of waste” (p.109) played a role in generating an emotional 
opposition to the threat of WWII. 
There was disillusionment towards conflict during the interwar years, having only recently 
been involved in one of the most devastating conflicts in history. In Britain, anti-war 
sentiment was signposted in a number of events during the interwar years, summed up by 
Sheffield (1997); 
“After a period of mental numbness lasting about ten years, there 
was an explosion of anti-war sentiment expressed in books, plays 
and films. In 1933, the British élite expressed their opposition to 
war in the vote of the Oxford Union against fighting for King and 
country, and in the same year ordinary folk followed in the 
Fulham East by-election. Two years later there was an 
overwhelming yes vote in the Peace Ballot. Clearly the shadow of 
the Somme hungover the generation growing up in the 1930’s” 
(p.30).  
This summary highlights anti-war sentiment amongst areas of the British public during this 
period. Due to the destructive scale of WWI, it is likely that almost the whole population 
were to some degree affected by these events, and therefore acts as a plausible 
mechanism in producing these views.  
During this period in Britain, there was a growth in pacifist sentiment with the rise of the 
Peace Pledge Union, the No More War Committee, and the Peace Society. McDonough 
(1998) argues that “[t]he growth of pacifism reflected a widespread public mood which 
suggested war was useless, wasteful, costly, and should be opposed” (p.99-100). If it was 
not for the experience of war to highlight what war is actually like, the scale of anti-war 
sentiments would carry less weight. The timing here is significant and can be evidently 
related to WWI.  
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If humans are distanced from the realities of war via LAWs and therefore no longer able to 
experience its nature, there is little to say that we would reject war in the same way. I 
argue that the memory of war and the suffering experienced provides us with grounds to 
acknowledge the nature of war, and gives us objective reasons to reject its onset. As such 
experience passes from living memory, or LAWs make war experience obsolete for whole 
parties, we enter into the danger that our lack of acknowledgement of war’s nature leads 
us to wage war more than we ought. Although not an argument against the benefits that 
LAWs may bring, such as greater harm prevention, we can at least recognise the sorts of 
cognitive anthropomorphic processes we stand to lose via their implementation.  
It was not only Britain where such anti-war feeling took hold, but existed in France and 
Germany too. Bartov (1997) argues that the effect of “mass industrial killing in the western 
front” created different responses, with a “powerful anti-war sentiment among otherwise 
strongly opposed political and ideological factions in France, and a growing willingness 
within wide-ranging circles in Germany to go to war again” (p.355). 
The anti-war sentiment was alive in France during this time, but contrary to Bartov’s claim, 
Germany also possessed an anti-war movement amongst those who had experienced the 
war. In 1919, a mass meeting in Berlin took place under the slogan ‘War Never Again’, 
consisting of 100,000 to 200,000 people (Mosse, 1990, p.196), yet were unsuccessful given 
they were seen to be supporting the Treaty of Versailles by collaborating with French and 
British pacifists.  It was not merely overt pacifist movements in Germany but literature too 
that signalled the rejection of war during this period. Mosse (1990) argues that Erich Maria 
Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front published in 1929 was a symbol of pacifism, and 
given its portrayal of the realities of war “its impact was feared by pro-war forces” (p.198). 
The book was hugely successful throughout Germany and other European countries which 
highlights that this was a message that resonated with the populations of a post-WWI 
Europe.  
Butler (1941), writing shortly after the start of WWII, claims that because of the 
indiscriminate slaughter witnessed during WWI, “the hatred and dread of war had never 
been so general or so genuine as they were in 1939” (p.164). Butler also recalls the feeling 
within Germany and their reaction to the declaration of war, in that “[w]hen Britain and 
France declared war; the bulk of the German people were dumbfounded” and the 
enthusiasm witnessed amongst the younger populations “was not shared by the great 
majority who remembered the horrors and privations of the Great War and its aftermath” 
A Jus Post Bellum Analysis of Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
47 
 
(Butler, 1941, p.165). Therefore, it is the case that pacifism existed less explicitly in 
Germany too. Interestingly, Butler recounts a conversation he had in 1937 with a porter in 
Germany concerning the onset of future war. The porter declared that;  
“‘[A]s far as we are concerned, only those young fools want war, 
because they don’t know what it means. All we older folk detest 
and dread another war.’ … The memories of long sufferings and 
final defeat were too fresh in many minds” (Butler, 1941, p.165).  
This conversation highlights the anti-war sentiment present in Germany during this time 
amongst those who experienced WWI, and thus had clear reasons not to support the onset 
of more suffering. This shows that pacifism existed amongst a range of individuals within 
Germany during this period, and most notably those old enough to have memory of WWI, 
and therefore supports in small part the theory I have presented regarding the way that 
war experience can act as a deterrent in future 
Generational differences in reactions to war are a good indicator that experience is a factor 
in shaping attitudes to war, and as such are threatened when human combatants are no 
longer witnesses to wars destruction. Sheffield (1997) argues that “[t]he First World War 
exercised a terrible fascination for men who had not been old enough to serve in the war” 
(p.30), and thus given their ages were not privy to the realities of war. Instead of being 
deterred by the prospect of future conflict, they looked upon it more favourably due to 
their lack of direct memory.  
Differences in attitudes between generations relate to war enthusiasm too. As Mosse 
(1990) argues; “the lingering memory of the First World War stirred that fear [of death] as 
well … it prevented a resurgence of the enthusiasm of the generation of 1914 in 1939” 
(p.223). The key element here is the generational divide between those who were alive to 
experience war and be affected by it, and those who were not born or too young to 
understand the impact of war. Mosse argues that “[t]he rush to the colors [sic] of this 
generation has been ascribed to the fact that they no longer knew the reality of war; the 
Franco-Prussian War was fought long before and has been a short war in any case” (p.53). 
In this sense, we can infer that the reality of war, and undertaking it which most formally 
derives from experience and memory, affects ones attitudes to war. It is important to 
recognise that there are most likely other factors too – such as religious conviction – in 
shaping attitudes to war and motivating anti-war sentiment that have not been discussed 
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here. However, experience can play a role, even if only reducing the onset of war 
enthusiasm. If indeed the case, the deterring by-product of war experience is lost when we 
replace, in a variety of situations, humans with machines on the battlefield. We should 
recognise the value of this suffering and experience, and seek never to repeat it, rather 
than ignoring its important lessons. 
Experience is equally conducive to peace, and is thus directly relevant to the arguments 
made throughout this paper. In this vein of thought, Douglas MacArthur claimed that “[t]he 
soldier above all other people, prays for peace, for they must suffer and bear the deepest 
wounds and scars of war” (in Grossman, 1995, p.xxxii). Humans thus have the capability to 
turn against war because of their experience, occurring predominately amongst soldiers. 
 Furthermore, Father George Zabelka, who was the chaplain who blessed the 
atomic bomb dropped on Japan, recalls that after he returned home from war, he found 
that nobody wished to talk about it and was told to forget it, yet he could not. The Korean 
and Vietnam Wars reminded him of his experiences, and he eventually became an active 
peace campaigner as a result (in Terkel, 1984, p.531-6). In this case, Father Zabelka’s 
experience of war was a catalyst in pursuing peace. It may be that arguments from 
experience are more persuasive, such that intimate knowledge constitutes a more 
powerful argument.        
 Holmes (2003), in his work on soldiers experiences in war, says that “[a]s Robert E. 
Lee looked out across the union dead who so thickly carpeted Maye’s Heights at 
Fredericksburg, he reflected that it was as well that war was so terrible or we would 
become too fond of it” (p.274). In this sense, our acknowledgment of war’s terribleness 
through experience is tantamount to an approach towards peace, and is something which 
is threatened when experience is removed from one side of war. I do not wish to claim that 
experience is the only source of rejecting war nor do I wish to claim that LAWs in place of 
humans creates a situation whereby war would never be rejected. Rather, experience plays 
a role in motivating anti-war sentiments, and that we should pay more attention to the 
implementation of technologies that do not allow for this kind of personal and meaningful 
experience in the same way. 
However, there is a criticism of this perspective which needs addressing. That is, if 
experience does act as a deterrent, and was present between 1918 and 1939, why did 
another war commence in direct contradiction to this process? Why do wars continue in 
spite of the experience and memory of prior conflicts? 
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In response I argue that the permissibility and perceived justness of war matters in 
determining support for it. Experience of war may make one apprehensive about 
supporting more suffering, yet it does not prima facie create a rejection of all war. For 
example, there are instances when a conflict is forced upon us, and we are obliged to 
respond. The justness and moral weight of the conflict is acutely relevant in the prior 
example of WWII. There was a “difference in moral authority” (Hynes, 1997, p.111) 
between the causes for the First and Second World Wars. The differences are laid out by 
Hynes in that “[t]he First War began in idealism but lost its moral certainty as the fighting 
ground on. The Second War began with a clearer sense of moral necessity and never lost it” 
(p.111). As such, reasons for going to war place a moral significance on the support for war. 
We may not wish to see more suffering as a result of experience, but experience and 
collective memory equally informs us in which circumstances war should be waged.  
In the lead up to the 1990 Gulf War, Shaw (1997) conducted research gauging the divergent 
attitudes towards the conflict between warriors (veterans of WWII) and non-warriors. This 
research presents a criticism to the aforementioned argument since “[t]he most significant 
deterrence was that only 10 per cent of the former [warriors], but over 20 per cent of the 
latter [non-warriors] opposed the war” (p.201). Furthermore, veterans of WWII were more 
likely to approve of the war than people who had not been involved in war, and were less 
likely to agree that the “television coverage ‘glorified the war too much’ or was ‘too 
patriotic’” (p.194). In this sense, there appears to be little evidence of a deterrent arising 
from past experiences. 
However, the justification for war was a superseding factor. Most telling are the responses 
by those of a “Second World War mindset” (p.195) to the question of; what do you think of 
Saddam Hussein?  
“While most people agreed that he was ‘a dangerous man’, older 
people both male and female, were more likely than younger 
people to agree that he was ‘like Hitler’ and less likely to agree 
that he was ‘mad’ (which was very much a young person’s 
response). Older people were also much more likely than young 
people to endorse the anti-appeasement view that ‘we have to 
stand up to dictators’ as a reason for justifying the war” (p.195). 
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In addition, the comparison between Saddam and Hitler was actually volunteered by many 
of the older respondents. We may infer that experience in this case was a leading factor in 
wanting to prevent injustice. They had seen what Hitler had done, and would support a war 
against Hussein as a result.         
 My point on experience as a deterrent is not one of pacifism, or a rejection of all 
wars, but rather it is a deterrent against unnecessary wars, and can still allow for the 
justification of others. There is a desire to prevent perceived injustice, specifically when 
such injustice is witnessed directly or indirectly. Thus the view that experience acts as a 
deterrent towards war is compatible with supporting permissible wars, since both avenues 
are directed at omitting unnecessary suffering and injustice. 
7.4 Reforming War as a Response to Experience 
Insofar as war is experienced and the nature of war witnessed, there can be a reaction that 
is both positive and conducive to peace. One way this takes place is in reforming the 
strategies, laws, and customs of warfare so as to work against unnecessary suffering. As 
such, war experience can act as a unifier against unethical conduct, and seek to amend 
such practices after wrongs have been committed. Experience therefore motivates 
subsequent action and generates a discussion on how best to move forward. There are a 
number of examples which highlight the way that experience can motivate and construct 
national and international reform.  
The end of WWI generated a theme of desiring peace internationally and not merely 
between individuals, giving rise to an institutional attempt for collective security in the 
form of the League of Nations, whose purpose was to preserve the peaceful order by 
making its members culpable for defending one another against aggression. Its aim was “as 
a useful means of ending diplomacy and finding a new framework in which to settle 
international disputes without resort to war” (McDonough, 1998, p.16). Despite its failings 
in effectively enforcing collective security – and the absent membership of the USA and 
USSR – it demonstrated how the visceral reactions to suffering, as was the case after WWI, 
can generate an appetite for reform. Additionally, although Neville Chamberlain’s 
appeasement policy towards Nazi Germany can be viewed as a reluctance to go to war, the 
critics of appeasement often favoured a different avenue for reform, whereby; “most 
critics, except those on the communist fringe and in the socialist league, forward support 
for the League of Nations, and the upholding of principles of collective security” 
(McDonough, 1998, p.111). As such, the route of reform offered by the League of Nations 
A Jus Post Bellum Analysis of Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
51 
 
was appealing and demonstrated the way in which humans are capable of learning from 
events, and desiring effective change as a result. 
The Geneva Conventions on the LOAC created post-WWII are also an example of 
international reform in response to conflict. Attempts to codify the acceptable practices of 
armed conflict and to institute mechanisms which hold actions accountable serve to 
entrench ethical conduct. The development of the UN Security Council in 1945 also 
highlights the demands for greater efforts at pursing peace as a response to conflict. We 
can recognise the benefits that experience of war has on developing large scale 
institutional reform, and acknowledge the way that humans can move towards a more 
ethically permissible waging of war in response to experience, and equally what is lost 
when these processes of reform are bypassed via technology.  
The reform of war in response to experience can take place on the national level too. 
During the period of 1918-1939, British foreign policy was changed as a result of WWI. 
McDonough (1998) argues that there was disenchantment towards the use of military 
force, such that “finding peaceful solutions to international conflict” (p.33) and 
encouraging the “reconciliation of defeated powers and to promote international 
cooperation and disarmament” (p.16-17) became central themes of British foreign policy 
and therefore determined its ends to be more peaceful. Foreign policy reform is significant 
since it dictates the external output and attitude of nation-states. Experience as a 
motivator for reform has positive utility in turning more than merely individuals against 
needless conflict and suffering, and therefore is also conducive to peaceful ends. 
Additionally, reforms can be on a smaller scale, yet still possess value. For example, WWI 
ignited a degree of distrust in leaders and thus was a catalyst for an alternative informal 
approach by some generals in WWII.  Montgomery, Rees, and Horrocks are examples of 
Generals who took up this approach. Montgomery even said himself that he had suffered 
under faceless generals during WWI and vowed to do things differently given the 
opportunity (Sheffield, 1997, p.34). Furthermore, WWI affected how military strategy and 
planning was conducted in the future. Connelly (2010) argues that “[f]or the professionals 
in the military, the shadow of the Great War was equally significant … Most British generals 
were anxious to avoid another trench stalemate” (p.54). Much like the aforementioned 
reforms by way of the Geneva Convention, the specific changes in military strategy are 
conducive to ethical warfare, and allow the experience of warfare to teach us about 
avenues for improved behaviour. 
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The importance of recognising the utility of learning lessons from experience in war comes 
from the words of Norman Chamberlain, the cousin of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, 
who sent a letter shortly before he was killed in France during WWI. His words had such an 
impact on Neville Chamberlain that he published them in private memoirs in 1923. Norman 
Chamberlain writes that “[n]othing but immeasurable improvements will ever justify all the 
waste and unfairness of this war – I only hope that those who are left will never, never 
forget at what sacrifice those improvements have been won” (Chamberlain, 1917, p.140, 
italics in original). This is the response to suffering and sacrifice that we should have when 
talking about experience of war; that such lives were lost and suffering endured to improve 
the lives of others. It is improvements Chamberlain speaks of and thus we must be 
cognisant of what is possible when talking about reform.  
Without being readily mistaken for advocating for suffering, let me clarify that my stance is 
that we should recognise suffering and take heed of its lessons, rather than preferring to 
create machines which ignore the lessons of conflict. As Shay pleads in the introduction to 
Achilles in Vietnam (1995);  
“Learn the psychological damage that war does, and work to 
prevent war. There is no contradiction between hating war and 
honouring the soldier. Learn how war damages the mind and 
spirit, and work to change those things in military institutions and 
culture that needlessly create or worsen these injuries” (p.xxiii, 
italics in original). 
Thus, we must recognise the suffering that war causes, lament its contingent presence, and 
seek to move beyond it. Rather than advocating for suffering, this argument advocates for 
acknowledging suffering, and using its axiomatic inevitability within war as a motivator for 
moving beyond it. 
It is of immeasurable value to understand the power that experience can have on the 
future. If we are willing to opt for the preventable measures which LAWs provide, yet 
which fail to eradicate suffering, then by what means can we envisage mechanisms for 
reform arising so pressingly, or meaning being derived from the actions of war? The 
preventable benefits of LAWs are welcome, yet without an understanding of what humans 
bring to war and its subsequent conclusion, we deny ourselves the information and 
opportunity to discuss the ramifications for the implementation of LAWs. 
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8. The Role of Human Interaction in War 
 
The introduction of LAWs creates a new paradigm in war whereby machine combatants are 
preferred over human combatants due to their superior capabilities. This chapter addresses 
the benefits of human-human contact within conflict in terms of the strictly 
anthropomorphic mechanisms for peaceful relations borne through such interaction. I pay 
attention to the events that arise purely because of the human connection that 
transgresses the traditional divide of friend and foe.     
 This chapter looks at; fraternization as a signpost of amicable relations arising from 
conflict; the recognition of humanity in opposing forces which can act as a barrier to 
unethical acts; and the effect of dehumanizing the enemy on psychological wellbeing and 
unethical actions. This chapter highlights the benefits of human interaction, made most 
salient by the juxtaposed chaos and despair of war, and shows that the recognition of 
humanity can and does encourage actions conducive to ethical conduct and peace. If a 
solider can see in the enemy the possession of the same fears, hopes, desires, humanity, 
and suffering that they themselves possess, they are less likely to wilfully act unethically 
towards that individual. To do so would be to justify those actions against oneself. 
8.1 Fraternization 
There is little said in the literature on the sort of fraternization relevant here. This sort of 
fraternization concerns the contact, on peaceful terms, with members of the ‘enemy’. Its 
absence may be due to the negative connotation often associated with these events, 
conjuring up thoughts of individuals turning against their own side often portrayed in film 
or other media sources.        
 However, fraternization can be a great source of value as it emphasises; the 
willingness to treat opposing forces fairly, the ability to move beyond the confines and 
labels of conflict, and the recognition of humanity within the other person such that they 
are viewed as similar to oneself. Fraternization is to some degree an act of great personal 
risk should the transient trust placed in one’s enemy fall foul. The very fact that we still 
admire such events and place value in them today shows that the act of fraternization is as 
much about the symbolism of human capacity in times of great hardship to come together, 
as it is about the specific act itself.   
During the Napoleonic Wars between France and Britain, fraternization took place between 
foes despite the conflicts fierce nature. One such instance of fraternization was the sharing 
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of food and drink amongst opposing forces. Kincaid (1847) recalls that in July 1813, “the 
French foragers and our own frequently met and helped themselves, in the greatest good 
humour, while any forage remained, without exchanging words or blows” (p.243). This 
ultimately showed that “British and French soldiers retained a measure of esteem and a 
feeling of fraternity towards men whom they saw more as adversaries than as enemies” 
(Montroussier-Favre, 2012, p.68).  The ability for humans to see beyond the immediate 
differences of individuals creates a temporary peace within war. Developed amongst 
individuals in a meaningful way, fraternization creates a respect amongst adversaries and 
demonstrates a side rarely observed which can be replicated in the restoration of 
relationships, and thus endowed with meaning as indicative of human capacity more 
broadly. 
Another example of fraternization is the 1914 Christmas day truce between enemies during 
WWI. This involved the exchanging of gifts and the fabled football match between 
adversaries during unofficial ceasefires throughout the western front. The focal point of 
similarities rather than differences cannot be said empirically to assuage feelings of 
resentment amongst foes. Yet, its presence highlights the capacity for humans to respect 
each other, rather than pursue violence. The very fact that we look upon this event, and 
subsequent similar events like this, highlights the value in fraternization and relations that 
it represents.  
Furthermore, there was a desire to fraternize amongst soldiers, since in WWI when 
fraternization was “limited and more rigorously policed, soldiers lamented the fact” 
(Bourke, 1999, p.148). If there were no perceived value in fraternization, why would 
soldiers wish to do so? Their response highlights the willingness of individuals to see the 
humanity in their enemy, and such an attitude is conducive to ethical behaviour; for who 
would prefer to cause harm to those they view as equally human?   
 The desire to fraternize is highlighted by the account of Gerald V. Dennis, who 
recalls of Christmas 1916 that he would have liked to continue “fraternizing as he had done 
in the previous two years”, and states that “we would have liked to have stood up between 
our respective barbed wire, without danger and shaken hands with our counterparts” 
(Dennis, 1994, p.129). Fraternization demonstrates the feelings of mutuality, but does not 
produce it. We find value in fraternization because it shows us the manifestation of 
underlying attitudes between enemies. 
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Lastly, fraternization is a product of admirable and ethical action. Cecil H. Cox introduces an 
event of fraternization which sought to preserve life, rather than take it – a stroke of 
individual peace within war;  
“I saw a young German coming towards me and at that moment I 
just could not murder him and lowered my gun, he saw me do so 
and followed suit, shouting ‘What the h—do you want to kill me 
for, I don’t [sic] want to kill you.’ He walked back with me and 
asked if I had anything to eat? At once the relief inside me was 
unspeakable, and I gave him my iron rations & my army biscuit” 
(in Bourke, 1999, p.148). 
Fraternization constitutes an important experience that is an ethical act and evidence of a 
temporary peace during war, yet equally highlights the value of human interaction and its 
ability to overcome negative relations after war. Although not common (and European 
opponents had more in common than contemporary actors in conflict) we can learn from 
these experiences, and derive hope from the events that bring former enemies together.  
The act of fraternization appears to be difficult for LAWs to replicate given its source in the 
recognition of humanity. As fraternization stems from a feeling or emotion towards ones 
enemy, it transgresses the demands placed upon combatants in war, and instead equalises 
their status as humans and not merely enemies. This requires something that LAWs are 
likely to be incapable of possessing – the ability to recognise the intrinsic value in other 
humans and respect them as such for the persons that they are – rather than merely 
replicate external functions and outcomes. LAWs are likely to perceive little value in 
fraternization given its individual benefits, not to mention the difficulty for humans to 
‘fraternize’ with enemy machines (whatever that may entail) and derive the equivalent 
meaning from the same act. 
8.2 Recognition of Humanity 
The second aspect derived from human action and interaction is in acknowledging the 
likeness of the enemy to ourselves. If one recognises that the enemy are not so different 
from us, the expression of empathy can influence the way we act towards them, and the 
degree of force we subsequently use, thereby encouraging peace. The recognition of 
humanity can manifest itself in different contexts. 
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One way is recognising the humanity in the fallen enemy, drawing the realisation that they 
are not different. Stefan Westmann, a sergeant in the 29th Division of the German Army, 
envisaged being friends with a young French soldier who had died;  
“A boy who had to fight with the cruellest weapons against a man 
who had nothing against him personally, who wore the uniform of 
another nation and spoke another language, but a man who had a 
father and mother and a family” (in Arthur, 2002, p.71). 
Robert Rasmus acknowledged the humanity in the fallen too. The German dead he passed 
by “were no longer the German’s of the brutish faces and the helmets he saw in the news 
reels. They were exactly our age. These were boys like us” (in Terkel, 1984, 44-45). 
Recognising that one wishes their adversary was still alive and perceiving them as humans 
is immensely powerful. If individuals can have a visceral response to those that have died, 
and thereby understand the vacuous nature of differences between enemies, such 
sentiments could extend to the living and actions towards them. Lamenting the loss of 
unfulfilled life signals more than just sorrow for what could have been, but entrenches a 
sentiment that one would rather not experience this again.    
 Although such recognition is potentially acknowledged with retrospect, I have no 
grounds to doubt their sincerity. These examples show that humans have the capacity to 
understand the importance of such events, and show the realm of possible reactions that 
demonstrate the positive attributes of human character.  
Additionally, mutual recognition manifests in the reshaping of views towards the enemy 
through exposure to their similitude, and thus provides a different perspective entirely. 
Hiram Sturdy was surprised at finally encountering German soldiers during WWI after being 
engrained with dehumanization propaganda;   
“The batch arrives, and I get one of the greatest disappointments 
of the war … Our prisoners were young men, bandaged and 
battered, who … furtled and jumped, a solid bunch of nerves ... 
The most savage comment I heard while watching the prisoners, 
came from an infantryman. That was ‘poor buggers’” (in Bourke, 
1999, p.165). 
Experience of warfare can promote the recognition of humanity in the enemy and act as a 
positive force in future. There is value to be found in the transformation of views brought 
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about through experience. We can say at the very least, for peace and future prosperity, it 
is better to see others as humans rather than different, which may thereby justify actions 
that we ourselves would deplore.   
There is no better example of this process being exhibited in practice than the El Alamein 
desert conflict during World War Two. John Bierman and Colin Smith outline in great detail 
in Alamein: War Without Hate (2003) the degree of respect harboured throughout this 
conflict – and after – amongst adversaries from all sides. This respect and shared humanity 
is exemplified in the reunion that takes place, comprising of veterans from German, British, 
Italian, and Australian forces from that conflict. This signifies “the extent to which shared 
experience, common hardship and mutual respect can create a bizarre comradeship of 
antagonists” (Bierman and Smith, 2003, p.1). As such, this is emblematic of how war can be 
fought to produce respectful peace processes between former adversaries, and that the 
transmission of respect and mutual recognition of humanity (and treatment of each other 
as such) is at the heart of such processes. 
The recognition of humanity is central to questions of ethical behaviour and acting 
positively towards others, and is important within the peace process in viewing others as 
equals. As Coker (2008) says on this point, in order “[t]o remain ‘ethical’, war requires one 
to see it through the eyes of the enemy” (p.160). If experiencing the nature of the enemy 
can act as a catalyst for change, then they are positive elements of war experience after all. 
Samuel Stauffer found that “men without combat experience hated the enemy more than 
actual fighters did, and servicemen who had not left the country hated more than those 
overseas” (in Bourke, 1999, p. 160). Since until now war has been a present reality, we 
have grounds to advocate that experience is useful as it generates the mutual recognition 
of humanity that is productive to renewing relations. 
The recognition of humanity and awareness of similarities between friend and foe was also 
observed during the Napoleonic Wars. In perceptions of the enemy between French and 
British combatants, “moderate views and mentions of respect greatly outnumber the 
expressions of hostility” as if they “recognised that they belong to the same world, shared 
the same values, and played by the same rules” (Montroussier-Favre, 2012, p.69). The 
French and British left similar accounts as “they had the sense that they shared the same 
culture and the same values, the former enemies wrote of each other with respect and 
esteem” (p.71). It is thus the case that humans possess the capacity to recognise the good 
in their opponents, generate some measure of respect for them, and act more ethically and 
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less destructive towards them as a result. Even though such actions are not frequent, it 
remains within the remit of human capabilities to exhibit such characteristics.   
Despite these evidentiary beneficial aspects of humanity in warfare, Schulzke (2016) 
highlights a genuine challenge to this viewpoint. Although he recognises the presence of 
humanity within war as a factor in staying the hand of lethal force, he argues that the 
obfuscation of ethical sympathies via autonomous and semi-autonomous drones is sourced 
from a fundamental misunderstanding of how war is currently waged. Wars throughout 
history have included the opportunity to realise the mutual recognition of shared 
humanity, yet current warfare is devoid of such occurrences. The aspect of distance in 
using force, as well as the desire of soldiers to be invisible from the enemy until and during 
the point of attack is indeed a challenge to the relevance of a shared humanity within 
contemporary warfare. Schulzke argues that such factors are “not apt to inspire feelings of 
empathy” (2016, p.70).         
 Although I believe Schulzke is correct in his assessment of the current state of 
military conflict, this does not take into account the beneficial and meaningful transmission 
of respect and humanity with civilian populations, or those who are potentially willing to 
join forces against oneself. The age of terrorism and non-linear military organisations 
indeed reduces the opportunities of transmitting respect and perhaps diminishes the 
meaningfulness of such encounters. However the necessary respect and transmission of 
humanity is both a possibility in and of itself given the presence of agents capable of doing 
so. Yet human combatants also play a role in the transmission of mutual humanity and 
respect within communities. Although the recognition of a shared humanity between 
combatants is diminished, the need for demonstrating ones humanity, and understanding 
its presence in others, is fundamentally important from the perspective of amicable 
conclusions of warfare and the concerns of jus post bellum. 
The recognition of humanity is a product of one’s own humanity. The reaction to the 
unfulfilled lives of those who have fallen is an empathy based upon what we value. The 
developments of attitudes that are conducive to peace are anthropomorphic in this sense, 
and thus are lost when LAWs displace human combatants. As for the consequences of this 
change, such conclusions are yet to be observed. However, this discussion merely 
highlights that human interaction on the battlefield can be a source of attitudes which 
promote ethical behaviour and subsequent peace. 
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8.3 The Dehumanization of the Enemy 
It has been shown that the recognition of humanity can have some benefits for ethical 
behaviour and actions towards peace rather than further destruction. However, it is 
important to acknowledge the adverse effects of encouraging the opposite sentiments – to 
dehumanize the enemy – as a mechanism for overcoming the psychological barrier to 
killing which humans might possess. By doing so, we can see what effects these processes 
have on soldiers and their output, and why we might choose to move beyond this in order 
for ethical behaviour and peace to be more lasting. 
The encouragement of dehumanizing the enemy and their population can be observed 
throughout the 20th century, with propaganda against the Germans describing them as the 
‘the Hun’ or ‘brutes’, or ascribing actions to all soldiers such as mutilating women for 
example (Hiram Sturdy in Bourke, 1999, p.165). Dehumanization encourages unity against 
the enemy, support for the war and those fighting it, and use of lethal force.   
 However, the recognition of humanity can be liberating and profound for those 
who overcome these misconceptions, and therefore have an important utility. Shay (1995) 
found that dehumanizing the enemy was psychologically damaging, saying that; “[o]ur 
patients tell us that turning the enemy into vermin exacted a terrible price from them after 
the fight was over” (p.116, italics in original). As a result, one of his proposed measures to 
reduce the psychological suffering in war was to respect the enemy as human. 
Another difficulty with dehumanizing the enemy, beyond transgressing the benefits 
engendering respect, is that the post-conflict phase is likely more difficult. What ground is 
there to build new relationships upon if the war has been spent relaying to the public that 
the enemy are less-than-human? Also, how do we go from dehumanizing the enemy out of 
perceived military necessity, to viewing them as international partners and cooperating 
with them? It is this question which I perceive to be of great importance, yet equally fails to 
be addressed within the jus post bellum literature. In this respect, the way the war is fought 
has significant consequences for how peace is achieved. Therefore, the encouragement of 
actions towards assisting the engendering of respect and mutuality between enemies is 
greatly beneficial to peace, and is also assistive towards the concerns of jus post bellum. 
The alternative practice of dehumanization however does great harm to the peace process, 
and anything counter to the end of peace is potentially unethical as a military strategy 
(given the subscription to the dependence approach), even without ramifications in 
prohibiting the recognition of humanity. 
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9. Martial Virtues: The Warrior Spirit and the Uniqueness of Mercy 
 
The role of martial virtues in warfighting has been addressed throughout military ethics, 
including the warrior ethos in Homer’s Iliad and historic military traditions such as chivalry. 
Watson (1999) maps out a transition between conceptions of military virtues; from Plato’s 
warrior class in The Republic, Aristotle’s widely cited virtue ethics, Machiavelli’s conception 
as merely tools of the prince himself and a product of self-interest, as well as Nietzsche’s 
aesthetics as a replacement for conventional morality. However, the role of martial virtues 
in contemporary conflict is questionable, and therefore is of concern regarding the 
changing nature of conflict. The implementation of LAWs questions the ability for actors to 
exhibit martial virtues. I find within this chapter that the only martial virtue whose ends 
cannot be replicated by LAWs is mercy. Since the by-products of mercy are beneficial to 
inculcating the conditions upon which peace is eventually founded, such as respect and the 
mutual recognition of humanity, it becomes morally problematic to introduce weapons of 
warfare that remove the possibility of such actions being exhibited, and especially those 
which have advantageous consequences to the ends of just wars. 
Although it is difficult to establish a comprehensive list of martial virtues since they largely 
correspond to individual military organisation’s code of conduct and ethics, there are a 
number of martial virtues which are often commonplace. Sparrow (2013) mentions 
physical courage as “the willingness to face fear of bodily discomfort, injury, and death” 
(p.89); moral courage as “the willingness to face and overcome fear of the social and 
personal sanctions that may be incurred by doing what is right rather than what is popular, 
expected, or prudential” (p.89); loyalty which involves “the willingness to bear risks and 
make sacrifices for the sake of that to which one is loyal” (p.90); honour defined as “the 
concern for how well one lives up to ones chosen ideals” (p.91); and mercy as refraining, 
“out of compassion, from killing or causing suffering when one is both able and would be 
justified in doing so” (p.92).         
 Additionally, Aronovitch (2001) provides a further set of martial virtues, consisting 
of bravery and courage, wisdom or good judgment, truthfulness, and temperance or self-
control. It is these that comprise the mainstay of martial virtues, and is thus the chief aim 
of military apparatuses to inculcate dispositions to virtuosity in order to influence the 
display of ethical outcomes.  
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9.1 The Warrior Spirit  
The embodiment of martial virtues culminates in the warrior ethic, or warrior spirit. Riza 
(2014) argues that killing at distance impacts traditional conceptions of the warrior, and 
how such dispositions are limited within this new space. For Riza (2014); 
“The warrior spirit is a sense that what a warrior does in war and 
how he (or indeed she) comes at it on a personal level transcends 
the cold rationality of performing a mission, completing an 
objective, or taking a hill … This is an important distinction from 
how mere combatants, that legally defined group, may approach 
war, because it goes far beyond duty … [C]ombatants do what 
they are told to do on the battlefield; warriors understand why 
such things must be done” (p.261). 
Since it is the warrior spirit that is prepared to die as well as kill, Riza predicts that a trend 
towards killing from a distance may “generate in us an apathy about killing other human 
beings” (p. 270), since the embodiment of martial virtues in the warrior acts as a barrier to 
war for its own sake. 
Morkevicius (2014) also shows how certain character traits are vital to the exercising of 
virtues. He argues that the ‘soul’ is a crucial aspect of moral decision-making, thus directly 
informing our ability to abide by certain rules such as discrimination. He also argues that 
empathy is a key attribute as it 
“[E]nables human beings as emotional creatures to recognise the 
emotional states of others … [I]t is sometimes unconscious, or so 
automatic as to be impossible to explain verbally. It is thus not 
something we can teach a robot” (p.7).  
In talking about LAWs and their ethical outcomes, the advent of emotions is recognised 
solely as a catalyst for unethical behaviour. However, Morkevicius (2014) argues that they 
play a role in our moral reasoning and decisions of which ethical code to use, as well as 
allowing us to understand another’s emotions. “This moral imagination can help us to 
evaluate the meaning of the other’s actions,” and understanding the threat posed by the 
enemy “requires being able to imagine the other’s purposes” (p.14, italics in original). 
Exercising martial virtues such as mercy and temperance requires a disposition of character 
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that understands the warrior spirit, as well as the nature of their surroundings (by using 
those emotions for positive ends), and is thus the embodiment of a virtuous character.  
Riza (2014) and Morkevicius (2014) show that new technologies such as LAWs are 
incapable of performing these character traits. Major Davis (2007) echoes these sentiments 
against the use of robotic weapons on such grounds insofar as there are things which 
humans are uniquely capable of carrying out. He argues that “one of the uniquely positive 
attributes of the combat soldier is his humanity in a particularly inhumane environment” 
(no page).  Thus in these respects, it is clear that LAWs are incapable of performing such 
tasks with respect to exhibiting martial virtues.    
However, I take issue with much of the previously stated arguments for one reason. Martial 
virtues are beneficial for both the individual and others (Foot, 2002) but do not possess any 
intrinsic value themselves. The need for martial virtues is to direct actions of soldiers 
towards more ethical ends, such that he who embodies certain virtues will thus behave 
ethically. For example, Aronovitch (2001) outlines this relationship with the martial virtue 
courage and good soldiers in that; “for genuine courage implies facing up to fearsome 
opposition or obstacles; cruelly inflicting suffering on those who are helpless, weak, 
defeated does not”; to be courageous “is neither to want nor to foster cruelty” (p.17) In 
this respect, we can say that the instrumental value of martial virtues is to encourage 
ethical actions, and incentivise such behaviour even when disadvantageous to the agents 
wellbeing, whether physically, psychologically or morally.  
There is no sign of intrinsic value to martial virtues. If LAWs are developed with ethical 
outcomes at least as consistent as exhibited within human combatants, then the lack of 
martial virtue in conflict is irrelevant, given such ends are achieved via different means. 
Insofar as human behaviour is unpredictable and subject to external influences, there is a 
need for internal guidelines laid out by virtue ethics and the contingent martial virtues. 
 Moelker and Olsthoorn (2007) reiterate this point, arguing that virtue development 
is the best way to prevent unethical behaviour since top-down implementations of ethical 
guidelines are impotent when no one else is around. The removal of humans capable of 
performing virtuously is not an immediate threat, so long as the agents replacing humans 
arrive at those same ethical outcomes. However, if LAWs are unable to replicate those 
same ends, then the inability to exhibit martial virtues becomes morally problematic.  
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9.2 On Mercy 
The only martial virtue which produces different ends to those which LAWs can likely 
reproduce is the martial virtue ‘mercy’.  Mercy bilaterally benefits both sides of the 
combatant divide, and for this reason I envisage LAWs as being unable to benefit the 
opposing side in the same valuable way that mercy does. It suffices to say that virtues such 
as courage, bravery, loyalty, and good judgement for example, are virtues which benefit 
the individual and moral patients, but only those who are fighting on the side of the 
exhibiting agent. Their benefits are strictly unilateral when viewed within the dichotomy of 
friend and foe.  
Take for example the virtue of loyalty. Since one cannot express loyalty to the enemy as 
this would transgress the integrity of the human combatant, it only has unilateral benefits 
for ones allies. For in instances of evident division and contradicting viewpoints (which 
friend and foe invariably are) one cannot be loyal to both.    
 Additionally, nor can ones outcomes of bravery benefit an enemy soldier. More 
often than not the beneficiaries of bravery are those whom the exhibitor of bravery deems 
worthwhile to sustain the sacrifice and risk incurred through their brave actions. Although 
principally this benefits the ‘friend’ and is unilateral in this sense, if it were to benefit the 
enemy other factors and dispositions would be at play beyond the act of bravery, such as 
empathy or a mutual recognition of humanity between adversaries. What we can say about 
bravery and similarly other martial virtues such as trust, is that they do not intrinsically 
include a connection with an adversary, and thus can be deployed unilaterally. 
Therefore, the one virtue which universally benefits all agents, regardless of combatant 
affiliation, is mercy. Mercy is extended across the divide of battle towards friend and foe 
alike, and can be defined as; “the suspension or mitigation of punishment that would 
otherwise be deserved as retribution, and which is granted out of pity and compassion for 
the wrongdoer” (Hampton, 1988, p. 158, italics in original). Furthermore, the act of mercy is 
intrinsically linked to a concern for wellbeing, and “it is when we do pay attention to the 
offender’s wellbeing that we may decide that mercy rather than further punishment is in 
order “(p.158).  
Mercy is thus a response to an act that does deserve retributive actions, but for internal 
reasons is deemed inappropriate. Such a concern can be logically derived from a mutual 
recognition of suffering and humanity that exists between the exhibiter of mercy and the 
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receiver by virtue of shared experience (or merely the capacity to do so). Mercy does not 
make sense outside of the paradigm of human-human experience and interaction. When 
we introduce machines, it becomes more difficult to talk meaningfully about wellbeing (of 
the machine), or the machine being able to recognise, in light of reasons for retributive 
actions, that mercy is instead a just response to wrongdoing. 
I take the view that LAWs could not exhibit mercy, or be recipients of it. Its situational 
appropriateness and relevance is not something programmable, but stems from a shared 
humanity and experience amongst individuals, rather than humans as part of a larger 
collective. Empathetic relations in warfare demonstrate the intrinsic value of human 
combatants and contest the notion that LAWs could carry out merciful acts with mutually 
beneficial ends. It is hard to imagine, given the relationship between wellbeing and mercy, 
why humans would act mercifully towards a side deploying machines in place of human 
combatants, given the distinct lack of connection between those exhibiting mercy and its 
expected positive outcome. 
The exhibition of mercy can resonate throughout history, and have profound impacts on 
the lives of many. Major Davis (2007) argues that; 
“There have been instances in virtually every war involving the 
U.S. in which the enemy was told the American soldiers would 
take no prisoners and kill everyone on the battlefield. Instead, the 
enemy discovered that although the GIs could be as ruthless and 
vicious as any opponent, the same soldier could extend mercy 
when appropriate. As information about U.S. soldiers’ humanity 
spread among enemy combatants, more of them willingly 
surrendered instead of choosing to continue to fight – which 
ultimately supports U.S war aims and saves lives on both sides of 
the battle line” (no page). 
As such, although martial virtues possess little intrinsic value themselves, we must 
recognise the value mercy plays on the battlefield, and how LAWs are incapable of 
replicating such actions. The inability for LAWs to replicate mercy – an important 
martial virtue – highlights how replacing human combatants can pose ethical 
dilemmas, even if they are not so obvious at first glance.  
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One such ramification of merciful action can be found as an effect of the actions of US 
soldiers during WWI. An interviewer of German prisoners of war in WWII found that 
German soldiers frequently said that veterans of WWI had advised them to surrender to 
the first Americans they saw. “The American reputation for fair play and respect for human 
life had survived over generations, and the decent actions of American soldiers in World 
War I had saved the lives of many soldiers in World War II” (Grossman, 1995, p.205). Thus 
merciful actions in warfare are positive to the extent that they benefit friend and foe, as 
well as the longevity that can be established when such actions are exhibited through the 
contingent preservation of life.  
The extension of humanity through mercy is also an important facet of war’s conclusion. 
Surrender is a complicated process, and requires submitting one’s short term autonomy to 
the opponent’s authority. It requires a different process than fighting war and an 
alternative disposition too;  
“In order to fight close range one must deny the humanity of 
one’s enemy. Surrender requires the opposite – that one 
recognize and take pity on the humanity of the enemy. A 
surrender in the heat of battle requires a complete, and very 
difficult, emotional turnaround by both parties” (Grossman, 1995, 
p.199). 
What do we envisage this process looking like when LAWs are deployed against human 
combatants? Perhaps this process is jeopardised when LAWs are implemented, since the 
recognition of humanity is a feature of surrender, and when it is appropriate to allow this 
to take place. In the heat of battle, humanity plays a role in understanding the actions of 
the other, and tailoring our actions as a result. 
Merciful action has at its centre the recognition of humanity, and the recognition of the 
importance of the enemy’s wellbeing.  George Ashurst, during WWI recounts merciful 
action which would otherwise have been counterproductive if it were not motivated by the 
recognition of humanity; 
“We saw a German lying wounded on top of an outhouse when 
up came another German carrying a ladder, calm as anything 
despite having five or six of our rifles pointing at him … The officer 
said, ‘Don’t fire boys. He deserves a medal, that lad.’ So we didn’t, 
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we let him walk away with his wounded fellow” (in Arthur, 2002, 
p.73). 
From a perspective of military necessity, this acknowledgement appears to be 
counterproductive; yet when viewed from the ends of peace, it is fundamental to the 
conclusion of war. The demonstration of compassion and mercy actually encourages the 
exhibition of ethical conduct. I am sceptical that LAWs would be able to extend such 
recognition, since its origin is derived from our co-humanity with the enemy, and influences 
our perception of when lethal force is appropriate.  
These events are important, since they preserve humanity in warfare which is seemingly 
devoid of it, and preserves life and respect which are essential to improving the prospects 
of restoring amicable relations post-war. Mercy is thus a product of recognising humanity. 
Its beneficial nature to both friend and foe and encouraging the exhibition of ethical 
conduct holds immeasurable utility for the waging of just wars. Although by no means 
frequently exhibited, the introduction of LAWs has a significant likelihood of displacing 
them altogether by removing the ability for the opposing force to exhibit merciful actions, 
and thus has further ramifications for the ends we ourselves seek to achieve in war.  
Although LAWs potentially possess transformative capabilities in terms of preventing 
suffering via greater precision, we should not forget the utility that humans are capable of 
instantiating. Perhaps instead of removing these aspects of warfare that have beneficial 
outcomes to the pursuit of peace and ethical behaviour, it may be better to encourage 
virtuous dispositions rather than replacing them altogether. Reconciling the preventative 
nature of LAWs with the intrinsic and instrumental benefits of humanity is no easy feat. Yet 
in highlighting positive human characteristics, this argument begins the discussion about 
which areas we are willing to sacrifice in the future.  
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Part 3: Achieving Peace after War: LAWs as 
Wrongdoers and Moral Repair 
 
Although jus post bellum focuses on post-conflict actions from an ethical perspective, there 
is an alternative view of peace theory derived from a practical perspective: peacebuilding. 
This area possesses an alternative utility from jus post bellum considerations by addressing 
descriptive mechanisms and requirements for peace rather than normative ones. Although 
both largely talk of ‘societal repair’ in the form of institutional changes and reconstruction, 
this section turns to the need for ‘moral repair’ defined as; “the task of restoring or 
stabilizing – and in some cases creating – the basic elements that sustain human beings in a 
recognizably moral relationship” (Urban Walker, 2006, p.23). Although just war theory 
focuses on ways to reduce suffering and harm through a set of rules to limit the proclivity 
and destruction of war, it says little about the ways in which wrongdoing should be 
repaired. Schulzke (2017) has provided an account of just war theory that attempts to 
highlight the absence of duties towards non-combatants during warfare so as to address 
the current “inadequate respect for civilian’s rights in just war theory itself” (p.219). This is 
indeed a welcome advancement in the direction of understanding how just war theory can 
be adapted to include what happens when its tenets are transgressed, especially towards a 
thorough account of the legal challenges faced too as is presented within Schulzke’s 
Protecting the Victims of War (2017).  This section of the paper aims to deepen this enquiry 
into the underdeveloped areas of just war theory pertaining most fundamentally to the 
necessity of moral repair.  
Throughout this section of the paper I will focus on descriptive measures for repair that are 
discussed within peacebuilding, and show how they are relevant to the ethical concerns of 
this paper. The following discussions concern the relationship of LAWs to three areas of 
moral repair; forgiveness, reconciliation, and truth telling, highlighting the way in which 
obligations incumbent upon wrongdoers manifest themselves in duties for moral repair 
post-conflict.  
Since I acknowledge that the potential for greater precision and reduced suffering 
produced by LAWs is positive, one might reasonably argue that this outweighs the 
demands of repair, at least within the bounds of just war theory. However, I see the 
benefits of preventing harm as having an important instrumental component; the limited 
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waging of war against unnecessary suffering is beneficial for peace. Walzer (1992) argues 
that “[t]he utility of fighting limited wars … has to do not only with reducing the total 
amount of suffering, but also with holding open the possibility of peace and the resumption 
of pre-war activities” (p.132). We can therefore perceive value in moral repair given its 
direction towards sustainable peace. Although just war theory directs us towards the 
imperative to limit suffering, it does provide a framework through which we can identify 
when morally culpable harm has been committed.      
 I do not see the limited waging of war in reducing suffering, and the establishment 
of mechanisms for dealing with suffering (repair), as competing areas since both are 
equally complementary to the pursuit of peace. Given my views on jus post bellum as a 
forum of accountability and repair in order to better realise the goal of peace, I also view 
these as mutually existing with the remit of just war theory. Therefore, I see moral repair 
and its various mechanisms as conducive to peace, since the repairing of relationships and 
engendering of respect procures fertile ground for cooperation and societal repair. 
The conclusions I reach in this part are tentative in their applicability, and I make efforts to 
show that the limitations of successful repair via LAWs is not tantamount to their ethical 
impermissibility. I emphasise the importance that means play in achieving ends, and how 
the implementation of LAWs as potential wrongdoers serves to transgress obligations for 
repair placed upon them. Though suffering is reducible via LAWs, this does not equate to 
the abolition of suffering altogether. So long as we are aware of the advent of suffering, 
and the benefits (and in many cases necessity) of repair to sustainable peace, it is worth 
our time enquiring into the ways that LAWs fall short of reparative duties, and how this 
impacts the goals of just war theory. 
In discussing LAWs as ‘wrongdoers’, I am almost exclusively addressing wrongdoing from a 
consequentialist perspective. Within the realm of moral repair, the impact on victims is of 
heightened importance, and thus the consequence of action which brings unjust harm is 
denoted as ‘wrong’. Although deontological and virtue ethics are competing legitimate 
perspectives of what constitutes wrong, their insistence on the possession of wrongful 
intent or bad character appears to be problematic in this context. The difficulty with 
concluding that LAWs can intend at all, or that such intentions are endogenously derived 
from an individual character, seems to make it difficult to apply deontological or virtue 
ethics to the ethical judgment of LAWs’ actions. As such, it is pragmatic to rest the 
following ethical judgements within the realm of consequentialist reasoning.  
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10. Forgiveness 
 
Within jus post bellum or peacebuilding discussions, there is a lack of attention paid to the 
act of moral repair. Instead, jus post bellum prescriptions mainly focus on macro-level 
changes, (such as reinstituting sovereignty and reconstruction of infrastructure and 
institutions), rather than individual level repair.  
War has a detrimental effect on relationships. Pre-war relations are destroyed, and are 
often seen as irreparable; especially when the process of dehumanization is inculcated. 
How do we then go about repairing relationships between individuals as well as collectives 
so as to sustain the fragile peace attained post-conflict? Without a secure foundation from 
which to build peace upon, with resentment and anger still fostered, we cannot realistically 
enter into discussions concerning reconstructing or reforming institutions. I see moral 
repair, or efforts to achieve its constituent parts, as a necessary basis from which to build 
lasting peace upon; for if we can move beyond wrongdoing and negative feelings between 
previous enemies, then the seeds for future conflict will have been diminished in 
constructive ways. 
This chapter begins by outlining the concept of forgiveness through its definitions and 
types to understand the demands entailed. I assess the compatibility of LAWs to 
forgiveness in connection with both its nature and subsequent conditions relating to 
victims, perpetrators, and within the act itself. I show why forgiveness is conducive to 
peace due to its consequences of developing moral repair between individuals as well as 
collectives, before highlighting the compatibility between forgiveness and LAWs within the 
wider theoretical schema of jus post bellum. Given that LAWs are unable to carry out 
forgiveness or be recipients of it; their implementation within war becomes morally 
problematic since their actions cannot reasonably be directed towards a sustainable peace 
via forgiveness. 
10.1 Background on Forgiveness 
A) Overview of forgiveness 
Forgiveness requires three pre-action conditions; a wrong must have been committed, for 
we cannot forgive something that was not wrong, even if only in the subjective sense; 
there must be a victim such that the wrong cannot be passive – for example, a collectively 
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perceived wrong such as speeding is not, prima facie, forgivable since it is lacking a victim; 
and the consequences of committing that wrong must lead to a development of justified 
negative sentiments towards the wrongdoer. 
B) Defining Forgiveness 
Forgiveness predominately entails the foregoing of resentment and negative feelings 
towards the wrongdoer (Govier, 2002; Griswold, 2007; Salzberg, 1995; Murphy, 1988), with 
resentment defined as “a response not to general wrongs but to wrongs against oneself” 
(Murphy, 1988, p.16). Forgiveness is endowed with meaning because it overcomes genuine 
and justified feelings of resentment. Walsh (2005) similarly argues that forgiveness entails 
holding the offender “excused from an offence, even in one’s thoughts, while still 
acknowledging his or her responsibility for the offence” (no page), and Roberts (1995) 
alternatively suggests that forgiveness “is a dispelling of justified anger at one who has 
offended against oneself” (p.302). These two definitions complement those previously 
mentioned and strengthen the view that forgiveness requires foreswearing resentment and 
overcoming negative feelings. Given the complementary nature of the aforementioned 
definitions, I accept that forgiveness entails victims to forego negative sentiments, whether 
resentment or alternative emotions – such as anger, hatred, or the desire to seek revenge– 
and thus arrive at a situation whereby the wrongdoer is redeemed from the offence.  
C)  Types of Forgiveness 
Forgiveness can also manifest itself in two types; within a bilateral context, whereby the act 
is situated between the two principle agents of forgiveness –the victim and wrongdoer – 
and also on a mutual level in acknowledging the reciprocity of wrongdoing and suffering 
which is largely contingent to conflict. Importantly, military conflict produces grounds for 
mutual forgiveness, since neither military force are simply victims or sources of 
wrongdoing, but occupy the space in between. Just war theorists may disagree with the 
manifestation of mutual forgiveness, since one may take the view that the unjust side must 
surely have more to apologise for, or perhaps have the sole burden of apologising. Even if 
one rejects the moral equality of combatants (whereby regardless of ad bellum conditions, 
combatants are equally liable to lethal force), mutual forgiveness is reconcilable with just 
war theory. For example, it would be disingenuous to argue that the just side cannot 
commit wrongdoing towards the unjust side, even despite their morally permissible cause. 
Just combatants are therefore morally culpable for harm they inflict. From an ad bellum 
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perspective there might be a hierarchy of culpability for wrong committed, yet this says 
nothing about wrongs committed during war which either side can be subjected to.  
10.2 Forgiveness and LAWs 
The compatibility of LAWs to the act of forgiveness will be assessed in relation to the 
necessary conditions required, and will look at three conditions; those related to the 
forgiver, wrongdoer, and within forgiveness itself.  
For the forgiver, Griswold (2007) believes that “recognition of shared humanity by the 
injured party is a necessary step on the way to forgiveness” (p.79). It is necessary that the 
forgiver see the wrongdoer as human as the shared mutual humanity allows for the 
necessary conditions of forgiveness to flourish. Similarly, Roberts (1995) argues that the 
victim has to know “that her anger can be reduced by finding excuses for her offender, by 
considering her own moral resemblance to the offender, by focusing compassionately on 
the offender’s misery, [and] by remembering her own indebtedness” (p.303). The 
recognition of equal fallibility is an essential feature and condition of forgiveness. 
It is difficult to see how a victim could reasonably excuse the actions of the wrongdoing 
agent to the extent of forgiveness when they are not like-body and mind, possessive of the 
same capacities, and lacking “moral resemblance” (Roberts, 1995, p.303). The recognition 
of humanity within forgiveness is necessary precisely because the parties to forgiveness are 
similar enough for such sentiments to arise, and not differentiate between essential 
natures and characteristics. Within these conditions it is clear that arguments can be made 
for an anthropomorphic condition of forgiveness, thus requiring human combatants as the 
principle agents of warfare if the reparative nature of forgiveness is desired post-conflict. 
For the wrongdoer, Griswold (2007) argues that they must acknowledge responsibility, 
repudiate their deeds, experience and express regret, commit to being the sort of person 
who does not inflict injury, and show they understand the damage done. In relation to 
LAWs, I have no trouble imagining that they could commit a wrongful act. My difficulty is 
their capacity to acknowledge their offence.  
Fundamental to the renewing of relationships is the ability to put things right between 
individuals who were wronged, and no longer feel such actions affect their views of the 
wrongdoer. This is achieved through the genuine expression of regret and being believed in 
their repudiation of misdeeds and commitment to a better future (Griswold, 2007). I see 
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these conditions as being incompatible with the capabilities of LAWs. This is because of the 
difficulty of LAWs expressing regret in the way we might expect humans to do so and 
equally be convinced by. Since forgiveness is counter to ones intuition of foregoing 
legitimate negative emotions, the relationship between victim and wrongdoer must be 
genuine. Similarly, LAWs are required to commit to becoming a better self that turns 
against former dispositions. Can we envisage LAWs to publicly show declaration of this 
reformation – or have it mean something to LAWs as a personal recognition of 
wrongdoing? I view this as unlikely since the recognition of wrong demands different 
processes than merely carrying out a wrongful act, such as moral awareness, and the 
repudiation of misdeeds is an important internal process, not simply imposed from the 
outside. Requirements upon actors within forgiveness to acknowledge their responsibility 
and wrongdoing whilst committing themselves to do better in future, places significant 
questions over the ability of LAWs to be involved in the act of forgiveness.  
Griswold (2007) also sees guilt as the key motivator for forgiveness, such that we envisage 
forgiveness as only truly arising when the guilty are involved within the act, arguing that 
“[t]he wish to alleviate the burden of guilt is surely the most common and pressing motive 
for requesting forgiveness” (p.52, italics in original). There are legitimate metaphysical 
questions as to whether LAWs could realistically acknowledge their actions as being wrong 
per se, never mind feel guilty and seek to do something in response.  
The final set of conditions relate to the act of forgiveness in general, that if not met 
forgiveness will not take place, or not be forgiveness in any meaningful and generally 
understood sense. Griswold (2007) argues that forgiveness is underpinned by “[t]he ideals 
of responsibility, respect, self-governance, truth, mutual accountability, friendship, and 
growth” (p.213). We can recognise the importance of each condition, and similarly 
recognise their anthropomorphic nature. Let us take, for example, mutual accountability 
and friendship as two qualities necessary for forgiveness, yet somewhat anthropomorphic. 
First, mutual accountability within the context of forgiveness requires being able to hold 
the wrongdoer responsible, not only for the wrongs they have committed, but also for their 
future deeds such that trust is secured. This is anthropomorphic in two respects. As 
outlined before, there are few available other agents to take responsibility for autonomous 
weapons (Sparrow, 2007). Forgiveness requires, to a large extent, that responsibility be 
sought for the wrongdoing by the perpetrator, and thus it is as an endogenous process that 
meaning is found within the healing nature of forgiveness. If LAWs, as an agent in war 
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capable of committing wrongs, are not capable of being held accountable for them, then 
this contravenes the necessity for mutual accountability.     
 The mutual feature of this condition is somewhat contextually anthropomorphic 
too. Since LAWs must hold the victim of their crime accountable (presumably for the 
offering of genuine forgiveness and not self-interested or alternatively motivated 
forgiveness-like acts), this places mutual accountability within the realm of human-human 
interaction. It is difficult to envisage how humans might appropriately hold autonomous 
weapons responsible for their wrongs and how an autonomous weapon might reasonably 
reciprocate this. 
Second, friendship is a two way process, a relationship between two parts of relative 
equivalency that must both be aware of their nature. The relationship between humans 
from which friendship springs is not the sort that is easily theoretically replicated, and 
indeed necessarily reciprocated, by humans towards machines and vice versa. Forgiveness 
aims to bring about some kind of relationship, in degrees of friendship or amicable 
relations, which requires the ability to relate and omit those characteristics necessary for 
genuine connections between agents. This is something beyond the prima facie replication 
of human functions in machines, but instead relies on its approach and behaviour towards 
those around it (in this case LAWs) and the way others are towards them. In the restoring 
of relationships within moral repair we see a fundamental rejection of LAWs, in that they 
are by their nature as non-humans, opposed to the sorts of positive relations we seek to 
bring about through forgiveness and moral repair.  
Alternatively, Long (1994) argues “that an act for which forgiveness is sought must involve 
something less than either full knowledge of the alternatives or their consequences and/or 
less than full freedom to choose among them” (p.107). There are two parts here which are 
contingent to bringing about forgiveness.      
 First is the extent of knowledge we have over the consequences of our actions. 
Intending harm means that forgiveness is unlikely to take place; whereas committing an act 
which has unforeseen wrongful consequences can still be forgiven. We can reasonably 
envisage LAWs as unable to a) act on less than full knowledge of its actions, and b) prove 
that it did not have full knowledge. On a), the inputs leading to the decisions and actions of 
LAWs are fully considered and entered into the process. It is therefore only acting because 
of those inputs. Although consequences cannot be wholly foreseen, in the case of collateral 
damage, this is no different to human combatants and thus the outcomes are still evidence 
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of wrongdoing. On b), how would the machine profess acting on less than full knowledge? 
Perhaps in a mechanised way whereby a list of inputs which led to the decision could be 
uncovered and analysed, although this would be an external process placed upon the 
machine, rather than an endogenous process originating from within. An inward to desire 
to do so, and a knowledge of the meaning in proving that they had less than full 
knowledge, as well as why they would want to do so, is something that forgiveness requires 
in what is essentially a two-party action. This is clearly a demand that is difficult for LAWs 
to fulfil in the theoretical sense given the need for moral awareness.   
 Second is the requirement of having less than full freedom to choose among the 
available actions. In this sense, if one was free to choose, and intentionally chose the action 
with wrongful consequences/outcomes, then forgiveness cannot easily occur. With respect 
to LAWs being able to fulfil these conditions, the conclusion is dependent upon the 
ultimate nature of LAWs. If their nature is a determinant on the plausibility of achieving the 
necessary outcomes related to forgiveness, we must ask; what would the deliberative 
process within LAWs look like in choosing/deciding their actions? Although this is 
speculative and thus difficult to determine, we have seen with the condition on knowledge 
that there is an inherent difficulty in proving ones intentions.    
 However, some features of AI programming simply do not allow this avenue to be 
explored at all. Matthias (2004) argues that attempts to create connectionist systems 
within learning artificial intelligence – whereby the “basic principles of neural operation in 
living systems” (p.178) is emulated – gives rise to an evaluation that can only be deduced 
from behaviour. Matthias argues that within connectionist systems we cannot “have a look 
at the information stored inside the network, or even more importantly; see what 
information is not represented inside it” (p.178-9). Therefore this avenue of exploring the 
mechanical representation of what actions were taken, or other opportunities available 
that were not taken, is therefore testament to the glaring difficulties that LAWs have in 
replicating reconciliatory mechanisms.  
These two conditions are not only dependent on what actually happened, but also on the 
extent to which the forgiver knows what happened too. Since trust is important within 
forgiveness, transparency over the process which brought about the wrongful act is 
essential to successful acts of forgiveness – and also in some respects is an obligation 
incumbent upon the wrongdoer in order to prove their commitment to the act of 
forgiveness and to a future without committing those wrongs again. LAWs have difficulty 
proving choices, available alternatives, and why it chose the wrongful act due to limitations 
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in communication and trust between machines and humans. As such, LAWs have difficulty 
fulfilling conditions which are necessary to forgiveness.  
Importantly, forgiveness is only acceptable; “in cases where it is consistent with self-
respect, respect for others as responsible moral agents, and allegiance to the rules of 
morality” (Murphy, 1988, p.19). The conditions of when forgiveness is appropriate similarly 
delineates when forgiveness is virtuous or not. If actions are ‘forgiven’ regardless of 
severity or other aforementioned conditions, then the transgression of self-respect 
highlights its lack of virtue in that situation as it is inappropriate. Forgiveness thus requires 
an intuitive understanding of the complex prerequisites and conditions, and how they 
relate to our feelings about the wrong committed.     
 With respect to LAWs, to what extent can we say that machines merely replicating 
the outcomes of humans through various inputs can truly replicate the necessary 
interpersonal and related functions that forgiveness requires? LAWs, since they cannot 
fulfil the demands placed upon wrongdoers within forgiveness, lack the ability to be 
appropriately forgiven thus burdening the victim to transgress their self-respect and moral 
dignity. Therefore, LAWs can neither lead to virtuous behaviour on the part of the forgiver, 
nor be conducive to the renewal of relationships. 
Through the demands upon victims, wrongdoers, and the broad conditions of forgiveness 
in general, LAWs frequently transgress the accepted provisions for producing successful 
forgiveness and moral repair. However, this only becomes morally problematic when 
assessed against the importance of forgiveness as a mechanism for achieving peace. 
10.3 Forgiveness and Peace 
The inability for LAWs to act within forgiveness is only of concern when forgiveness is 
valuable to the pursuits of peace. This can be determined through two areas; being free 
from the past and the renewal of damaged relationships. I argue that the failure of LAWs to 
bring about the act of forgiveness becomes ethically problematic if implemented within 
war as a result of such inadequacies.  
Being free from the past is a benefit of forgiveness. The ability to distance oneself from the 
past has both intrinsic and instrumental value. Forgiveness intrinsically plays a therapeutic 
role as thoughts of guilt or grievance are admonished. Instrumentally, it allows for moving 
forward from past events and approaching things anew in a seemingly more positive way. 
Govier (2002) argues that forgiveness benefits the wrongdoer with “the opportunity to 
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begin anew, allowing the better acts and a brighter moral future are possible” (p.44), and 
benefits the victim by “escaping negative emotions of anger and resentment with more 
positive emotions and escaping a fiction with the past and potentially obsessive desire for 
revenge” (p.49). Both ‘escaping’ and ‘fresh start’ are inferences of moving forward. Shriver 
(2001) argues that forgiveness is able “to unlock a society in danger of being imprisoned in 
the past” (p.167). The manifestation of forgiveness in this context is evidently beneficial, in 
both its intrinsic and instrumental consequences towards peace.  
The second benefit of forgiveness is the healing of damaged relationships. This is inferred 
throughout the literature (Roberts, 1995, Hampton, 1988). Conditions such as the 
interpersonal process of forgiveness, as well as the development of empathy and 
generation of mutual recognition all lead to the idea that forgiveness heals. Forgiveness 
does not mandate a type of relationship, yet its requisite actions lay the foundations upon 
which to build new relations and repair those previously destroyed. Once one can move 
beyond the past, there are no barriers to a relationship, pointing us in the direction of 
advocating for forgiveness post-conflict.  Since war contingently destroys relationships, and 
we can collectively recognise that peace is sustainable when relationships are genuinely 
renewed, we can advocate for the necessity of forgiveness in achieving the function of 
moral repair. By its very nature, in foregoing resentment, forgiveness is conducive to peace.  
The relinquishment of resentment is unlikely and therefore we cannot expect its large-scale 
use. However, we must understand the importance of renewed relations between 
wrongdoer and victim in contributing to moral repair. 
In order to advocate for forgiveness on a larger scale than merely the interpersonal which 
we have done thus far, it is helpful if forgiveness can be situated between collectives rather 
than simply individuals. If we can satisfy collective forgiveness, then it becomes more 
valuable to large scale peace processes and not strictly within the realm of individuals.  
 Govier (2002) argues that group level forgiveness can take place since groups fit 
the necessary elements required for forgiveness, such that they “can be agents responsible 
for wrongdoing … can suffer wrongful harm … [and] can have –and amend – feelings, 
attitudes, and beliefs about various matters, including harms they have suffered at the 
hands of others” (p.87). I am inclined to agree with this point on groups being able to fulfil 
the elements required by forgiveness. Govier argues that “[t]here is no justification for a 
pessimistic double standard at this point. If negative emotions and attitudes such as hatred, 
rage, and vindictiveness can characterise groups, so too can positive actions such as 
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affection and compassion” (p.91). Given that theoretically groups can undergo the sorts of 
process and conditions necessary for forgiveness, and we frequently normalise the 
attribution of negative emotions and attitudes at the collective level, it is not a stretch to 
say that groups can forgive. Therefore, we can say that forgiveness is evidentially beneficial 
for peace as it is a mechanism which can conceivably take place on a large scale, and thus 
extend the benefits of healing and renewed relationships more effectively. 
However, there are a number of criticisms to collective forgiveness which I believe are ill-
founded, and will thus be dealt with in turn.      
 Griswold (2007) sees forgiveness as being replaced with the term ‘apology’ at the 
group level and emphasises the myriad of alternative factors in play at the political level 
beyond the pure form of forgiveness. Griswold argues that the ascription of forgiveness to 
the political realm is metaphoric and not actual attribution, arguing that “[a]t the political 
level, the spokesperson for a political entity may apologize for an injury committed by the 
body even though neither the spokesperson nor any of its current members may personally 
be responsible for the wrongdoing” (p.140).  
I agree that group forgiveness, whether we frame it in the public or political space, is 
difficult because of the plethora of additional interests and actions taking place. The pure 
motive of forgiveness is harder to repatriate beyond the interpersonal. Griswold is also 
correct in asserting that if a group consists of current members who did not bear witness to 
the wrongdoing, whether as victims or culpable for a wrong committed, forgiveness cannot 
by definition arise.         
 However, I see group forgiveness rising out of membership from certain groups 
based upon the equality within which one is a party to wrongs committed (whether victims 
or wrongdoers). Instead of seeing the group as a corporation or body of individuals who 
collectivise around a specific interest, I instead see the group formed as a result of its 
member’s culpability to wrongdoing or as victims of the same actor. Although this requires 
a specific and somewhat semantical redefinition of ‘group’ or ‘collective’, it shows how 
forgiveness takes place beyond the interpersonal. Members of a group cannot forgive if 
they were not wronged or wrongdoers. This seems self-evident if one understands the 
necessary conditions of forgiveness, and something I see missing from Griswold’s claim. It is 
because the group does not fit the conditions of forgiveness, not forgiveness in general, 
that is important in this example. 
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Furthermore, I do not see a significant variation between the term apology and collective 
forgiveness. Ignatieff’s (1998) outlines the process of ‘apology’, and displays essential 
elements which are present within forgiveness, that; 
“Without an apology, without recognition of what happened, the 
past cannot return to its place as the past … Of course, an apology 
must reflect the acceptance of the other side’s grief” (p.189-190). 
The acknowledgement of past wrongs is an important feature of forgiveness, and one can 
take little away from a unique exploration of ‘apology’ in its place. An apology includes 
recognition of wrong committed, the admonition of guilt, and an acceptance of the harm 
caused, all of which are important elements in forgiveness too. Therefore it is clear that the 
way I have outlined forgiveness above is conducive to a collective manifestation, and thus 
supports the pursuit of peace by engendering the benefits of forgiveness on a larger scale. 
A similar criticism of group-level forgiveness comes from Long (1994), arguing that “one 
relates corporate intention to individual intentions, that relation becomes still more 
problematic when the corporate self outlives the individuals who provided its original 
occasion” (p.113). In making this assertion, Long (1994) evokes an example of current day 
Germany requiring forgiveness for the actions of its Nazi history. He argues that “the 
enormity of the Nazi wrongdoing and the related fact that the primary victims cannot speak 
for themselves contribute to a conflicting sense … that whatever efforts Germany may 
make –corporately or individually – those do not remove the burden of Germanys past” 
(p.113).  
I take issue with this argument too. I would say that it is not a ‘related fact’ that the primary 
victims cannot speak for themselves but is actually at the centre of this example. I 
understand forgiveness in the bilateral sense (Govier, 2002) as a process which requires 
assent from the victim in order for the wrongdoer to be forgiven. This is the reason that we 
cannot attribute corporate level forgiveness to the aforementioned example.   
 I also find the term ‘corporate’ in place of ‘collective’ problematic too. In a 
corporate environment, it is conceived that agency stems from the corporate insofar as its 
constituent individuals can change (just like in a corporation with changes through 
individual employment) yet the corporate itself remains the same, such that it is not 
identified by its specific members. This is the same formulation as is evident within a 
conglomerate conception of responsibility (French, 1984, p.13f) and is present within 
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Long’s concern of the ‘corporate’ outliving the individuals. However, in the case of 
forgiveness at the collective level, this does matter. One cannot join the collective of 
victims without having been wronged in the same way or by the same actor. Its constituent 
members are the victims, yet it is the broad scale and shared experience of wrongdoing 
that constitutes the collective in the case of forgiveness. For this reason I prefer the term 
collective, as it refers more closely with the notion of a collective of similar individuals of 
similar experiences, rather than a corporate conception which prima facie represents 
something external to its constituent members.  
Another counter-argument may take the form that, without a formal decision making 
structure within such groups committing harm, how can collective forgiveness take place or 
at the very least, how can we hold individuals of that group collectively responsible for 
forgiveness too? May (1987) deals with this issue by asserting collective responsibility 
through a ‘mob’ (which has no decision-making structure) in three ways; “by direct causal 
contribution … by indirectly contributing through aiding or facilitating those directly 
involved … or by indirectly contributing through omissions” (p.75). In this formulation, the 
group is constitutive of the harm its individuals bring, but for the reasons of associative 
responsibility. Therefore, we might reasonably attribute responsibility for wrongdoing to a 
group based upon collective responsibility and causal links to harmful consequences via its 
constituent members. Although the most controversial of these conditions is the third – 
that one is responsible via omission – May’s arguments highlight why it might be intuitively 
possible for that same group to request forgiveness (or forgiveness like acts that equally 
constitute the sort of moral repair we are seeking). Omissions count in ascribing moral 
responsibly since “the omission contributed to the result … and the omission was not part 
of the normally existing background conditions” (p.77, Italics in original). The background 
conditions which are accepted by group membership distinguish the group’s members 
from disassociated bystanders. As such, as forgiveness is sought from the group, its 
members are collectively responsible for its transmission and acceptance.  
I take the view that group-level forgiveness can take place and thus we can derive two 
aspects; a) that we can include forgiveness as a more universal principle for post-conflict 
peace. If, by virtue of war, one becomes a perpetrator of violence and a victim of it, there 
are grounds for repairing relationships between groups and not simply individuals. And b) 
collective wrongdoing can generate possibilities of collective forgiveness. If this can in 
theory take place, that former enemies relinquish negative feelings and recognise the 
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exculpatory factors to those who committed wrongs, we can extrapolate interpersonal-like 
acts onto the collective. Therefore, forgiveness becomes conducive to the demands of 
peace on a larger scale rather than strictly interpersonal. 
Collective forgiveness has ramifications for LAWs, for if we see that collective forgiveness 
can take place between combatants and between combatants and non-combatants, and is 
beneficial to moral repair on that scale, then we must include human combatants in order 
to be able to extrapolate the necessary elements of collective attribution within group-level 
forgiveness, such as responsibility, dissemination of information, and agreement on 
collective intention. 
Shriver (2007) place these benefits of forgiveness within the political context and 
intrinsically linked towards the ends of peace, arguing “[p]eace and reconciliation are the 
great purposes and consequences of just and forgiving resolutions to political conflict … for 
recovery from the vast uselessness of most warfare, forgiveness may be a critically 
important political virtue” (p.52). For Shriver (2007), the pursuits of justice and forgiveness 
are not contradictory procedures and processes, but instead complementary to achieving 
peace on the political level. 
10.4 Are Forgiveness and Jus Post Bellum Compatible? 
The discussion of forgiveness takes place within jus post bellum discussions on peace and 
justice, and therefore it is important to show how concepts of moral repair are compatible 
with jus post bellum. The objection to their compatibility is that forgiveness does not allow 
for punishment, and since jus post bellum requires wrongful acts be held accountable and 
punished, this misconception needs to be settled.  
Punishment is a common feature of justice, and thus present within jus post bellum too. A 
core component of justice within war is that people are held accountable for their actions, 
such that justice can be served through various mechanisms including retributive justice, 
publicly, or through distributive justice in the form of punishment. Punishment is metered 
out to those that have committed unjust actions, and plays a corrective function on future 
behaviours, such that providing accountability for one’s action deters similar injustice. 
 Punishment is important within jus post bellum. Within the minimalist approach 
the vindication of rights is linked to some form of accountability via punishment, and 
similarly a maximalist approach requires punishment as it is necessary in moving towards 
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peace. The formal settling of the past, whist also recognising the wrongs committed on 
both sides, are a core component of punishment and justice. 
Forgiveness and punishment are compatible given that forgiveness does not require one to 
forget or ignore the wrongdoing suffered, but instead requires the acknowledgement that 
although the wrongful act is bad, he or she who committed the act is not. Salzberg (1995) 
summarises this point aptly in that “[f]orgiveness does not mean condoning a harmful 
action or denying injustice or suffering” (p.75) and Walsh (2005) arrives at a similar 
conclusion, that forgiveness means; “to hold him or her excused from an offence, even in 
one’s thoughts, while still acknowledging his or her responsibility for the offence” (no 
page). The important area for forgiveness is how we separate the actions from actors when 
victims of wrong, and similarly how, as wrongdoers, we allow ourselves to be redefined as 
separate from the wrong committed. It is clear that forgiveness allows for punishment, and 
is thus conducive to inclusion within jus post bellum considerations. 
Similarly, Govier (2002) provides the summary of these features in that forgiveness 
demands only the forswearing of resentment toward the causer of the wrong, and not the 
wrong itself; that  
“to regard people as absolutely unforgivable on the ground that 
what they have done is atrocious is to extend attitudes, 
unwarrantedly, from acts to persons, to argue from acts to 
character is such a way as to mark an irrevocable stain on the 
agents … To claim that because he has committed terrible deeds a 
moral agent is thus absolutely unforgiveable is to ignore the 
human capacity for remorse, choice, and moral transformation” 
(p.93). 
In this sense, it can be said that forgiveness is aimed uniquely at the wrongdoer and not the 
wrong; that the wrong is not forgiven or corrected in any way – excused or other – but 
rather the wrongdoer is treated anew despite out feelings towards the act. Forgiveness 
does not necessitate we forego obligations incumbent upon us to deliver justice, and 
therefore the act of forgiveness is consistent with the demands of jus post bellum. 
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10.5 Conclusion 
The concept of forgiveness has been addressed both in relation to its nature and 
subsequent conditions, its compatibility with LAWs, as well as its importance to both the 
peace process and relevance to jus post bellum. It has been shown that LAWs are incapable 
of fulfilling the demands incumbent upon actors within forgiveness from three 
perspectives. First, for victims, LAWs cannot be forgiven in any meaningful sense, since the 
recognition of a shared humanity is a fundamental principle within this area. The ability to 
acknowledge the equal fallibility of oneself with the actions committed by the wrongdoer is 
unattainable for humans to accomplish in relation to LAWs. Second, wrongdoers within 
forgiveness are expected to acknowledge their wrongdoing and persuasively commit to a 
future without continuing that offence. LAWs are incapable of publicly acknowledging their 
wrongs, since this demands an awareness of right and wrong and the contingent moral 
awareness of ones actions. Given their nature, LAWs are unable to convincingly commit to 
any kind of future, since this equally requires the advent of internal processes and a 
genuine desire to do so. And third, LAWs are unable to fulfil the additional demands of 
forgiveness itself, such that they transgress the requirements of foreknowledge, less than 
full freedom, as well as burdening victims with a transgression of self-respect in the event 
that they are actually forgiven. 
I have also shown how forgiveness is integral to moral repair post-conflict in its 
encouragement of the necessary factors conducive to peace. Since forgiveness benefits its 
actors from freeing them from past events, as well as repairing broken relationships, the 
inability of LAWs to forgive or be forgiven has evident ramifications for the likelihood of 
peace. Since LAWs are incompatible with the act of forgiveness, and that forgiveness is 
integral to peace, the actions of LAWs within war are questionable ethically as per the 
dependence approach, since their actions cannot reasonably be directed towards 
reparative ends and a sustainable peace. There are further obligations upon wrongdoers in 
achieving peace post-conflict, and it is within this realm that LAWs fail to satisfy such 
obligations.  
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11. Reconciliation 
 
Reconciliation is an important concept when looking at moral repair and its necessary 
components. As shown within the previous discussion on forgiveness, there are demands 
upon wrongdoers post-conflict requiring conditions that LAWs are unable to fulfil. 
Importantly, if reconciliation between wrongdoer and victim is constructive for sustainable 
peace post-conflict, then can LAWs replicate the demands upon wrongdoers? For if they 
cannot fulfil the conditions incumbent upon actors within reconciliation, their actions 
within war cannot be directed toward peaceful ends. This is an ethical dilemma as laid out 
through the dependence approach within jus post bellum, and therefore challenges the 
implementation of LAWs as ethical agents within war. 
I begin this chapter by outlining the definitions and types of reconciliation, and aligning 
those conclusions with the ability of LAWs to achieve reconciliation. I then turn to 
mechanisms of reconciliation, and argue that the necessary acknowledgement, cultural 
awareness, and accountability, are found wanting when LAWs become principle agents of 
warfare. I show both theoretically and empirically that reconciliation is an essential process 
in securing sustainable peace, before responding to a likely criticism from the perspective 
that reconciliation within different cultures might discount some of the concern raised with 
wrongdoers being unable to participate fully in such processes. I conclude by highlighting 
that LAWs jeopardize the process and mechanisms of reconciliation which thus becomes 
morally problematic given the dependence approach of jus post bellum. 
11.1 The Nature of Reconciliation 
A) Defining Reconciliation 
There is a general consensus on how one can define reconciliation. One suggestion within 
the literature involves the restoration of relationships. For Govier (2002), reconciliation 
means “coming together again, in restored relationship, after a rift resulting from actual or 
perceived wrongdoing on the part of one or both parties” (p.141), and similarly for Hamber 
and Kelly (2009), one of the core elements of reconciliation includes the “[b]uilding of 
positive relationships” (p.292).        
 Similarly, reconciliation is considered in relation to the establishment of a desired 
‘wholeness’.  Peterson (2001) defines reconciliation as a “a restoration or even 
transformation toward intended wholeness” (p.13), whilst Villa-Vincencio (2006) sees 
A Jus Post Bellum Analysis of Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
84 
 
reconciliation as “perhaps an anthropological if not a primordial longing for wholeness, 
even where wholeness is no longer part of historical consciousness” (p.62). 
Therefore two important aspects can be derived. First, both conceptualisations of 
reconciliation are complementary, since they necessarily include a restoration of what was 
broken. Second, the inclusion of an innate longing for ‘wholeness’ places reconciliation in 
an anthropomorphic perspective, such that ‘longing’ to be whole is intrinsic to humans. 
This is relevant to whether we can expect LAWs to carry out the same necessary functions 
that lead to peace. If the intimate longing for wholeness is not present within LAWs, then 
they cannot personally carry out reconciliation in the same way. I am accepting of both 
conceptions within the following discussion on the relationship between LAWs and 
reconciliation, since how we see reconciliation and the way it is defined has implications for 
the way we expect it to be carried out. 
B) Types of Reconciliation 
It is also important to look at the types of reconciliation. Clegg (2008) develops a typology 
of reconciliation in four stages. Political reconciliation concerns macro-management such 
as peace deals and negotiations; societal reconciliation consists of a group-to-group level 
and “tries to establish or re-establish the possibility of people co-existing without violence 
in a shared space” (p.83); interpersonal reconciliation “is directly about personal hurt and 
healing” (p.83) between individuals or small groups; and personal reconciliation “is about a 
person reconciling the parts of her/himself that are, or have become, alienated since 
conception” (p.83). Clegg argues that although we focus predominately on personal and 
political reconciliation, the others are valuable since they tell us something about 
reconciliation too.  
Gloppen (2005) divides reconciliation into thicker and thinner perspectives. A ‘thinner’ 
perspective describes mere non-violent coexistence, whereas ‘thicker’ involves a shared 
comprehensive vision of a common future. There also exists a middle ground which creates 
conditions “where former enemies may continue to disagree, but respect each other as 
citizens with equal rights” (p.20). These varying lenses of reconciliation recognise its 
complexity and highlight the important role it plays within renewing relations and moral 
repair. 
Borer (2006) principally views reconciliation as existing within two strands; individual 
reconciliation, and national unity reconciliation. Individual reconciliation can either exist 
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within a medical paradigm, emphasising the healing of individual victims and the 
restoration of relationships, or a religious paradigm which alternatively emphasises 
repentance and forgiveness (p.32). National unity reconciliation is close to a political 
perspective, starting from the assumption that since enemies are unlikely to agree with 
each other, the best outcome is peaceful coexistence. It is associated with; “tolerance, 
peaceful coexistence, rule of law, democracy, human rights culture, conflict resolution, 
transparency, and public debate” (Borer, 2006, p.33). Borer argues that both of these 
models are necessary for peace. “A society at peace is one in which not only victims are 
healing and victims and perpetrators coexist, but in which the rule of law, gender equity, 
justice, human rights, and tolerance flourish as well” (p.35). Reconciliation is thus different 
to the aforementioned tenets of forgiveness, and equally necessary for peace. By including 
third parties within reconciliation such as courts, tribunals or truth commissions, the 
mechanisms are different to those of forgiveness. 
11.2 Reconciliation and LAWs 
Since the background of reconciliation has been addressed, we now turn to the way that 
LAWs can be expected to fulfil the demands of reconciliation, and in turn, aspects of moral 
repair. With respect to the nature of reconciliation, such as fulfilling the longing for 
wholeness and its interpersonal and collective manifestations, LAWs are inherently 
disadvantaged. Similar to interpersonal forgiveness, individual reconciliation is unconducive 
to non-human actors, and reconciliation’s definition in satisfying the innate longing for 
wholeness and repaired relationships attests to this, for it presupposes the presence of the 
internal longing and incomplete wholeness. The extent to which LAWs can desire 
something such as wholeness – let alone whether LAWs could feel ‘less than whole’ – is 
questionable. Reconciliation derives its meaningfulness through the desire from both 
parties to accomplish their aim. It is because they are both consenting and willing to enter 
into reconciliation that it is effective at renewing relationships and moral repair – for 
example, this would not be the case if the desire for moral repair via reconciliation was 
unilateral.         
 Although political reconciliation is vaguer, collective reconciliation involves a 
process consisting of individuals reciprocally experiencing injurious relations in need of 
repair. As such, political/collective reconciliation must acknowledge individual actors in 
order to be successful in restoring relationships or establishing peaceful coexistence. Since 
reconciliation means little to LAWs given their inability to desire such ends, this highlights 
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the redundancy of reconciliation for LAWs, yet fails to dispel its necessity for victims of 
wrongdoing. If LAWs cannot provide the requisite elements of moral repair via 
reconciliation, then we have no choice but to question their implementation within warfare 
as they jeopardize the mechanisms of peace as a result. 
Addressing the mechanisms of reconciliation is another avenue for exploring the 
compatibility of LAWs to reconciliation and subsequent moral repair. Gloppen (2005) 
introduces two important mechanisms for establishing reconciliation; the need for justice 
(holding perpetrators accountable), and the need for truth, restitution and rehabilitation of 
individuals (acknowledging and repairing damages). Hamber and Kelly (2009) propose 
similar mechanisms for reconciliation. They see a human rights perspective of 
reconciliation as stressing “regulating social interaction through the rule of law and 
preventing the recurrences of certain violations” (p.293) which is intimately linked to our 
perspective on justice, and as such we will equate the two into a broad condition of justice. 
And second, they see a religious perspective as emphasising “moral reflection, repentance, 
confession and rebirth” (p.293) which is tied closely to acknowledgement. As such, it is 
clear that both Gloppen and Hamber and Kelly propose similar conditions of justice and 
acknowledgment. These two conditions of reconciliation apply explicitly to actors of 
reconciliation and moral repair, thus we can analyse the use of LAWs against both 
conditions. 
With respect to mechanisms via justice – the process of holding perpetrators accountable – 
we find the same barriers to the involvement of LAWs that we found with forgiveness. 
LAWs possess an inherent deficiency through lacking the necessary functions to be held 
accountable, since programming rather than endogenous processes determine behaviour. 
There is also the difficulty of how to hold machines accountable and what that would look 
like. For example, distributive justice (punishment) is intuitively irrelevant when applied to 
machines. Reconciliation via justice is therefore prohibited so long as the perpetrators are 
not human combatants, given the necessity of moral responsibility implied within justice 
demands. 
Mechanisms via acknowledgement that seek to bring about reconciliation – such as truth, 
restitution, and rehabilitation – are also jeopardized. The presence of acknowledgement 
within these mechanisms is an important aspect and relevant to the capabilities of LAWs to 
the peace process. Acknowledgement can be; existential (acknowledging “the existence of 
an individual or group and the moral stature and entitlements of these people” (Govier, 
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2009, p.37)), aversive (“what is acknowledged is something unwelcome” (p.38)), and 
affirmative (“what is acknowledged is something positive” (p.38)). In terms of 
reconciliation, we are most interested in aversive acknowledgement, since we are 
acknowledging the wrongs committed in order for moral repair.  Acknowledgment requires 
the knowledge of what one has done, what its outcomes were, and why this was wrong. 
This demands a further level of intelligence than required within LAWs – as the functions of 
recognising right from wrong need to be developed. For example, being able to carry out x 
is different from understanding why x is being carried out, and the moral weight it carries. 
Therefore, acknowledgement demands more from LAWs than military necessity requires. 
Creating LAWs that are able to recognise the moral weight of their actions can have short 
term ethical consequences, such as whether this could plausibly lead to LAWs rejecting 
orders they deem to be morally insufficient.       
 In addition to the problem of whether LAWs can acknowledge their own behaviour 
and attach a value judgment and moral weight to it, the second issue is how they go about 
transmitting this in a meaningful way. It is difficult to see how LAWs as wrongdoers can 
enter into reconciliation in a non-mechanical way. There is a legitimate concern as to 
whether reconciliation is relevant to LAWs, since the restoration of relationships and 
healing processes between individuals or groups makes little sense, given the different 
sorts of relationships and emotional states associated with machines. If reconciliation 
contributes to moral repair such that those who are reconciled no longer seek conflict, the 
inability of LAWs to bring about these reparative ends questions their ethicality as per the 
dependence approach of jus post bellum. It is clear that acknowledgment requires more 
than LAWs possess, since from a military perspective, LAWs grounded in necessity need not 
ascribe moral weight to their actions.  
Gloppen (2005) mentions some additional mechanisms of reconciliation, yet these consist 
of third party actors rather than the principle actors of reconciliation itself, including 
strategy reform such as constitutional and institutional reform, and healing over time 
through amnesty/amnesia. Although these mechanisms rely less on the actors specifically 
and are somewhat macro in their approach, they still involve individual wrongdoers, and 
therefore we can equally admonish the implementation of LAWs since they are expected to 
fulfil roles that they are incapable of fulfilling. 
Hamber and Kelly (2009) offer a unique mechanism of reconciliation through an 
intercommunal understanding approach which focuses on “bridging divides between 
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different cultures and identities” (p.293). However, an intercommunal understanding is 
equally difficult to envisage, as the appropriation of cultural norms, practices, and 
identities, equates to a complex societal arena and not a mechanical and fixed set of 
programmable processes. The ability to recognise culture and identity is a product of 
societal education, and not simply a product of our intelligence. Therefore LAWs would 
require more than simply the ability to replicate human functions. The inability of LAWs to 
realistically carry out such mechanisms prohibits them from being agents of moral repair, 
and limits their prospects of achieving peace too. 
However, why can’t others (humans) still reconcile within this process? In other words, 
could reconciliation not take place without LAWs? I would argue that we have to 
understand that the way war is fought has a role to play in the sort of peace that is 
achieved. An implementation of LAWs that supersedes human combatants is troublesome 
for reconciliation, and although this can take place on one side, it is not the sort of mutual 
recognition that reconciliation entails. For example, non-combatant victims of wrongdoing 
benefit greatly from moral repair with the combatants that wronged them through 
reconciliation. Similarly, if they are human on-the-loop LAWs, then the process is merely 
analogous to a parent apologizing for the deeds of their child. The enveloping responsibility 
complex that is crucial to reconciliation is weakened by on-the-loop representation in 
reconciling efforts, and this jeopardizes the benefits that reconciliation can bring about.  
11.3 Reconciliation and Peace 
As it has been shown that LAWs are unable to be actors within reconciliation if they are 
wrongdoers, we must ask; is reconciliation important for peace? 
Reconciliation is conducive to peace because it renews relationships as an avenue of moral 
repair. Hamber and Kelly (2009) argue that “addressing relationships specifically, and to 
some degree achieving limited reconciliation, is necessary with regard to achieving any 
aspect of the peacebuilding process” (p.294). This is an important assessment of 
reconciliation, as even in a limited capacity it is necessary to peacebuilding. 
Similarly, Llewellyn and Philpott (2014) view reconciliation from a relational justice 
perspective. Relational justice is directed towards “equality of respect, dignity, and mutual 
concern for one another” (p.19). They argue that; 
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 “A relational approach does not offer the static ‘end state’ of 
justice done, delivered, or served up or of peace settled, achieved 
or realised … On a relational approach justice and peace are 
transformed into a way of being in relationship, and thus less 
something one has ‘done’ than something one is ‘doing’” (p.32). 
This perspective highlights the benefits of reconciliation to peace, that viewed from a 
relational perspective justice is achieved when peace is relational and therefore the two 
are intricately related. As this paper looks at LAWs within jus post bellum and just war 
theory, the pursuits of reconciliation to just outcomes provide an important observation of 
the compatibility of reconciliation to the demands of justice. This shows that reconciliation 
is necessary for peace and sustainable future relations, as well as relevant within jus post 
bellum, which has thus far been omitted. 
Furthermore, there is useful empirical evidence linking reconciliation efforts to peace. Long 
and Brecke (2003) looked at successful reconciliatory mechanisms that were deployed in 
civil and international peace settlements. They introduce the ‘reconciliation as forgiveness’ 
model which involves; mechanisms of acknowledging harms caused, reducing societal 
identities as something other than ‘victim’ or ‘enemy’, the foregoing of revenge, and the 
public expression of forgiveness. They found that peace was achieved through these 
‘reconciliation as forgiveness’ factors in seven of the ten cases of civil conflict that were 
assessed, (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Mozambique, South Africa, and 
Honduras). They found that “over the last two decades, countries wracked by civil conflict, 
often protracted and horrendously violent, can peacefully reach an ending settlement 
through forgiveness and national reconciliation” (p.148). 
The authors saw a different process of reconciliation within international conflict – the 
sending of successful symbols – involving; the higher cost of the peace offering the better, 
vulnerability, novel approaches to reconciliation, voluntary action, and making 
noncontingent and irrevocable offers of reconciliation. Although the ‘reconciliation as 
forgiveness’ approach is not explicit within international conflict, they remain relevant such 
that “the cases suggest that the presence of these factors – public acknowledgement of 
harm, for example – helps to reinforce the costly, novel and irrevocable nature of the signal 
and this makes it more reliable” (p.153).      
  Long and Brecke found that when reconciliation “events are part of a four-part 
forgiveness process they can contribute to the successful termination of civil conflict and 
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social reconstruction” (p.157). As such, these events mark turning points and significantly 
reduce “rates of recidivist violence within and between nations” (p.2-3). It can therefore be 
shown empirically that reconciliation is an important process in the re-establishment of 
peace. 
Legitimacy is important for reconciliation, and also within peace insofar as an illegitimate 
peace – as an attempt to impose measures from an illegitimate source – threatens the 
likelihood of peaceful outcomes. Long and Brecke (2003) argue that “[c]ontrary to some 
findings on the possibility for peaceful termination of civil war, these forgiveness processes 
were substantially “home grown” rather than imposed from the outside” (p.150). This 
entails recognising that peace itself cannot be imposed externally in order to take place 
through forgiveness orientated reconciliatory efforts. Gloppen (2005) similarly argues that 
“strong and direct international engagement appears to make it more difficult to generate 
legitimacy” (p.45). Legitimacy is difficult for international actors to procure within 
reconciliation since “[t]hey are often perceived as geared more towards the needs of the 
international community than the local context, and in many cases they appear to have 
little effect on processes of national reconciliation” (p.44). Therefore legitimacy is a barrier 
to reconciliation as it needs to be present and endogenously derived. 
11.4 A Cultural Critique: The Practice of Sulh 
Thus far I have outlined the ideas and mechanisms related to reconciliation, however it is 
important to develop a perspective of cultural reconciliation to explore a potential 
objection to the view I have laid out thus far. I will address the Islamic cultural practice 
referred to as Sulh as a prima facie objection to the conclusions I have arrived at on LAWs 
and reconciliation.  
Sulh occurs after a wrong has been committed, and mandates that the offender go into 
hiding until the final process of apology has occurred; “[h]e has to do this because if the 
other tribe sees him they will kill him” (Kilcullen, 2009, p.167). The wrongdoer’s community 
selects a mediator – a respected sheikh recognised between tribes – to open negotiations 
on their behalf with the victims’ family. The sheikh, if successful, brings the two tribes 
together in order to negotiate terms of apology through the settling of diya or ‘blood price’. 
After the terms have been agreed, the dispute is over and the wrongdoer can emerge from 
hiding (Kilcullen, 2009). Importantly; 
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“After this, no one can take revenge, so the dispute is over. If they 
do take revenge, it would be considered a new dispute, and they 
would be guilty. The guilty man can come back, but this may not 
happen straight away. No one will break the deal because if they 
do they might be banished from the tribe, in which case they 
would die. They might not like it, but they can’t take tha’r 
(revenge)” (Iraq Field Note June 5 2008, in Kilcullen, 2009, p. 168, 
italics in original). 
This process was adopted as a mechanism for conflict resolution by coalition force 
commanders, most notably Colonel H.R. McMaster who “emulated the behaviour patterns 
of a responsible sheikh in Iraqi tribal society, which helped gain community respect and 
build peer-to-peer relationships with local leaders” (Kilcullen, 2009, p.169). However, it is 
important to note that Sulh can only be replicated by a non-Iraqi. The process merely 
demonstrates genuine intent for apology, since “[e]ven if you pay them compensation from 
the government they will still be your enemies because there is no Sulh for your actions” 
(Iraq Field Note June 5 2008, in Kilcullen, 2009, p.169, italics in original).  The advent of 
different practices in the form of Sulh, as well as its use for apology by those individuals 
who are not the wrongdoer –but merely acting on their behalf – present a potential 
objection to the views I have previously espoused. If cultural practices can generate new 
mechanisms that do not include the wrongdoer, my criticism of LAWs within reconciliation 
holds little weight for moral repair. 
Despite the advent of alternative mechanisms for apology existing outside of reconciliation, 
I see little genuine objection from this cultural critique. My response can be addressed 
within three strands which exist as independent responses, yet taken collectively constitute 
a much stronger rejection; a) Reconciliation must be aimed at both the victim and 
wrongdoer; b) Reconciliation should be voluntary not coercive, and; c) Reconciliation 
requires both justice and accountability. 
First, it is clear from the outset that the process of Sulh focuses uniquely on the victim. As 
the wrongdoer is excluded out of fear for their own wellbeing, it is difficult to convincingly 
say that this particular cultural manifestation is a reconciliatory process, since 
reconciliation must be, by its nature, reparative and restorative. By ignoring the necessity 
for reconciling the wrongdoer it seems to me that Sulh can only be understood from the 
perspective of an apology, rather than a bilaterally restorative process. 
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Krause (2005) shows within a restorative justice approach that there exists multiple 
obligations incumbent on actors within the process of reconciliation, one of whom is 
invariably the defendant. As such, restorative justice as a mechanism for healing 
necessitates the inclusion of the wrongdoer since its function is aimed at healing all parties, 
not solely the victim. Smith (2005) also argues that the crucial factor of these processes 
“resides in the capacity of practices involved to restore or repair the co-humanity of both 
victim and offender” (p.44), thus mandating the inclusion of the wrongdoer within 
reconciliation. 
Furthermore, reconciling the wrongdoer is fundamental to breaking the cycle of violence 
that peace emerges from. The perpetuation of violence and retaliatory states is broken by 
including, rather than omitting, those who have committed the offence. An Na’Im (2005) 
highlights that; 
“[O]ne has to start at some point in the cycle of violence and 
counterviolence and consider what it would take to bring parties 
to appreciating the need for reconciliation and having confidence 
in its viability and sustainability” (p.241). 
Holding the offender accountable, whether through requesting confession or 
acknowledgement, offers an alternative avenue for resolution than that of retaliation, yet 
only holds value to peace when the wrongdoer is reconciled as well. Urban Walker (2006) 
argues that the wrongdoer actually possess the obligation for instigating reconciliation, 
such that; “those most directly responsible for wrong are also those with paramount and 
unique responsibilities for attempting to make amends for it” (p.7). It is clear that Sulh 
escapes the fundamental aspects of bilaterally including victim and wrongdoer. It achieves 
a different type of restoration and as such poses no criticism to the sorts of reconciliation 
applied to LAWs within this paper. 
The second response to this cultural objection comes from the belief that reconciliation 
must be voluntary, and the healing incurred is an intentionally derived process.  The 
cultural imposition of healing we see within Sulh, such as the enforcement against revenge 
even though feelings of resentment may remain, shows the dislocation of this practice to 
the process of healing relationships. However, a response to this claim could be that I fail to 
acknowledge or appreciate the cultural differences present, and am therefore imposing my 
own conception of reconciliation onto another culture.     
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 My response is that Sulh offers a different kind of conflict resolution than 
reconciliation. Dugan’s (1996) model of nested conflict is useful to draw upon here. She 
proposes we view conflict as a set of integrated levels; beginning with the issue (the cause 
of the dispute itself), nested within a relational conflict (the breakdown of relations 
between those which the issue involves), which is further nested in a structural mode of 
conflict on the macro level (which both the issue and relational conflicts are a product of). 
The chosen method of conflict resolution cannot be conducive to all levels; such that by 
prioritising structural challenges we necessarily ignore the importance of relational 
reparation, yet prioritising the restoration of relationships, we fail to address the broader 
structural issues (Lederach, 1997, p.57).  
It is within this framework that I see this paper situated within. The relational approach to 
conflict resolution, or ‘moral repair’ (Urban Walker, 2006) is complementary to, but not 
substituted by, ‘social repair’ (Urban Walker, 2006). I frequently acknowledge the process 
of jus post bellum which approaches peace and repair on the macro or social level, yet 
instead highlight the importance of moral repair, such that the interpersonal restoration is 
conducive – but different – to the broader societal approaches that jus post bellum is 
currently aimed towards.        
 With respect to the cultural critique, the process of Sulh evidently ignores the 
relational conflict resolution mechanisms, yet remains important on a societal level, such 
that wrongs experienced between individuals do not become a product of, or a catalyst to, 
wider tribal conflicts. I see Sulh as a method of cultural societal repair but not reconciliation 
which is conversely a method of moral repair. I do not see Sulh as an objection to LAWs and 
reconciliation as it has been laid out, since it is not aimed at the restoration of relationships 
but rather societal coexistence, and therefore does not contradict the type of reconciliation 
that I outline emphasising relational restoration. 
Lastly, reconciliation must, by its nature, involve both justice and accountability. Although 
Sulh does in many ways represent a sort of justice for the victim – a voice and vindication of 
their suffering – the practice omits entirely the necessary process of accountability. An 
Na’im (2005) argues that the two pillars of reconciliation are justice and accountability, 
whereby “[j]ustice addresses the underlying causes of that desperate and lawless 
behaviour, and accountability addresses the violation of the rule of law in international and 
national affairs” (p.235). More than that however is the need to recognise the advent of 
both in order to consider something reconciliation. We might call these the intrinsic 
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elements. The presence of justice and accountability serves to constitute instrumental 
benefits too, such that reconciliation is conducive to peace and not merely a peaceful 
coexistence on offer within Sulh. An Na’im (2005) argues that; 
“The existence of fair and credible norms and mechanisms of 
accountability reduces the risk of self-help and vigilante justice … 
since a different choice is always available to all sides in a conflict, 
each side can seek to break the cycle of violence, which is more 
likely to happen when there are prospects of justice and 
accountability” (p.236). 
Holding the wrongdoer to account is therefore fundamental to peace, yet it need not be 
distributive in the form of punishment, but merely reparative within restorative justice for 
example. 
Although we can recognise that Sulh delivers some kind of justice (although incomplete as 
is testament to the top-down enforcement of non-violence rather than an internal 
response to justice received), it does not address the need for both society to hold the 
wrongdoer accountable (within the Rule of Law), or the interpersonal need for victims to 
hold their offender to account. After all, the broad spectrum of needs on the part of the 
victim is largely shared; including the values of “reassurance, safety, recognition of 
suffering, and appropriate placement of blame. Victims of grave wrongs are likely to feel 
they desire this from both offenders and others, whether or not they desire to see the 
offenders punished” (Urban Walker, 2006, p.18). This broadly recognised sentiment which 
arises within victims shows that LAWs are required to do such things within moral repair, 
but also that the cultural example of Sulh is lacking in its recognition of these important 
processes.           
 As such, I would term Sulh either a method of societal repair, or a process of 
apology. Given its ineffectiveness to fulfil the interpersonal and voluntary process of 
restoring relationships, as well as lacking in accountability mechanisms for the victim, I fail 
to see how this cultural critique poses a satisfactory and coherent objection to the 
formulation of reconciliation I have previously addressed. It is clear that LAWs have a 
conventional role to play in reconciliation as wrongdoers, and their failure by virtue of their 
nature to constructively participate in this area of moral repair casts doubt on their ability 
to act ethically in warfare, since their outcomes cannot reasonably be articulated towards 
peaceful and restorative ends. 
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11.5 Conclusion 
Throughout the preceding discussion on reconciliation, two important elements regarding 
its relationship to LAWs and peace have been satisfied. First, LAWs are, by the demands 
incumbent upon wrongdoers, unable to participate in reconciliation post-conflict. It has 
been shown that with respect to acknowledgment and responsibility, LAWs are 
insufficiently placed to serve this function, or in the case of being held accountable, fulfil 
these demands due to insufficient moral responsibility. Additionally, LAWs cannot be 
expected to bridge cultural and identity divides since they are a product of human based 
reality. Education within that forum – rather than a programmable recognition of context 
dependent factors – is a necessary element of cultural recognition. Although macro-level 
reconciliation such as institutional reform and healing over time are proposed, LAWs 
continue to remain important actors within reconciliation, and thus must still be able to 
adequately participate towards the ends of relationship development. Since ‘relationship’ 
requires two parties, and the other being humans, the fruitful relations brought about 
through reconciliation are restricted from the outset by replacing relational agents 
(humans) with non-relational agents (machines). Second, reconciliation is fundamental to 
peace in civil and international conflicts, shown theoretically through relational justice 
(Llewellyn and Philpott, 2014), and empirically (Long and Brecke, 2003). It was also shown 
that reconciliation requires endogenous legitimacy to be successful, and so replacing the 
combatants of war (LAWs) with externally imposed peacekeepers is neither legitimate, nor 
successful for establishing moral repair.      
 Furthermore, I have outlined a possible objection to the arguments made within 
this chapter, stemming from a cultural critique claiming that reconciliation manifests itself 
differently within different cultures. Although the potential objection of Sulh is relevant to 
societal repair, it is not an example of moral repair. I respond by outlining three essential 
conditions of reconciliation for valuable moral repair; that it includes both wrongdoer and 
victim, that it be voluntary, and that it involve both justice and accountability. It is clear 
that reconciliation, by virtue of its bilateral approach to securing the involvement (and 
fulfilling the obligations) of the wrongdoer, is applicable to LAWs as a pathway of moral 
repair, yet found wanting for the aforementioned reasons. 
It suffices to say that given peace is the main goal of just war theory, mechanisms and 
processes of reconciliation must be conducive to the development of peace by way of the 
dependence approach. Since LAWs are unable to play a role within reconciliatory 
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processes, we can derive conclusions that the implementation of LAWs is problematic if 
wrongdoers should necessarily be actors within this process. Although within reconciliation 
(unlike forgiveness) a third party can mediate and encourage mechanisms, machines 
remain unable to be actors within this process, and thus we can go some way to rejecting 
LAWs on the ethical grounds that their use jeopardizes the healing of relationships post-
conflict.  
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12. Truth Telling 
 
Truth telling is an important mechanism to moral repair, since it also includes the 
participation of wrongdoers. Truth-telling addresses the underlying necessity of developing 
better relationships between former enemies, and is thus a foundational mechanism upon 
which the future reconstituting of states rests upon. I begin this chapter by addressing the 
nature of truth telling with respect to the important pillars required to be effective and 
meaningful, looking at the dissemination of knowledge and the acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing. I then assess the compatibility of LAWs to knowledge and acknowledgment, 
and show that neither function is able to be replicated by LAWs. Lastly, I show why this is 
an important conclusion as truth telling is both instrumentally valuable to the pursuit of 
peace, and possesses intrinsic value in and of itself through the pursuit of truth and its 
relationship with future justice. I conclude that since truth telling is important for the 
pursuit of peace and is irreplaceable because of its intrinsic value, it is morally problematic 
that LAWs cannot fulfil the demands incumbent upon wrongdoers within moral repair. 
Before address the concept of truth telling, it is important to outline why it constitutes a 
unique concept and not merely replicates forgiveness or reconciliation. Truth telling 
mechanisms are different from forgiveness since the advent of a third party differentiates 
the type of relationship which is sought. Forgiveness, by its nature, only includes the 
principle actors and cannot be facilitated through third party intervention. Truth telling 
thus becomes uniquely valuable as a post-conflict mechanism since it involves facilitation 
by third parties, and becomes an additional feature of moral repair.   
 Similarly, we can differentiate truth telling from reconciliation. Borer (2006) argues 
that by equating the two concepts, we are looking at whether reconciliation is brought 
about, rather than recognising the inherent value within truth telling; although 
reconciliation may be a function of truth telling, the mechanism of truth telling is more 
than simply a tool for reconciliation. Borer argues that “focusing only on the presence or 
absence of reconciliation as a basis for assessing contributions of truth-telling mechanisms 
runs the serious risk of overlooking various other ways in which they are successful, or the 
many contributions they do make” (p.31, italics in original). In this sense, we can see that 
truth telling is related, but different, to both forgiveness and reconciliation. 
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12.1 The Conditions of Truth Telling 
Truth-telling is a mechanism deployed post-conflict with the aim of disseminating truth and 
reconciling individuals from once opposing sides. This is an area of the peacebuilding 
literature that, rather uncommonly, addresses the estrangement between individuals and 
groups, rather than focusing on societal repair such as the reestablishment of institutions. 
Taking place through truth commissions or courts, these are areas where stories can be 
told and the past revealed so that it no longer manifests itself in negative resentment, but 
plays a therapeutic role in order to settle animosity between individuals. Truth telling is 
significantly underrepresented in the literature (Borer, 2006) and therefore warrants 
further analysis in order to understand its capacity for promoting peace.  
The foundations of truth-telling can be derived from the sorts of truths that are brought 
about within this forum. Borer (2006) highlights a range of different truths, as seen in the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, including “factual or forensic truth, 
personal or narrative truth, social truth, and healing and restorative truth” (p.21). In this 
case, we can understand factual truth as knowledge, and narrative truth as 
acknowledgement, both of which are necessary to successful truth telling. Borer (2006) 
highlights the fundamental pillars of truth telling–knowledge and acknowledgement –must 
be carried out by any actor within this process. I will call these ‘personal’ conditions, since 
they apply uniquely to participants within truth telling to the extent that any actor not 
accomplishing such processes significantly affects the success of moral repair via truth 
telling. 
Conversely, Méndez (2006) outlines the requisite conditions for truth telling, yet focuses 
specifically on the demands incumbent upon third parties. These conditions require “some 
initial acceptance that there are facts that require investigation, disclosure, and reckoning” 
(p.142); that “the process has to be fundamentally fair and has to be seen by the public as 
such” (p.142); and lastly that “the result must contribute to a societal knowledge of the 
tragic events of the recent past and that is unassailable, at least in terms of its reflection of 
events” (p.143). The process must also produce “a series of data and analyses that can 
resist the pressures of time and oblivion and stand as a barrier to those who would rewrite 
history by falsifying the record” (p.143). We can therefore say that third parties within 
truth telling, such as those creating or overseeing such forums, must meet these 
conditions. Third party conditions are such because they can be directed from above onto 
the forum of truth telling. 
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Importantly then, there are two sorts of conditions. First, there are those which apply to 
the individuals, or ‘personal’ conditions, within truth telling. These conditions are 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing brought about through personal and narrative truth, as 
well as disseminating knowledge of what happened such that accountability processes can 
be set in motion. And second, there are those conditions that apply to third parties, 
whether wider society or government organisations who seek peace and reconciliation, to 
ensure that truth telling is appropriate, effective, and achieves what it set out to 
accomplish.          
 For the purposes of my argument, only personal conditions will be assessed against 
the abilities of LAWs to fulfil such demands. This is because although third party conditions 
are important to the ultimate utility drawn from truth telling, such conditions continue to 
rely on effective actors within the process in order to bring about the requisite truth, 
regardless of the successful imposition of third party conditions. 
12.2 Truth Telling and LAWs 
In assessing the ability of LAWs to take part in truth telling, one important area is to be able 
to acknowledge ones past wrongs. This concern has been satisfied two fold in the 
aforementioned discussions on forgiveness and reconciliation. The argument that LAWs are 
incapable of this sort of acknowledgment is based upon LAWs being unable to recognise 
the moral weight of their actions, such that being able to carry out a morally permissible 
action is different from both wanting to acknowledge, and understanding why their actions 
possess moral weight. Additionally, it would be technologically expedient from a military 
perspective not to programme this sort of moral awareness, since sufficient 
acknowledgement of ones actions, and a complete awareness of the morality of those 
actions, can lead to ethical dilemmas such as refusing to carry out necessary military 
orders. Furthermore, LAWs themselves lack the ability to ‘acknowledge’ when 
acknowledgement in this sense is considered as personal apology. Internal 
acknowledgement within the truth telling process is not enough, and thus LAWs are 
required to be able to disseminate this acknowledgement in a meaningful way. Since 
humans are expected to do this, it is not unreasonable to require LAWs to do the same, and 
thus is difficult to imagine a human responding similarly to machine acknowledgement 
than they would to human combatants.  
Additionally, knowledge is a key factor to truth-telling (through forensic or factual truth), 
and is also found wanting in LAWs. As Borer (2006) point out; the purpose of knowledge in 
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this process is that it is “important for prosecutions and thus for furthering justice and the 
rule of law” (p.22). Although we may envisage some method of factual truth being derived 
from LAWs in terms of their actions being made public, the possession of such knowledge 
does not serve the ends it should within the forum of truth telling because of the inability 
to hold LAWs responsible for their misdeeds. This is unachievable from an ethical 
perspective since they are not morally responsible agents in the same way humans are, and 
from a practical perspective in that society simply lacks the mechanisms to punish 
machines for wrongful action. In the lack of ability for LAWs to be held accountable, the 
utility of the truth telling process is significantly weakened. As such, it is clear that 
acknowledgement and knowledge, the two pillars of truth telling– and the source of its 
value to peace and moral repair – are unable to be carried out when the actors within truth 
telling are LAWs. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that LAWs could offer a kind of truth telling in the 
form of video feedback and record keeping of actions taken. This would be able to provide, 
at least in theory, an overview of the event and what occurred which could then be relayed 
to victims. In some cases, this would provide far greater factual knowledge within the truth 
telling processes than attempts to recollect factual information from memory. However, 
this sort of truth telling serves a rigid purpose in simply portraying the events themselves 
whilst still being devoid of meaning. Although this could indeed be of some value, it is not 
accompanied by personal accounts of remorse, or reasons why such actions were taken. An 
apology cannot be given alongside these sorts of black and white accounts, and therefore is 
not restorative in the same way humans can be. Such avenues perhaps offer the best hope 
for LAWs to play a role in reparative processes if indeed they possess such features. 
Without attaching meaning to this however, or simply lacking the interplay with victims 
and satisfying their personal needs through exploring the reasons behind such actions, the 
truth telling process which LAWs are privy to achieves only a limited purpose compared to 
equivalent human processes. 
12.3 Truth Telling and Peace 
Given this determination on the relationship between LAWs and their applicability to truth 
telling, it suffices to say that I must now turn to why this is an important conclusion to the 
pursuits of peace – the question being; are truth telling procedures advantageous to 
peace? And similarly, can those benefits be replicated through other means? It will be 
shown that, predominately through the development of justice in truth telling, that such a 
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mechanism is important for the pursuit of peace, but also similarly, that truth telling 
possesses intrinsic value in uncovering truth and therefore is irreplaceable post-conflict. 
Truth telling is important for the pursuits of peace since it is conducive to varying forms of 
justice. Llewellyn (2006) discusses the benefits of truth telling within a framework of 
restorative justice. Since we can acknowledge that truth telling is a restorative process, we 
can understand that “the restoration of relationships is at the heart of justice” (p.100). In 
that respect, we are obligated to focus on processes that encourage the procurement of 
relationships to bring about just and peaceful outcomes. Llewellyn argues that  
“[t]ruth-telling mechanisms, insofar as they are restorative justice 
based, are important not only for what they can offer in terms of 
justice in transitional times but also for what they can contribute 
to ensuring a just and lasting peace beyond the transition” (2006, 
p.101). 
On the same theme of justice, De Grieff (2006) argues that it contributes to the 
establishment and entrenchment of the rule of law. This is “because truth telling can foster 
the development of civic trust, both among citizens and between citizens and intuitions. 
Such trust is both a condition and a consequence of the rule of law” (p.194). Since the rule 
of law is a foundation upon which lasting peace is necessarily built, and an equalizer of 
justice too, processes which lead to the creation of necessary trust conducive to the rule of 
law are therefore fundamental to peace. Truth telling leads to aspects of sustainable peace, 
and firmly establishes the demands of justice between parties.  
Another benefit of truth telling to peace involves its ability to reintegrate estranged groups 
back into society. Becker (2006) highlights that “if truth processes have something to do 
with reintegrating an aggressive and destructive past into the social fabric, then they have 
the potential to contribute to peace” (p.249). In this respect, the benefits of peace rely on a 
type of truth telling mechanism which involves intrinsic elements of moral repair. As such, 
peace arises from a firmly universal approach to the truth telling mechanism insofar as it 
satisfies the necessity of healing divisions between formerly alienated parties.  
Additionally, if met, the conditions of truth telling are conducive to peace too, such that 
acknowledgment and knowledge; “are important in different ways for fostering sustainable 
peace. Knowledge can be important for prosecutions and thus for furthering justice and the 
rule of law. Acknowledgement can contribute to the personal healing of victims. Both are 
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necessary for peace” (Borer, 2006, p.22). Knowledge serves a kind of justice role here, that 
it encourages accountability, whereas acknowledgment is similar to Becker’s (2006) 
contention of healing and reintegrating individuals into society. 
However, truth telling is not only instrumentally valuable to peace, but also valuable in and 
of itself. Méndez (2006) argues that the contingent pursuit of truth is valuable, arguing that 
“[i]t is important to advocate that society must confront its past … and that the pursuit of 
truth should be carried out for its own sake” (p.143). The pursuit of truth therefore, is of 
supreme value to society, and additionally, there is value to be found in confronting the 
past too. Truth telling, as a mechanism for bringing about both, is irreplaceable in terms of 
the function that it serves.        
 Furthermore, truth telling can serve an education function in teaching society 
about justice. Llewellyn (2006) argues that truth telling mechanisms do more than simply 
act restoratively between participants, but equally contribute to a lasting and just peace 
too.  “Through participation in these processes, citizens gain an understanding of, and 
experience in, doing justice (restoratively)” (p.101). This ‘education function’ for future just 
processes and actions highlights the positive utility found within truth telling. 
Therefore, we can acknowledge that truth telling mechanisms are important to the peace 
process, and additionally, that they do more than simply repair the social fabric but also 
present a unique utility. Truth telling mechanisms have a value beyond their role in 
bringing about peace which further emphasises the necessity they play post-conflict, and 
entrenches this specific mechanism within the remit of forgiveness and reconciliation as 
precursors to other ascriptions of securing peace and moral repair. Since truth telling is 
largely a mechanism for those involved in conflict, the fact that LAWs are unable to be 
actors within truth telling has been shown to contradict their ethical obligation to direct 
actions towards peaceful ends as per the dependence approach within jus post bellum.  
Although it appears that truth telling can be accomplished collectively, thus making room 
for LAWs and their human commanders to achieve moral repair as a combined effort, I 
believe it would be unjust to include those implementing LAWs as equally culpable for 
wrongs committed, or even associated to those wrongs in the first place. It is important to 
separate those responsible for wrongs committed within truth telling, as apology on behalf 
of others is in some ways unjust, and in others impractical. 
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 It is unjust to associate the humans which commanded LAWs as culpable in some way with 
the wrongs committed, given the independent and autonomous nature of LAWs 
themselves. Although parents are in some measure responsible for the actions of children 
during their formative years, it would be unreasonable to place responsibility or the 
obligation to devolve truths about actions of their children for which they knew nothing of, 
had no control over, and were only loosely associated with in the first place, especially 
when their child’s degree of autonomy develops into adulthood as is equivalent to LAWs. I 
believe this sort of activity would develop a precedent of robotic weapons that would 
evade responsibility out of convenience, and thereby hold humans responsible for wrongs 
and potential crimes that they had little or nothing to do with.   
 Additionally, warranting collective truth telling with LAWs and their human 
commanders is impractical. For victims, they only receive a partial closure, since the 
meaning behind wrongful acts and trust in the future behaviour of the wrongdoer is not 
restored, given that those involved in the process – the human commanders – possessed 
no control over the wrongful act itself. Additionally, the purpose of accountability and 
justice demands within truth telling are found wanting. By shifting the burden of blame 
onto those who had no control over the actions of LAWs weakens the system of justice, 
and guilt by association (although perhaps legitimate in some cases if the human 
commanders were wrong in their instructions) does little to restore relations between 
victim and wrongdoer as is the purpose of reparative processes. It thus appears that LAWs 
must be, by virtue of their independent and unpredictable nature, the sole responsible 
agent within truth telling. Although human commanders may be able to assist in 
developing factual accounts for the victim by divulging information about the event, the 
lack of personal meaning derived from this process leaves LAWs solely responsible for their 
incompatibility with the mechanism of truth telling. 
12.4 Conclusion 
It has been shown that LAWs are incompatible with the mechanism of truth telling, for the 
principle reason that the conditions– knowledge and acknowledgment – cannot be fulfilled 
by the sort of AI that we expect LAWs to possess. For this process to be worthwhile and 
provide instrumental benefits to the procurement of peace post-conflict, the victims of 
wrongdoing perpetrated by LAWs have to be in receipt of a genuine and clear 
dissemination of truth. LAWs can neither disseminate knowledge of their wrongdoing in a 
meaningful way, nor attach a moral significance to why they would choose or see value in 
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doing so. LAWs equally fail to acknowledge the demands and expectations of their victims 
and meet the individual needs which the dissemination of truth demands, and therefore 
are unfit to participate within the truth telling process.     
 Much like forgiveness and reconciliation previously discussed, this enquiry into the 
relevance of LAWs to truth telling shows that there are additional demands incumbent 
upon perpetrators of wrongdoing post-conflict which require addressing for moral repair 
and the transition to a lasting and sustainable peace.  
Within all three areas of moral repair, it has been shown that the requisite conditions and 
fundamental pillars of each concept are beyond the capacity of LAWs. Collectively, this 
constitutes an argument to highlight the inability of LAWs to fulfil these actions which are 
evidently conducive to peace, and therefore raises serious questions concerning the moral 
suitability of LAWs, since their actions within war cannot be directed towards the ends 
which just war theory demands, nor moral repair in fulfilling reparative duties as 
wrongdoers.  
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Conclusion  
 
The trend to displace human combatants in warfare via technology is underway, evidenced 
in many contemporary conflicts around the world. The development of technology and AI 
has the potential to create weapons of war with greater independence than modern 
weapons, and superior capabilities than humans possess. However, I have attempted to 
argue throughout this paper that we should proceed with caution before employing these 
changes. Too quickly came the onset of nuclear weapons, and too readily we are walking 
into the same unknown with weaponised AI. 
My aim throughout this paper has been to highlight the ways that humans offer unique 
methods to achieving peace – the only justifiable end of war – and present the notion that 
there are discussions that need to take place regarding what we lose in exchange for the 
preventative advantages of LAWs. I answer this question through two broad themes, 
focusing on the role of human action and interaction in the pursuit of peace within war, 
and the role of moral repair after warfare. I have argued that these themes are conducive 
to peace – and in some respects essentially so – and are comprised of various 
manifestations which are currently conducted by humans, yet cannot be replicated by 
LAWs.  
The first set of arguments addressed the way humans respond and relate to each other 
within war; either through past events such as war experience and memory, or through 
physical interaction. I showed that experience of warfare can be positive to our rejection of 
unnecessary suffering and our support for necessary and just wars, and can reform how 
war is conducted to encourage ethical conduct and, indirectly, peace itself. Additionally, I 
show that there is value to be found in fraternization and the mutual recognition of 
humanity which are conducive to a greater degree of ethical conduct and more amicable 
relations existing post war. Lastly, the role of martial virtues is satisfied within conflict 
involving weaponised AI. I discuss the relevance and multi-faceted presence of martial 
virtues, and conclude that although worthy of discussion broadly, it is only mercy which is 
unable to be replicated by LAWs. Since mercy can be a motivator for ethical conduct and 
encourage the presence of humanity between adversaries, the inability to replicate 
outcomes of mercy is equally problematic.  
Therefore LAWs are found to be unable to replicate the recognition of humanity and 
development of beneficial war experience. This is primarily due to the fact that, by and 
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large, the aforementioned actions are a product of our own humanity, and the 
anthropomorphic ability to see the enemy as ourselves. Since this recognition is beyond 
LAWs, we cannot expect these acts to be performed, endowed with the same meaning, 
viewed the same way by the opposing force, or exercised with the same proclivity as these 
actions have and are currently being performed. As such, the important benefits that these 
processes bring to warfare are lost when humans are replaced by LAWs in a variety of 
areas. 
The second set of arguments concern the necessity of moral repair. I show that since much 
of the present literature focuses on institutional and macro-level restructuring (which I 
distinguish as a type of societal repair), the role of moral repair is underestimated in 
establishing a foundation upon which to instantiate societal repair.   
  I found that LAWs are unable to replicate the necessary elements of three areas of 
moral repair – forgiveness, reconciliation, and truth telling. For forgiveness, I show that the 
need for recognition of harm done, the suffering endured, and a commitment to changing 
ones character, are fundamental aspects to forgiveness that LAWs cannot replicate. I also 
highlight that forgiveness is acted in appropriate situations which are consistent with the 
victim’s self-respect (Murphy, 1988), meaning LAWs cannot be forgiven without the victim 
transgressing their own dignity. Furthermore, given the inability of LAWs to be held 
accountable, by lacking moral responsibility or their inability to be morally aware of their 
action for reasons of military necessity, I conclude that LAWs are incapable of being actors 
within reconciliation. I found that the conditions of reconciliation – accountability and 
justice – are essential to moral repair and peace, whilst also being unable to be replicated 
by LAWs. LAWs were equally incompatible with the process of truth telling. Given the 
similar demands to both forgiveness and reconciliation, I find that the plausible conception 
and characteristics of LAWs to be unable to participate meaningfully in this process of 
moral repair – given the need to acknowledge the severity and moral weight of ones 
actions, and disseminate information meaningfully concerning the events of wrongdoing – 
thereby prohibiting the benefits of moral repair to peace that arise via truth telling 
For this reason, the lack of effective forums whereby LAWs as wrongdoers can act is of 
genuine concern, since the absence of closure for victims and renewal of amicable relations 
upon which former enemies can work together signals difficulties for sustainable peace. 
The continued existence of resentment amongst individuals threatens the fragile peace 
secured. 
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The conclusions within this paper contribute to three important areas; to the study of 
artificial intelligence within war and autonomous weapons; to jus post bellum theory and 
the importance of reparative processes; and discussions surrounding preferable 
mechanisms post-conflict.  
Firstly, this paper highlights the way we should approach the discussion of autonomous 
weapons within warfare. The present debate surrounding the permissibility of LAWs 
focuses on the many number of positive attributes that AI brings to the conduct of warfare, 
and particularly on the way they might contribute to the ethicality of future conflicts. 
However, the analysis that I have provided in comparing the relational aspects of peace 
and ethical behaviour amongst human combatants presents an alternative viewpoint to the 
current trend. By assessing LAWs in light of their shortcomings with respect to replicating 
actions that are currently perceived as worthwhile and conducive to peace,  I have shown 
that there is room for more discussion concerning the prospects of what humanity may 
lose by waging war via LAWs. I believe more debate needs to take place concerning the 
way war is fought, and how LAWs fit into the present paradigm. Much focus will need to be 
placed on the role LAWs might be expected to play, so as to act as a compromise between 
the beneficial aspects they bring, but also what we as humans currently possess too.  
The findings within Part Two of this paper will hopefully provide a basis for addressing 
some of the positive benefits of human combatants, and to remind us to act more 
cautiously in replacing means of warfare for the short term benefits of technology. The 
areas which I have touched upon and actively encourage – such as the recognition of 
humanity – appear to be difficult for LAWs and technology more broadly, yet if inculcated 
within human combatants, could present a positive trend towards sustainable peace. It is 
my hope that offering a viewpoint which emphasises the benefits of humans, and their 
ability to relate to those most distanced from themselves, is a lesson which is of paramount 
importance that we must take heed of. No matter the degree to which such acts take place, 
their manifestation is testament to the power of humans to create order out of chaos, and 
as such should not be lightly thrown aside. 
Additionally, this paper presents a fissure that arises between the demands of preventative 
strategies within war and the needs of moral repair. Despite the clear necessity of 
recognising humanity and moral repair to sustainable peace, these avenues must be 
weighed up against the benefits that LAWs bring. The just war tradition has always been a 
preventative theory, aimed at reducing suffering in war. Since LAWs may have the capacity 
A Jus Post Bellum Analysis of Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
108 
 
to prevent suffering far better than humans via greater precision, they are arguably more 
permissible within just war theory than humans. The difficulty is therefore in reconciling 
the need for repair and relationships with preventative advantages. I am tentative in 
proclaiming the impermissibility of LAWs based upon the inadequacy of repair as there are 
benefits, particularly from a utilitarian perspective, that LAWs present. We may say that 
repair is necessary, yet if LAWs generate the need for less moral repair, then this is an 
indirect benefit to concerns regarding repair itself. Although suffering cannot be universally 
abolished in war – thus always leaving the need for repair – it is important to equally 
acknowledge that not all instances of wrongdoing can be repaired either. Although these 
judgments are limited and simplistic in their scope, they do at least highlight the difficulties 
that exist when faced with changes that LAWs bring. 
Until now, prevention and repair can be prioritised and carried out by different actors, with 
prevention via technological or strategical improvements still leaving space for reparative 
duties. Yet in the case of LAWs the same agent is expected to accomplish both. This 
compromise might be accomplished through innovations in post-conflict mechanisms, or 
through a coalition between machines and human combatants being effectively deployed. 
However, such judgements are beyond the scope of this paper. I hope that by raising these 
issues contingent to the development of LAWs, I have at least highlighted the concerns 
which LAWs bring through their inadequacy to accomplish the demands of moral repair.  
Thirdly, through my focus within the realm of jus post bellum, I have consistently 
highlighted the inadequacy of the present literature when dealing with interpersonal and 
smaller-scale elements of moral repair. As I have expressed, much of the literature on jus 
post bellum ignores the demands of moral repair as a post-conflict imperative for 
sustainable peace, and fails to give enough credence to the view that one’s actions within 
war affect the likelihood and methods of achieving peace post-conflict. As such, my 
conclusions on the necessity of moral repair should at the very least serve as a reminder 
that issues arise post-conflict that are smaller in scale than institutional restructuring. The 
purpose of jus post bellum should be similar to the other tenets of just war theory; to act as 
a check on actions and to accommodate the likelihood of securing a just peace. Although I 
do not advocate for policy prescriptions per se, I think more attention needs to be paid to 
the efficacy of moral repair as a basis from which to build societal repair upon, as well as to 
its role in developing sustainable peace in its own right.  
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For now, my aim has been to show that we should not so readily ignore the ways that 
human actors can uniquely achieve peace, and by the same token, generate sustainable 
peace inter-relationally. Through a unique approach to autonomous weapons by focusing 
on their contribution to peace, this paper has highlighted the benefits of human behaviour 
and interaction, and whether LAWs can replicate such avenues. Although focused on 
narrow areas that are individually linked to peace, this paper has shown that despite the 
superior capabilities that LAWs possess over human combatants in a range of areas, it is 
the products of relational processes that cannot be so easily replicated. As such, we must 
collectively find ways to preserve such avenues, or at the very least ensure that we 
continue to acknowledge the horrors and suffering of war at a distance. At the very least, 
we may be able to decide before it is too late whether the outcomes of human action 
within war – both good and bad – are something we wish to see displaced. 
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AI    Artificial Intelligence 
IHL    International Humanitarian Law 
LAW    Lethal Autonomous Weapon 
LOAC    Law of Armed Conflict 
ROE    Rules of Engagement 
UAV    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
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